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Abstract 
Seven experiments determined whether young children‟s comprehension of 
aspectuality, when acquired, was robust enough to cope with demands and variations to the 
task. Four to 5-year-olds were able to choose whether to look or feel to find out information 
about a hidden item that was identifiable by sight or touch (Experiments 2 & 7). However, 
they had difficulty when the test question did not directly refer to a perceptual aspect of the 
target item (Experiment 7). Four to 6-year-olds coped well with irrelevant verbal 
descriptions of the items included in the test question (Experiments 2 & 3). Five and 6-
year-old‟s performed well whether the target had to be discovered or located (Experiment 
1) but had difficulty when irrelevant partially differentiating information was included in 
the array of items (Experiments 3 & 4) and when they received verbal pre-trial experience 
of the items (Experiments 5 & 6). In conclusion, children depended on their recall of their 
pre-trial experience of the items, even when it was unnecessary to do so. They had 
difficulty recognizing the relevance of verbal information and problems recalling it. Hence, 
their understanding of sources of knowledge is limited until at least 7 years of age.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Do you know where your car keys are? Yes? How do you know? Maybe you know 
that your keys are in your bag because you remember putting them in there earlier today. 
Or maybe you know they are in your bag because you can see them poking out, even if you 
cannot recall actually placing them there. Knowing that you know something and 
understanding how you have come to know it are important skills that enable us to 
comprehend our world. They are metacognitive abilities, in that they entail thinking about 
what we know. When we think about our knowledge states we show awareness of the 
cognitive processes involved (Flavell, 1976, 1979). This level of thinking allows us to 
actively process the knowledge that we possess: We are able to evaluate it, justify it and 
disregard it, if required (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991).  
In our day-to-day lives we demonstrate our awareness of our knowledge states. We 
evaluate what we know by assessing where it has come from. We consider the source of 
our knowledge to justify its validity or establish its unreliability. For example, imagine a 
friend asks you to meet them in a café. You know where you have to meet them because 
they gave you directions and you trust that they were correct. You believe the source of 
your knowledge. In contrast, if a stranger had given you directions to this café, you may not 
be confident about this source of information and may check that they were correct. Hence, 
we alter the way we behave depending on our evaluation of our knowledge sources (Tardif, 
Wellman, Fung, Liu, & Fang, 2005).  
Young children are constantly being told or shown new pieces of information, for 
example, how a toy works, or where an item has been placed. Once children are in 
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possession of this information, they may simply accept what they have just learned. On the 
other hand, they may judge whether or not they should believe it. Children may make these 
judgements for many reasons: They must understand whether or not they should trust the 
sources of their knowledge, so they can learn to function effectively in the world (Perner, 
1991); They need to be able to assess the truth of what they have been told, so they can 
learn from other people‟s experiences (e.g., Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999; 
Robinson, Haigh, & Nurmsoo, 2008); They need to understand that knowledge is based on 
evidence, as this is important for justification of validity and scientific thinking (e.g., 
Pillow, Hill, Boyce, & Stein, 2000); They need to be able to judge whether or not others 
share their knowledge, as this forms the basis for most social interactions (e.g., Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
It seems, therefore, that young children‟s ability to understand the sources of their 
knowledge is important for the development of both their cognitive and social functions 
(e.g., Gopnik & Graf, 1988). Prior research reflects this significance. Over the past twenty-
five years, researchers have investigated the relationship between young children‟s 
understanding of sources of knowledge and other cognitive abilities such as Theory of 
Mind (ToM), memory, and language (see Naito, 2003; Perner & Ruffman, 1995, for 
examples). Previous studies have also tracked the development of young children‟s 
understanding of knowledge sources. For example, research has found that while 3-year-
olds show limited comprehension of where their knowledge has come from (e.g., O‟Neill & 
Gopnik, 1991), by the ages of 5 or 6 years young children have the ability to assess both 
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how knowledge has been acquired and how it can be gained in the future (e.g., O‟Neill, 
Astington, & Flavell, 1992). 
Nevertheless, much of young children‟s understanding of the importance of 
knowledge sources remains unexplored. For example, we know little about how robust their 
comprehension actually is. Once they show understanding of where their knowledge has 
come from are they then able to cope well with different formats, presentations, or 
variations in those sources? Once they grasp the concept of how they can gain knowledge is 
their understanding complete, or are they vulnerable to unexpected demands, changes, or 
contexts?  The focus of this thesis is this: the limits of young children‟s understanding of 
sources of knowledge. 
The following literature review will evaluate the research that has been carried out 
on 3 to 7-year-old children‟s understanding of sources of knowledge and related areas. 
Initially the review will explore how understanding sources of knowledge is associated with 
the broader metacognitive abilities linked with possession of a ToM. This will be followed 
by reviews of the literature investigating: how young children come to understand the 
meaning of knowledge; their comprehension of the link between perception and knowledge 
states; their ability to reflect on how knowledge has been acquired; and their active use of 
knowledge. The final section will focus on the development of aspectuality: how young 
children come to understand the necessary perceptual action to find out specific knowledge 
from a source.  
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1. Theory of Mind and Sources of Knowledge 
Someone is said to possess a ToM if they are able to attribute mental states to 
themselves and others (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For example, you have a ToM if you 
understand that another person may not be thinking about the same thing that you are 
(Marvin, Greenberg, & Mossler, 1976). Research into the development of ToM in young 
children has tended to focus on mental states such as beliefs, knowledge, desires and 
intentions (Flavell, 2000). The aims of this type of research are to discover what young 
children understand about mental states and how much they understand about the causal 
links between these mental states, perception, and behaviour. The interest here is how 
someone with a ToM must understand whether possession of knowledge exists and what 
justification there is for that knowledge state. A summary of the tasks that tend to be used 
to assess ToM will now follow. 
ToM is rooted in the idea that young children are egocentric (e.g., Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956). In other words, young children have difficulty in imagining perspectives 
other than their own; they tend to be biased towards their own point of view. Therefore, 
ToM in children tends to be assessed by asking them first, what they are thinking, and 
second, what another person might be thinking (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For 
example, in a “deceptive box" task, 3 to 5-year-old children are shown a “Smarties” box 
(Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987). They are asked what they think is inside the box and 
they tend to reply that it contains Smarties. The experimenter then opens the box and 
demonstrates that there are actually pencils inside. The box is closed and (crucially) 
children are asked what another child would think it contained if they now entered the 
room. Most 4 and 5-year-olds pass this task and realise that a child entering the room will 
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think what they had originally thought; that the box contained Smarties. However, most 3-
year-olds state that a child entering the room will know that the box contains pencils. These 
3-year-olds do not see the situation from another‟s perspective; they act as though the other 
child has their knowledge state. They do not evaluate the evidence for the other child‟s 
knowledge state. They do not realise that the other child does not know what they know 
(the true contents of the box). 
Young children‟s understanding of ToM is also often assessed with a “false belief” 
task. False belief refers to the understanding that others can have beliefs about the world 
that are incorrect. The false belief task indicates a robust ToM and an understanding of the 
need for evidence to support knowledge (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). The classic false 
belief “unexpected transfer” task, designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983), involves a child 
observing two dolls (Sally and Anne) playing with a marble. The dolls put the marble into a 
box, then Sally leaves while Anne stays with the box. While Sally is away Anne moves the 
marble from the box to a basket. When Sally returns the child is asked where she (Sally) 
will look for her marble. To pass the task the child must state that Sally will look for the 
marble where she left it (in the box) and not where it actually is (in the basket). Until the 
age of 4 years children have difficulty with this task. They do not evaluate the evidence for 
Sally‟s knowledge state. They do not realise that she does not know what they know (the 
true location of the marble). 
One difficulty with ToM tasks is that very young children often lack the ability to 
understand verbal instructions and offer verbal responses. When verbal responses are 
unsuitable, preferential looking times can be taken as a measure of interest and 
understanding. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) devised a non-verbal unexpected transfer 
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task in which 15-month-old infants watched a sequence of events unfold. They watched an 
actor looking at a toy being placed in a box.  The toy was then transferred to another box 
without the actor seeing. The task then required the actor to retrieve the toy. The infants 
looked longer when the actor behaved unexpectedly. In other words, when the actor 
reached for the box where the toy actually was, rather than the box where she had seen the 
toy being placed, it attracted the infant‟s attention. This demonstrated that the infants had 
awareness of the actor‟s knowledge state, even though it was different from their own. 
They understood where the actor should look (based on her knowledge state), and noticed 
when her behaviour did not reflect that knowledge state. 
Young children‟s non-verbal responses to false belief tasks have also been 
examined by Clements and Perner (1994) and Garnham and Ruffman (2001). Although the 
2 to 3-year-olds they tested gave incorrect verbal responses to the task (they said that the 
actor would look for the item in its new location), their eye gaze indicated otherwise (that 
the actor would look for the item in its old location). This anticipatory looking behaviour 
suggested that children did realise that the actor‟s belief was different to theirs, but had 
difficulty verbalising that understanding. Their explicit response was different to their 
implicit response. In other words, they showed implicit understanding of belief. 
 So, existing research has assessed young children‟s explicit and implicit 
understanding of ToM. However, regardless of what is being assessed, both types of 
understanding rely on the understanding of sources of knowledge. In order to understand 
what another person (or doll) believes, young children must think about the cause of that 
belief. They must evaluate the evidence for, and source of, that knowledge. This is how 
understanding sources of knowledge can be related to possession of a ToM. Indeed, Burr 
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and Hofer (2002) suggest that tasks assessing understanding of sources of knowledge were 
devised to find out why children who fail the false belief task did not seem to think about 
the other person‟s perspective. In tasks investigating understanding of sources of 
knowledge young children have to evaluate what knowledge they or others possess or need, 
and what perceptual access they and others have had, or could have (e.g., Gopnik & Graf, 
1988; O‟Neill et al., 1992; O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991).  
Children begin accurately (and explicitly) reporting the sources of their knowledge 
from 3 to 4 years of age (e.g., Gopnik & Graf, 1988), around the same time as they can pass 
explicit ToM tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Their ToM ability appears to be 
dependent on their capacity to understand sources of knowledge. This is because in order to 
understand what someone else might be thinking, you have to realise why they might have 
that belief. For example, in order to understand that Sally will think that the marble is 
where she left it, you have to realise that she did not see it being moved (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). Children need not only to be aware of other people‟s sources of knowledge, 
but they also have to understand how these sources form evidence and justification for 
knowledge states. From this, it seems that understanding sources of knowledge is not only 
associated with possession of ToM, but may be a precursor for ToM.  
Understanding sources of knowledge and possessing a ToM are also associated with 
other developments in young children‟s cognitive abilities. Perner (1990, 1991, 2000) 
suggests that episodic memory development is associated with children‟s ability to assess 
mental states. Episodic memory requires children to recall their experiences as having been 
personally experienced (knowing how you know) and is distinct from semantic memory 
which just requires knowing facts (knowing that you know) (Tulving, 1983, 1985). If 
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young children must re-experience an event in order to realise how they know something, 
they must be simultaneously considering the source of their knowledge (Perner, 1990). 
Therefore, understanding sources of knowledge may not only be important for the 
acquisition of a ToM but may also be dependent on episodic memory development (e.g., 
Perner & Ruffman, 1995).  
In summary, the evidence presented so far suggests that young children‟s 
metacognitive abilities, specifically their possession of ToM, is related to their 
understanding of where knowledge comes from and their ability to evaluate this 
knowledge. To be able to understand sources of knowledge, young children must 
understand what constitutes knowledge itself. The next section of this literature review will 
focus on young children‟s comprehension of the meaning of knowledge.  
 
2. Understanding the Meaning of Knowledge 
How do young children come to understand what it means to “know” something? 
Perner (1991) proposed three facets of knowledge that must be comprehended before 
children can be said to have an understanding of knowledge states. First, they must realise 
that knowledge is associated with truth. For example, you can only “know” that an egg box 
contains eggs if the box actually does contain eggs and not something else. Second, 
children must comprehend that knowledge can be “proved” by acting successfully. For 
example, you can prove that you know which of three boxes contains eggs by opening the 
appropriate box and showing that there are eggs inside.  
Nevertheless, not all realms of knowledge can be proved by such direct action. For 
example, we “know” that historical events have taken place because we have read about 
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them, not because we have taken part in them. In this way, we trust the authors of the 
historical texts that we read. We realise the significance of the evidence they present and 
accept it as a substitution of direct personal proof. Consequently, Perner‟s (1991) third facet 
of knowledge concerns such verification of facts; young children must understand that 
knowledge must be supported by evidence. For example, that you will only know that the 
box actually contains eggs if you look, or if you are informed by a reliable source of 
knowledge.  
At around 3 years of age, young children understand the first two aspects of 
knowledge, but it is only later that they understand the significance of sources of 
knowledge (Perner, 1991). In other words, 3-year-olds do not realise that knowledge is 
dependent on evidence. Instead, they believe that successful behaviour is a sign of having 
knowledge. For example, imagine someone choosing correctly the box that contains the 
eggs. Three-year-olds do not consider whether that person had based their decision on an 
accurate source of knowledge (e.g., they had been told which one to pick), or because they 
had no evidence (e.g., they made a lucky guess). They do not consider whether the person 
knew what was in the box because they had seen it, or someone had told them, or if they 
had no evidence at all and had chosen that box at random. Three-year-old children are only 
concerned with the fact that the person had successfully found the eggs. 
According to Perner (1991), therefore, young children initially have a behavioural 
theory of knowledge. They believe that knowledge is demonstrated by successful action. 
This behavioural theory of knowledge has been supported by several pieces of research that 
show young children associating knowledge with success, rather than evidence. For 
example, 3-year-olds tend to attribute prior knowledge to a person who has found a hidden 
Introduction 
10 
 
item by guessing (e.g., Johnson & Wellman, 1980). Young children also tend to view their 
own knowledge differently, depending on whether it is based on their physical behaviour, 
or not. For example, 4 and 5-year-olds admitted that they had learned new information 
when that information was behavioural (i.e., an action), but incorrectly stated that they had 
possessed prior knowledge of the new information when it was factual (Esbensen, Taylor, 
& Stoess, 1997). They acted as though only behavioural knowledge was important.  
Young children‟s understanding of the false belief paradigm also seems associated 
with the behavioural theory of knowledge (Perner, 1991). As mentioned previously, false 
belief is typically demonstrated by asking children what someone else, who does not share 
their own knowledge state, is thinking (see Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Astington and 
Pelletier (1996) showed that children who passed false belief tasks (where they had to 
attribute an incorrect belief to another) referred to teaching as "telling". In other words, 
these children understood teaching as passing on knowledge verbally. However, children 
under 4 years of age who could not pass false belief tasks referred to teaching as 
"showing"; in this case, teaching was associated with action. Emphasis on behavioural 
knowledge acquisition is also evident in children‟s performance on second order false 
belief tasks, where they have to explain what someone else, who does not share another‟s 
knowledge state, is thinking. For example, 5-year-olds were found to have difficulty 
distinguishing between the behavioural action that caused a situation and someone‟s belief 
about it (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002).  
So far, this review has covered young children‟s understanding of what the mental 
state of “knowing” means, but do young children understand what the word “know” 
actually signifies? They may use the word freely but not comprehend its true meaning. 
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They may not realise that it refers to such a definite mental state and this could be why they 
confuse it with other less certain terms. Several researchers have investigated young 
children‟s understanding of mental state words. For example, Moore, Bryant, and Furrow 
(1989) examined 3 to 8-year-olds ability to distinguish between the terms “knowing”, 
“thinking”, and “guessing”. A piece of candy was hidden in one of two boxes and two 
monkeys „informed‟ children of its location. One monkey would state that it knew where 
the candy was hidden, while the other would say that it could guess where it was, or that it 
thought the candy was in a particular box (or different combinations of the terms knowing, 
guessing and thinking). The results showed that 4-year-olds could differentiate between 
knowing, thinking and guessing; they successfully picked the box indicted by the most 
definite term. They showed more confidence in the monkey who knew than the monkey 
who guessed, and in the monkey who knew than the monkey who thought, but realised that 
guessing and thinking were equivalent. These findings indicate that 4-year-olds have 
awareness of the certainty of these knowledge state descriptions.   
Other research suggests that it is not until at least 5 years of age, that young children 
understand the difference between knowledge and other mental states such as guessing. For 
example, Johnson and Wellman (1980) proposed that young children do not understand that 
knowledge requires evidence because they are unable to say how they have come to possess 
information. In their study, an item was hidden in one of two boxes. Four to 9-year-olds 
were either: shown where the item was before the boxes were closed; could see where the 
item was because of clear windows in one side of the boxes; or had no idea in which box 
the item was hidden. Children were then asked which box the item was hidden in and had 
to justify their choice. Until the age of 6 years, children had difficulty reporting whether 
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they had remembered, had known, or had guessed the location of the item. They were 
confused about the source of their knowledge. They did not seem to understand that 
knowing and remembering are based on evidence, but that guessing is not.  
A similar task was carried out where children either saw an item being hidden in 
one of three boxes, or did not see it (Miscione, Marvin, O‟Brien, & Greenberg, 1978). 
Children were asked to choose the box that was hiding the item. Children were then asked, 
before and after the items location was revealed, whether they had known or guessed where 
it was. After 5 years of age children were able to distinguish the differences between 
knowing and guessing. However, children between the ages of 4 and 5 years were more 
likely to base their responses on the outcome of the task, supporting Perner‟s (1991) 
behavioural theory of knowledge. For example, if children were shown that they had 
chosen the correct box, they were more likely to say that they had known where the item 
was, even if they had not seen the item being hidden and must have been guessing 
(Miscione et al., 1978). Even when they had accidentally been successful, children 
reasoned that they had known where the item was all along. 
 In summary, young children gradually come to comprehend the meaning of 
knowledge both as a mental state and as a mental state term. Understanding sources of 
knowledge appears to be a final acquisition in the development of understanding what 
knowledge means. Young children treat knowledge as something that is true and as 
something that can be proven, before they comprehend that it must also be justified by 
evidence (Perner, 1991). Young children initially believe that successful outcomes indicate 
possession of knowledge, before they understand the significance of evidence. However, 
understanding that knowledge requires evidence is not a straightforward process. Evidence 
Introduction 
13 
 
can take several forms; it can be direct, through perceptual contact, or it can be indirect, 
through inference. The next section will summarise young children‟s understanding of 
perceptual access as a source of knowledge. 
 
3. Understanding the Link Between Knowledge and Perception 
As adults we understand that we can gain knowledge through the information 
transmitted by our senses. We realise that perception leads to knowledge, for example, that 
looking leads to knowledge of colour, whereas knowledge of weight can be gained by 
touching. We also comprehend that if we know that something is true we must have either 
had direct perceptual experience of it, or we trust the information we have been given from 
an indirect source. For example, you might know that my pet dog is black because you have 
seen it with your own eyes, or I might have shown you a photo of it, or told you its colour. 
On the other hand, you may have inferred that it is a black dog because of a clue; I might 
have mentioned that my dog‟s hair does not show up on my black coat.  
At first, however, young children‟s understanding of the link between perception 
and knowledge is more limited. They do not realise that knowledge can be gained through a 
variety of perceptual sources. Rather, young children initially believe that seeing equals 
knowing (Dretske, 1969). Wimmer, Hogrefe, and Sodian (1988) suggest that when children 
have to assess someone‟s knowledge of an item, all they consider is whether or not that 
person has had visual contact with that item. If the person has seen the item, then the child 
attributes knowledge to them, if they have not, then the child believes them to be ignorant. 
For example, 3 and 4-year-olds attributed knowledge to someone who had seen a hidden 
item, but ignorance to someone who had had no direct perceptual contact, but had been told 
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of its identity (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1993). The children did not understand that, in both cases, knowledge 
would have been acquired. 
Some studies have shown, however, that young children do not always rigidly 
follow the seeing equals knowing rule. They sometimes fail to attribute knowledge to 
someone who has looked. For example, Friedman, Griffin, Brownell, and Winner (2003) 
suggested that if children believed that seeing equals knowing then they would attribute 
knowledge in a “true belief” task. However, they found that 3 to 5-year-olds denied that a 
puppet would know where a toy had been hidden, despite having observed the puppet 
clearly ”seeing” the toy be placed in its original location and then moved to its final 
location. The children did not equate the puppet‟s visual access with knowledge: they 
behaved as if no “rule” exists between perceptual access and knowledge. To Friedman et al. 
(2003) this is just one demonstration of the fragility of young children‟s understanding of 
knowledge states.  
Even if children do believe the seeing equals knowing rule, this does not necessarily 
mean that they understand exactly what can be learned from looking at an item. They may 
not grasp that seeing does not always lead to the acquisition of knowledge. Taylor (1988) 
suggests that while 4-year-olds realise that others may not know what they know (Level 1 
conceptual perspective taking), it is not until several years later that they comprehend that 
seeing a small part of an item may not be enough to allow it to be identified (Level 2 
conceptual perspective taking). For example, 5 to 7-year-olds maintained that they could 
successfully identify a picture, when in fact they had seen only a tiny, uninformative 
section of it (Robinson & Robinson, 1982). In this case, the children acted as though any 
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type of visual contact was enough to provide full knowledge of the mainly hidden item. 
However, such overestimation of knowledge by children of this age is not unusual: they 
tend to misjudge what information they can acquire from other perceptual actions too. For 
example, they overestimate the knowledge that can be gained from ambiguous verbal 
information (e.g., Beck & Robinson, 2001).  
Young children‟s tendency to overestimate knowledge acquisition and believe that 
seeing equals knowing implies that, at first, they do not understand indirect knowledge 
sources, such as inference. Evidence does suggest that understanding inference is a later 
acquisition than understanding more direct sources of knowledge. For example, Sodian and 
Wimmer (1987) carried out an experiment where children observed an actor looking at a 
container of identical balls.  Out of sight of the actor one of these balls was then transferred 
to a bag. However, 4-year-olds refused to believe that the actor would know the colour of 
the ball in the bag. The children did not understand that because the actor knew that the ball 
had been taken from the container, he would be able to infer its colour. Being able to use 
inference as a source of knowledge is a valuable skill and yet Pillow, Hill, Boyce, and Stein 
(2000) among others, propose that it may not be until 8 years of age that children develop 
this ability.  
The seeing equals knowing rule also implies that young children base knowledge 
only on visual access and may not believe that other perceptual experiences (e.g., feeling) 
are reliable sources of knowledge. O‟Neill and Chong (2001) examined 3 and 4-year-olds‟ 
understanding of what knowledge could be gained from all five senses. In one of their 
studies children had to say how they had found out a particular perceptual property (e.g., a 
smell or a taste) and indicate the appropriate sensory organ on a toy. For example, smelling 
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a bottle of bubble bath and pointing to the nose of a Mr Potato Head doll, rather than his 
eyes, ears, mouth, or hands. O‟Neill and Chong‟s (2001) results indicated that young 
children suffer a general misunderstanding concerning the link between perceptual 
modalities and consequent knowledge, rather than behaving as though one type of 
perceptual act is best. 
While young children‟s understanding of every perceptual action has been 
investigated, only certain types of access tend to be used when their understanding of 
sources of knowledge is being studied. These are seeing, feeling, and hearing. O‟Neill and 
Gopnik (1991) support using these particular perceptual modalities because seeing and 
telling are important sources of knowledge from early in a child‟s life. They also suggest 
that from 3 years of age children seem to be able to reflect effectively on tactile 
experiences. For example, they perform well in appearance-reality tasks and perspective 
taking tasks involving tactile appearances (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1989). It is also 
possible that testing young children‟s understanding of taste and smell presents more 
methodological difficulties. For example, it is not always easy, or appropriate, to encourage 
young children to taste liquids that are unknown to them (O‟Neill & Chong, 2001).  
The three perceptual modalities of seeing, feeling, and hearing are not necessarily 
treated as equivalent sources of knowledge by young children. Biases towards particular 
modalities have often been found. For example, 4 to 9-year-olds frequently overestimated 
the amount of knowledge that they could acquire from looking (Robinson, Thomas, Parton, 
& Nye, 1997). However, despite the seeing equals knowing rule, children do not always 
show biases towards the visual mode of access. In one case, Flavell, Green, and Flavell 
(1989) found that the children they tested believed that feeling would give them all the 
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perceptual information they needed (e.g., they acted as though feeling would inform them 
about an item‟s colour). Yet O‟Neill and Gopnik (1991) did not find this bias towards 
feeling with a similar task. On the other hand, O‟Neill et al. (1992) showed that young 
children prefer to feel when they are trying to find out information, but when assessing 
what others might know, they act as though those that are looking will gain more 
knowledge. 
There is no explanation in the existing literature as to why young children show 
biases towards particular modalities when their understanding of sources of knowledge is 
tested. However, such preferences do appear to indicate a misunderstanding of the type of 
knowledge that can be gained by specific modes of access. As such, comparing children‟s 
understanding of at least two perceptual actions provides additional information about the 
limits of their comprehension of the knowledge that can be gained from different sources.    
In summary, from around the age of 3 years children have some understanding 
(albeit with limitations) that perceptual access is important as a source of knowledge. 
However, children do not understand that knowledge can be gained through indirect 
sources, such as inference, until they reach 7 or 8 years of age. Realising that somebody 
possesses knowledge because of the perceptual experience they have had is an important 
development in understanding mental states. To comprehend what perceptual action had led 
to knowledge, young children have to be able to reflect back upon the source of that 
knowledge. The next section will summarise the research that has explored young 
children‟s understanding of how knowledge has been gained. 
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4. Reflections About Sources of Knowledge 
This literature review has so far shown how young children‟s understanding of 
beliefs is associated with, and possibly relies upon, their understanding of knowledge 
sources. To comprehend why someone has a particular belief, young children must be able 
to reflect on the source of that person‟s knowledge. Also, in order to understand their own 
knowledge state, young children must be able to reflect on the source of their own 
knowledge. They must also realise when they do not possess knowledge and be able to 
reflect upon their lack of evidence as the cause for this knowledge state. Several researchers 
have investigated young children‟s ability to reflect upon sources of knowledge and say 
how information has, or has not, been gained. However, the literature offers a fairly 
inconclusive answer as to when young children fully understand this reflective process.  
Some research has suggested that children might find it easier to judge the source of 
someone else‟s knowledge, rather than their own, because they are not distracted by 
performing the physical actions involved in such experiments (O‟Neill et al., 2002). 
Therefore, children are often asked whether others are in possession of knowledge, and 
asked to justify this knowledge state. For example, Pillow (1989) asked 3-year-old children 
to say whether a doll that had looked in a box or a doll that had touched a box would know 
the colour of the toy inside. These children were able to say that only the doll who had 
looked would know the toy‟s colour. However, other researchers disagree and suggest that 
3-year-olds have difficulty assessing what others know. Some of these studies have 
compared young children‟s ability to reflect on their own knowledge source with their 
ability to reflect on the source of someone else‟s knowledge. For example, Wimmer, 
Hogrefe, and Perner (1988) told or showed one child the contents of a box. Another child 
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either shared the access or did not. The first child was asked whether they knew what was 
in the box and whether the other child knew what was in the box. Children aged 3 years had 
difficulty with the second part of this question. They were able to correctly say that they 
knew the contents of the box, but they could not correctly judge whether the other child 
knew or not. This happened even when the two children had shared the access, for example, 
when they had both looked into the box at the same time. Wimmer et al. (1988) concluded 
that 3-year-olds are able to assess their own knowledge states, but they cannot judge 
another person‟s beliefs on the basis of their access to sources of knowledge.  
So, young children may be able to reflect upon their own knowledge states before 
they can reflect upon the knowledge states of others. It is likely that this is why the majority 
of the research investigating sources of knowledge has focused on this ability. However, 
rather than just asking children whether they possess knowledge (e.g., “do you know?”) 
(Wimmer et al., 1988) other researchers have asked children how they have come to be in 
possession of knowledge (e.g., “how do you know?”). For example, in Gopnik and Graf‟s 
(1988) study children were shown, told, or inferred from a clue, the contents of a drawer. 
Children were asked how they knew what was in the drawer with a forced choice question, 
for example, “how do you know...did you see it, did I tell you about it, or did you figure it 
out from a clue?” Three-year-olds performed above what would be expected by chance at 
this task, although they did find it more difficult than the 4 and 5-year-olds tested.  
In contrast, other research suggests that children around 3 years of age have 
difficulty saying how they have gained knowledge (e.g., O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991; 
Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). In O‟Neill and Gopnik‟s (1991) tasks, 3, 4, and 5-year-olds 
found out about an item that was hidden in a toy tunnel by seeing it, feeling it, or being told 
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about it. They were asked to state what was in the tunnel and how they knew. Three-year-
olds had difficulty with this task even after they had received training in identifying sources 
of information. O‟Neill and Gopnik (1991) pointed out that children could have succeeded 
at the task by referring back to the event that had just taken place when answering the “how 
do you know?” question. They could have succeeded, even if they had no understanding of 
the significance of the evidence, by just recalling what perceptual action had just taken 
place. They could have just recalled looking, touching, or listening. However, the children 
did not do this. They seemed to treat the question “how do you know?” as something that 
they just could not answer. 
It seems from the extant research, therefore, that while 3-year-olds can say if they 
know something, only when they reach around 4 years of age can they can consistently say 
how they know something (O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). It 
also seems that young children can find it easier to judge their own knowledge states, than 
assess the knowledge states of others (Wimmer et al., 1988). Nevertheless, Pratt and Bryant 
(1990) have proposed that 3-year-olds must understand that knowledge can be gained by 
looking; in themselves and in others. This is because looking and knowledge are linked 
from a very young age: Even 1-year-old infants will follow an adult‟s gaze and attend to the 
same item in the environment (Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Pratt and Bryant (1990) also 
suggest that if a 3-year-old does not understand that information can be gained by looking, 
then looking at a picture book with a parent would be pointless as it would not allow shared 
conversation about the images.  
To support their theory, Pratt and Bryant‟s (1990) research set out to show that 
difficult question phrasings were the cause of Wimmer et al.‟s (1988) findings and that 3-
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year-old children did understand that looking would lead to knowledge in another person, 
and not just themselves. Pratt and Bryant (1990) repeated Wimmer et al.‟s (1988) 
experiments but simplified their test question. For example, Pratt and Bryant asked children 
“who knows what is in the box?” (p.976) rather than “Does.....know what is in the box or 
does she (he) not know that?” (Wimmer et al., 1988, p.388).  
Pratt and Bryant‟s (1990) results showed that 3-year-olds could assess the 
knowledge of another when that knowledge was different from their own (also supporting 
Pillow‟s 1989 research). These 3-year-olds were able to do this when they were active 
participants in the task and when they were just observers. Altering the phrasing of the 
question allowed these children to perform well on this task and suggests that young 
children may be vulnerable to methodological differences in sources of knowledge tasks. 
This is a matter that will be broached later in this thesis; the influence of procedural 
differences on young children‟s performance. 
To recap, the literature suggests that at around 3 years of age young children can say 
how they, or others, have gained information. They are able to reflect back on the 
perceptual access that afforded them, or others, knowledge. Children of this age are able to 
understand whether knowledge has been gained. However, they cannot consistently say 
how knowledge has been gained until they reach around 4 years of age. According to 
Perner (1991) this means that these 4-year-old children are starting to have an 
understanding of the third and final stage of knowledge: they understand that knowledge 
must be supported by evidence.  
Being able to say how you found something out is not the only way of 
demonstrating an understanding of sources of knowledge. You also need to understand 
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what source you must use if you want to find out knowledge. For example, you may realise 
that you know the colour of an item because you looked at it, but you also need to 
understand that if you want to find out the colour then you need to look at it. In other words, 
to comprehend that knowledge must be supported by evidence you must be able to reflect 
upon how that evidence gave you knowledge, and realise what evidence you need in order 
to gain knowledge. The following section will discuss how this ability to use sources of 
knowledge to gain information has been investigated in the existing literature. 
 
5. Active Use of Sources of Knowledge 
This review so far has shown that from the age of 3 years, young children are 
beginning to have the ability to say whether they know something and how they have come 
to know it. Both abilities require children to reflect upon their knowledge states. As such, 
the tasks that assess this understanding tend to require children to observe or participate in 
an activity (e.g., hiding toys in boxes) and then answer questions about the information that 
has been gained through this action. However, reflection is not the only way to assess 
knowledge states. Flavell (2000) proposed that a possible difference between children‟s and 
adults‟ understanding of knowledge is that adults have an unprompted awareness of their 
own and other‟s mental states and spontaneously use this ability. For example, if an adult 
wants to find something of a particular colour then she will look: there is no need to 
consider any other perceptual access. This suggests that assessing young children‟s active 
use of sources of knowledge may be more revealing than asking them to reflect on their 
knowledge. It may be more informative to ask them how they want to find out, than ask 
them what they know, or how they came to know it.  
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It seems then, that most sources of knowledge tasks assess children‟s ability to 
reflect on how they know something rather than their understanding of how to gain 
knowledge (Robinson, Haigh, & Pendle, 2008). This limitation does not only restrict what 
we know about children‟s active use of sources of knowledge. It is also possible that such 
reflective procedures do not accurately assess children‟s understanding of knowledge 
states. As mentioned previously, children could succeed at tasks that ask them how 
knowledge has been acquired by repeating the action that has just taken place, rather than 
really understanding the importance of specific perceptual access as evidence for 
knowledge states (O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991).  
Young children‟s “working understanding” of sources of knowledge has therefore 
been investigated (Robinson, Haigh, & Pendle, 2008). In a tunnel they hid one of a pair of 
toys that were distinguishable only by feeling, seeing part, or seeing the entire toy. Three to 
5-year-olds were asked to find out which toy was hidden. They were allowed to look at or 
feel the toy when it was hidden but the identity of the toy was not always apparent from 
their mode of perceptual access. However, the children were allowed to carry out additional 
perceptual access if they wanted to. For example, if they felt the toy in the tunnel and 
realised that this mode of access did not allow them to identify it, they could choose to look 
at it. Robinson, Haigh, and Pendle (2008) found that 3 to 4-year-old children were good at 
knowing when they needed additional perceptual access, but could not always predict what 
type of perceptual access was necessary. In other words, they realised when they did not 
know enough, but did not necessarily understand how to gain that extra knowledge. 
Other researchers have investigated young children‟s ability to say what perceptual 
access they would need to take to find out particular information. Perner (1991) called these 
Introduction 
24 
 
“aspectuality tests” as children were required to determine what action to take to find out a 
specific aspect of a hidden item. For example, O‟Neill et al. (1992) asked 3 to 5-year-old 
children whether they or a puppet would need to feel or see a hidden item to find out, for 
example, its colour. Their results suggest that 3 and 4-year-olds have difficulty in 
understanding which perceptual access will lead to which form of perceptual knowledge. 
While other studies assessing young children‟s understanding of aspectuality have taken 
slightly different formats, they have shown the same results. For example, Pillow (1993) 
ran experiments where an item was hidden in one of three containers and children had to 
choose the correct perceptual access to find out where it was hidden (e.g., they had to 
decide whether to look or feel). He also found that 3 and 4-year-olds did not seem to 
understand the modality specific aspects of knowledge. They did not know how to find the 
hidden item. 
In summary, young children understand whether they know something and how 
they have found out that knowledge, before they have the understanding of how to gain 
knowledge. While both rely on understanding the importance of evidence, there is a 
distinction between reflection on knowledge (knowing how you know something) and 
prediction of knowledge (knowing how to find out something). Children aged around 3 
years of age are able to correctly reflect on the source of their knowledge, but children 
under 5 years of age cannot understand which perceptual access will allow them to gain 
knowledge (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Pillow, 1993). The next section will focus on the 
development of this latter ability: young children‟s understanding of aspectuality.  
 
 
Introduction 
25 
 
6. The Development of Aspectuality Understanding 
Understanding which perceptual action will lead to a specific kind of knowledge is 
known as aspectuality (Perner, 1991). Knowing what action you need to take to find 
something out is a useful ability which can affect later behaviour. For example, as adults 
we know that picking up a suitcase will inform us about its weight and this knowledge will 
determine whether we walk to the train station or get a taxi. Looking at the suitcase may 
inform us about its size, but will not tell us whether it is heavy or light. In this situation, 
looking would not be useful but feeling would give us the information we need. 
For young children to comprehend aspectuality they must understand that a 
particular form of perceptual access will only lead to certain types of knowledge. For 
example, that looking will lead to knowledge of colour but not of weight. As such, it is the 
realisation of the limitations of perceptual actions that signify an understanding of 
aspectuality. There are two main theories concerning the development of aspectuality 
understanding in young children and both involve progression through stages of realisation 
of the importance of sources of knowledge. These theories will now be described in turn. 
First, Perner (1991) suggested that young children progress through various stages 
of understanding the concept of knowledge before they can comprehend aspectuality. 
Children initially have a behavioural theory of knowledge at around 4 years of age, where 
knowing is governed by success (as described earlier). They then move on to a 
representational theory of knowledge after 4 or 5 years of age. This representational theory 
means that children can think about how they have gained knowledge because they can 
represent the acquisitions. Once children can represent how knowledge was gained, they 
can then use the representations to understand how knowledge can be gained. The 
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representations of knowledge are acquired, interpreted, and then actively used. In other 
words, possessing a representational theory of knowledge allows children to consider how 
knowledge is formed; they understand the importance of evidence in justifying knowledge 
and governing behaviour. Once they understand how knowledge is formed, young children 
can re-experience events and use that experience to influence their future actions. They then 
have an understanding of aspectuality (Perner, 1991).  
In the second theory, O‟Neill et al. (1992) also suggest that children progress 
through stages of understanding sources of knowledge. These stages culminate in a mature 
comprehension of aspectuality. During the first of these stages, at around 3 years of age, 
children understand something about knowledge. As previously stated, they are generally 
able to understand the difference between knowing and guessing and therefore show some 
understanding of what it means to be in possession of knowledge. They also understand 
that perceptual access to a hidden item will lead to knowledge about that item and that a 
lack of perceptual access will not lead to knowledge. For example, that a person looking at 
a toy inside a tunnel will be able to identify it, but a person resting his hand on the outside 
of the tunnel, will not (e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990).  
During the second stage of understanding the link between perception and 
knowledge, 4 to 5-year-old children start to recognise the causal relationship between 
perceptual action and consequent knowledge (O‟Neill et al., 1992). As discussed earlier, 
these children are able to say how they, or others, found out a piece of information: they are 
able to monitor the source of their knowledge. In other words, they are able to reflect on 
and state, what specific perceptual action, carried out in the past, led to the acquisition of a 
piece of knowledge (e.g., Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O‟Neill & Gopnik, 1991).  
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The statements and reasons that children give, when reflecting on the sources of 
their knowledge, reveal that they understand the causal link between perception and 
knowledge (e.g., Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Sodian, 1988). 
For example, a 3-year-old child asked to justify a puppet‟s lack of visual knowledge 
pointed out that the removal of a blindfold would have let “him” know the items colour 
(O‟Neill et al., 1992). However, while 4 to 5-year-olds might be able say how they had 
found something out, O‟Neill et al. (1992) argue that they cannot yet correctly choose what 
perceptual action is necessary in order for them to gain specific knowledge. That is, 4 and 
5-year-olds show retrospective comprehension in that they can remember and explain what 
previous action led to knowledge (e.g., understanding that you know the colour because 
you looked), but they cannot yet choose what future action is needed to gain knowledge 
(e.g., understanding that you have to look if you want to find out the colour).  
Only at the third and final stage of understanding, at around 5 to 6 years of age, do 
children develop the ability to choose correctly which perceptual action is necessary to 
obtain knowledge (O‟Neill et al., 1992). This third stage of understanding is based on the 
realisation that knowledge must be supported by evidence and, more specifically, that 
different evidence supports different types of knowledge (O‟Neill et al., 1992). For 
example, realising that if you want to know an item‟s colour it is necessary to gain specific 
evidence from visual access and that other forms of perceptual access will not give you the 
information you need.  
To summarise, Perner‟s (1991) theory suggests that at around 3 years of age, young 
children posses a behavioural theory of knowledge and do not understand aspectuality; they 
base the acquisition of knowledge on successful outcomes. Once young children possess a 
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representational theory of knowledge (at around 4 years of age) they begin to understand 
that evidence is necessary for knowledge acquisition. They then realise the modality 
specific aspects of knowledge and start to understand aspectuality (at around 4 or 5 years of 
age). O‟Neill et al.‟s (1992) theory suggests that at around 3 years of age young children 
understand only that perceptual acts lead to knowledge. At around 4 to 5 years of age they 
are able to reflect on how knowledge has been gained and understand the perceptual 
evidence behind such information. Finally, at 5 or 6 years of age, young children 
understand how to use particular perceptual access to gain specific aspects of knowledge; 
they have a mature understanding of aspectuality (at least as far as looking and feeling are 
concerned).  
The two theories covered here propose that young children develop an 
understanding of aspectuality somewhere between the ages of 4 to 6 years. However, they 
do not enlighten us about how robust young children‟s understanding is, once it has 
developed. They do not suggest how young children‟s understanding of aspectuality might 
have limitations. This is the focus of the current research. 
 
7. The Current Research 
Most of the existing aspectuality literature has centred on the development of young 
children‟s understanding. Researchers have suggested the ages at which young children can 
succeed at these tasks (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner, 1991). They have also proposed 
how the development of this understanding might relate to other metacognitive abilities 
(e.g., Naito, 2003; Perner & Ruffman, 1995). On occasion, research has demonstrated that 
children are vulnerable to procedural changes, and shown that younger children than 
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expected can perform well at the tasks (e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990). Also, researchers have 
noted that sometimes children seemed to have difficulty with particular instructions during 
the tasks (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992). These factors have never been fully explained and 
suggest that while children might be able to succeed at these tasks their understanding may 
be less than robust. However, the robustness of young children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality has never been investigated. We do not know whether, when young children 
can succeed at aspectuality tasks, they really understand the modality specific aspects of 
knowledge; whether their understanding is robust enough to withstand variations and 
irrelevances; or if we can genuinely say that they understand aspectuality. The current 
research sought to correct this. 
In the seven experiments of this thesis, the robustness of young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality was investigated. Children within the age range of 4 to 7 
years were tested. They were given tasks including experimental manipulations that 
someone with a robust understanding would have had no difficulty with. In the present 
research, “robust” refers to an understanding that is able to function, without any problems, 
under a broad range of conditions. Manipulations were created that would test the 
robustness of children‟s understanding through a variety of conditions; in the context of 
presentation; the question phrasing; the item description and the pre-trial experience. 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to discover whether children could use their 
understanding of aspectuality in different situational contexts; by identifying a single 
hidden item and by locating a hidden item among many. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 
investigated children‟s ability to recognise and ignore irrelevant information that was 
included in the task. Experiments 5 and 6 sought clarity concerning the influence of pre-
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trial experience of the items on children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks. Finally, 
Experiment 7 explored how different ways of referring to test items might affect children‟s 
understanding.   
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CHAPTER 2 – THE EFFECT OF SITUATIONAL CONTEXT ON YOUNG 
CHILDREN‟S UNDERSTANDING OF ASPECTUALITY: DISCOVERY VERSUS 
LOCATION  
 
If you want to find something of a particular colour the best action to take is to look. 
This is true across various situational contexts. For example, if you wanted to locate a blue 
shirt that you own, then it would make sense to look through the clothes hanging in your 
wardrobe until you found it. You would realise that using another form of perceptual 
access, such as feeling, would not be the best way to find this item. It is best to look if you 
want to find something that is blue. Equally, if you wanted to check what colour shirt you 
had packed in your overnight suitcase, you would realise that the best action to take would 
be to have a look. It is best to look if you want to discover whether or not something is 
blue. 
These examples demonstrate that, as adults, we understand that we need to use 
particular types of perceptual access to find out specific perceptual information. They also 
show that we can use this knowledge in different contextual situations: to find one item 
among many (one blue shirt in a wardrobe containing several shirts of different colours) 
and to discover a feature of an individual item (the colour of a shirt in a suitcase). This 
ability allows us to function effectively in the world, proficiently using our understanding 
of aspectuality: the link between perceptual access and the subsequent knowledge that can 
be gained (Perner, 1991). However, it is possible that young children might find it harder to 
locate an item than to discover information about one, or vice versa, although these tasks 
have never been directly compared. It is possible that the two tasks require different 
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cognitive abilities: finding out what something is and finding out where something is. The 
current research aimed to clarify whether young children could use their understanding of 
aspectuality to gain information in two such distinct contextual situations. 
An understanding of aspectuality requires the ability to predict the correct 
perceptual access necessary to determine a specific perceptual property (O‟Neill et al., 
1992). For example, the ability to know that you will need to look if you want to find out 
the colour of something and the ability to recognise that other perceptual actions will not 
give you the information that you need. When young children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality is investigated, a particular experimental procedure tends to be followed. For 
example, children are given two items that are the same in one modality (e.g., colour) and 
different in another (e.g., tactile quality) (see for example, Perner & Ruffman, 1995; 
Robinson et al., 1997). Children are encouraged to look at and feel these items and they 
also have these similarities and differences pointed out to them by the experimenter. One of 
these items is then hidden in a container or tunnel that allows separate visual and tactile 
access. Finally, the children have to decide whether they (or others) would need to look or 
feel in order to discover which item has been hidden.  
It is not clear whether this task is really assessing a robust understanding of 
aspectuality. As suggested above, a robust understanding would require the ability to cope 
with variation. Therefore, it would require not only an ability to determine what perceptual 
action is necessary to find out the perceptual qualities of a single hidden item (what will be 
referred to as a discovery task). It would also require the ability to determine what 
perceptual action is necessary to find a single hidden item amongst many (what will be 
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referred to as a location task). For example, someone with a robust understanding would be 
able to discover the colour of a single pencil in a pencil case, as well as locate a particular 
coloured pencil in a case full of different coloured pencils. Someone with a robust 
understanding of aspectuality would have little difficulty with either task: regardless of 
whether they needed to discover information about the item or locate the item, they would 
realise that colour is determined by looking. They would understand that other perceptual 
actions would not be of any help.  
In Pillow‟s (1993) first experiment children also had to discover information about a 
single hidden item. However, in his following three experiments more than one item was 
hidden and children had to locate the target rather than discover something about it. In these 
location studies children were given three items that shared a similar aspect but differed in 
another (e.g., they felt the same but were all different colours). They also received 
descriptions of the items by the experimenter. All three items were then hidden: one in each 
of three containers, all allowing separate perceptual access (e.g., the opportunity to put a 
hand in and feel the contents without seeing the contents and vice versa). Children were 
asked to find out which of the three containers was hiding a specific item and had to decide 
the correct action for themselves or puppets to take (e.g., looking or feeling). In other 
words, they were asked to choose the correct perceptual action to locate a particular item. 
The aim of Pillow‟s (1993) location studies, however, was not to find out if children 
found this task more difficult than a standard discovery version of the aspectuality task. 
Rather, the aim was to compare children‟s ability to predict the correct perceptual access 
for themselves to take, with their ability to predict the correct access for a puppet to take. 
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Consequently, little research has been carried out to investigate young children‟s ability to 
choose the correct perceptual access to locate a specific item and none has compared 
children‟s performance between location and discovery tasks. 
  
1. Experiment 1 – A comparison of young children‟s performance on discovery and 
location versions of aspectuality tasks 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to compare these two different types of aspectuality 
procedures (discovery and location) and establish whether young children find the tasks of 
differing difficulty. This would then add to the existing literature on the development of 
their understanding of aspectuality. Three possible outcomes were predicted.  First, children 
could find it easier to locate an item among many (location task) than discover information 
about a single hidden item (discovery task). This suggestion is based on the experience that 
children have of the items before they are hidden and while they are hidden. To elaborate, 
Perner and Ruffman (1995) proposed that the amount of links the child has to make 
between their initial experience of the items in an aspectuality task and their final 
experience of those items, may affect their performance in the task. They suggest that the 
fewer links a child has to make between the items and the necessary differentiating 
perceptual action, the better their performance. This can be interpreted to suggest that if 
children have to re-evaluate their initial experience of the items, they have to think about 
them in a different way. If they have to expend extra cognitive effort considering these 
items this could have a detrimental effect on their final decision making ability. 
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The discovery and location tasks in the current experiment vary in the amount of 
links that need to be made between the initial experience and the final experience. In the 
location task the number of items that children initially experience and the number that they 
finally experience do not alter. Children initially experience two items and then still have to 
consider those two items when asked to locate one of them. No additional links need to be 
made. Therefore, no additional cognitive effort is required. In the discovery version of the 
task, however, the children initially experience two items, but then have to consider which 
one has been hidden. The number of items being considered alters and an extra link is 
needed. Children first consider two items, and then have to re-evaluate that initial 
experience when one item is removed. An additional link is made and additional cognitive 
effort is required. Therefore, Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) hypothesis could suggest that 
children would perform worse on the discovery task, as the extra cognitive effort required 
to form this additional link would affect their performance.  
The second possible outcome is that children may find the location task harder than 
the discovery task. They may find it more difficult to compare two hidden items in the 
location version of the task, than deal with a single hidden item in the discovery version of 
the task. Evidence from the sources of knowledge literature suggests that young children 
might have difficulty carrying out comparisons. For example, O‟Neill et al., (1992) showed 
that 3 to 5-years-olds found it harder to compare two puppets‟ knowledge states than 
consider each one separately. Pillow‟s (1993) results also offer some support for this 
hypothesis. For example, in his first study 4-year-olds performed significantly better than 
would be expected by chance at choosing what action a puppet should take to discover 
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information about a single hidden item. Nevertheless, in his second study 4-year-olds were 
no better than chance at choosing the action themselves or a puppet should take to locate 
one item among three that were hidden. However, the comparison between these two task 
types was not direct and the designs of the studies varied in other ways, so it is unclear 
whether children found one task harder than the other.  
Research from the visual perception literature also suggests that the location task 
would be harder. This is because in visual perception tasks location has priority over 
discovery of identity (e.g., Sagi & Julesz, 1985). For example, participants were quicker at 
identifying a target when they knew its location among four items presented on a screen, 
than locating a target among the four items when they knew which one they were looking 
for (Logan, 1975). In other words, if you know where something is, you do not have to 
spend time thinking about its location and you just have to say which one it is as soon as 
that information becomes apparent. In contrast, it is more effortful to think about where a 
target might be, even when you know what you are looking for. When applied to the 
current research, this argument suggests that children would be more successful at the 
discovery task. They would know the item‟s location (it would be the one that was hidden) 
and would just have to discover which one it was (e.g., the red one or the blue one). 
However, in the location task children would know which item had been hidden (e.g., the 
red one) but they would not know its location. 
The third possible outcome is that children perform just as well on the discovery 
task as the location task. This would suggest that their understanding of aspectuality is 
robust, at least in the context of choosing the correct perceptual action to discover or locate 
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a hidden item. It would demonstrate that their understanding of aspectuality is strong 
enough to withstand variation in the method of presentation. It would suggest that young 
children do not expend more cognitive effort forming extra links between their initial and 
final experiences of the items, as implied by Perner and Ruffman (1995). It would suggest 
that they do not find it harder to compare two items than consider one, as implied by 
O‟Neill et al. (1992) and Pillow (1993). 
Previous experiments carried out by O‟Neill et al. (1992) and Perner and Ruffman 
(1995) suggest that children cannot succeed at aspectuality tasks until they are at least 5 
years of age. Therefore, Experiment 1 assessed the performance of 5 and 6-year-olds on 
both the discovery and location versions of an aspectuality task.  
1.1 Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two children participated from a school serving a predominately working 
class population in Leeds, U.K.  Thirty-six 5-year-olds (24 girls) participated. Their ages 
ranged from 5 years and 2 months (5;2) to 6 years and 1 month (6;1) with a mean age of 5 
years and 7 months. Thirty-six 6-year-olds (range 6;2 to 7;1, mean 6 years and 7 months; 
19 girls) also participated. They were all reported by their teachers as possessing a good 
understanding of English.  Ethnicity was distributed as follows: White (45), Asian (12), 
Black (5) and other (10). 
Materials 
The materials consisted of five balls, two tunnels, an opaque bag and an opaque 
cloth. The balls were approximately 7 cm in diameter and were used as the test items. One 
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ball was green, two balls were red, and two were blue. The green ball was filled with 
polystyrene beads and felt like a bean bag. One of each of the red and blue balls were filled 
with cotton wool and felt soft. The other red and blue balls were filled with solid plaster 
and felt hard. The fillings fitted inside thin foam layers within outer fabric covers, so that 
balls that were the same colour and had different fillings were indistinguishable by sight. 
The balls were kept in the bag when not in use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two identical grey tunnels measuring approximately 30 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm were 
used to hide the balls (see Figure 1). The tunnels were identical, with 5 cm diameter holes 
cut in their 10 cm x 10 cm ends and “hook and loop” patches that allowed the tunnels to be 
securely stacked on top of each other. On one end of each tunnel the holes were covered 
Hole  
for feeling 
through 
that 
prevents 
glimpses 
of inside 
Cloth flaps to hide 
hole and window 
Door used by experimenter to 
insert and remove items from 
back of tunnel 
Figure 1 
 
Example of a tunnel used to hide the balls. 
 
Plastic 
covered 
window for 
looking 
through 
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with clear plastic, forming windows that could be looked through to see inside. On the 
other end of each tunnel the holes were covered by pieces of black felt with two diagonal 
slits cut into them, so that a child‟s hand could pass through. Black felt squares were 
attached at the top of the outside of the ends of the tunnels, so that the windows and 
feeling-holes were covered with flaps of felt that had to be lifted up in order to look in or 
put a hand in. Each tunnel also had a door on the back panel that could be opened by the 
experimenter, through which the balls were inserted and removed. The cloth was used to 
hide the movements of the balls, both their positioning in the tunnels and their transfer from 
the bag.  
Design 
Every child was familiarised with the equipment and then received eight 
experimental trials: four location trials and four discovery trials. The order of trials was 
counterbalanced, but to help keep the task simple for children and to allow checks for order 
effects, half the children were given their location trials before their discovery trials and the 
other half received their discovery trials first. Two of each of the discovery and location 
trials required looking to succeed and two of each required feeling to succeed. Children 
were assigned in turn to one of two orders of trial presentations based on their teacher‟s 
class list. The trial orders were as follows: (i) Look, Feel, Feel, Look, Feel, Look, Look, 
Feel (LFFLFLLF), (ii) FLLFLFFL. The colour or feel of the target item and its position in 
the tunnels in the location trials (top or bottom tunnel) was counterbalanced. The question 
order was alternated between children so that half were asked if they wanted to “look or 
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feel” to discover or locate the target in each of their trials and the remainder if they wanted 
to “feel or look”.1 
Procedure 
Familiarisation. Children were tested individually in a quiet room while sat at a 
table opposite the experimenter.
2
 Children were shown the bag, and then were told that it 
contained some balls and that they were going to play a game with them. A tunnel was 
placed on the table and the children were informed that a ball would be put inside. The 
experimenter took the green ball from the bag and placed it inside the tunnel through the 
back door (under the cloth so that the children could not see). The experimenter then 
pointed to the appropriate end of the tunnel and explained that on one end of the tunnel, 
under the flap, there was a window that would let them see which ball was inside. To check 
that they understood how to carry out the correct procedure, the children were asked to lift 
the flap, look inside, and say the colour of the ball. They were then informed that the ball 
was being removed from the tunnel and another one inserted (to convey that no ball was 
left in the tunnel between trials) although under the cloth the same ball was actually 
reinserted. The experimenter then pointed to the other end of the tunnel and repeated the 
procedure with the tactile access point: Children were asked to lift the flap, put their hand 
inside the tunnel and say what the ball felt like.  
The experimenter explained that for every go of the game they would have to decide 
whether they wanted to look or feel to find something out about a ball that was hidden in a 
tunnel. It was emphasised that they would only be allowed to carry out one of the actions. 
                                                 
1
 Counterbalancing of question order, modality of target, and location of target was the same for all 
subsequent experiments. 
2
 This was the same for all subsequent experiments. 
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As a check of their understanding of the difference between the two modes of access, the 
children were then asked which side of the tunnel they would use if they wanted to look 
inside and which side they would use if they wanted to feel inside.  
Main trials. The two tasks were designed to be as similar as possible apart from the 
necessary differences regarding the number of items that were hidden. For the discovery 
trials an aspectuality task used by O‟Neill et al. (1992) was adapted. Children were initially 
presented with two items that both looked the same and felt different, or vice versa. One of 
the items was then hidden in a tunnel while the other was removed. For the discovery trial 
test question children were asked whether they needed to look or feel to find out about the 
hidden item (e.g., to find out if it was the blue one). 
For the location task an aspectuality task used by Pillow (1993) was adapted. In his 
task children were presented with three items that shared one perceptual property but 
differed in another. In Pillow‟s study all of the items were then hidden, one in each of three 
containers. In the current experiment‟s location task two items were hidden in two tunnels. 
For the location trial test question children were asked what perceptual access was needed 
to locate one of the items (e.g., find the blue one).  
At the beginning of each trial the children were handed the two balls that were 
going to be used in that trial and asked to, “look at them properly and feel them properly”. 
This was done while the experimenter pointed out the perceptual attributes of each ball in 
turn, for example, “this one is red and soft”. The experimenter then retrieved the balls. The 
movements of the balls into the tunnel(s) and bag took place underneath the cloth so that 
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the children could not see which ball was placed where. Once the balls were in place the 
test question was asked.  
In the discovery trials the children were told that one of the balls would be hidden in 
a tunnel and the other one would be put back in the bag. For two of the discovery trials the 
test question matched the ball that was hidden, for the other two trials it did not. For 
example, if the red ball was hidden the matching question was, “find out if it‟s the red one”, 
whereas the non-matching question was, “find out if it‟s the blue one”. This was so that 
children did not always have to confirm that it was the target ball that had been hidden. 
Children were asked if they wanted to look or feel (using their allocated question order). In 
the location trials the children were told that both of the balls would be hidden, one in each 
of two tunnels. In the location trials the children were asked to find out which tunnel 
contained, for example, “the red one” by choosing to look or feel (using their allocated 
question order).  
The children‟s responses were noted and they carried out their chosen action. They 
were then asked to indicate to the experimenter which tunnel they thought contained the 
target item (location) or whether it was the target item (discovery). They were not permitted 
to carry out the alternative action. The children were then given the ball that had been 
hidden in the discover trials and the ball that they had chosen in the location trials. 
However, the experimenter offered no correction or feedback. After the ball was retrieved 
from the child the next trial was started. When children changed over from one trial type to 
another, they were told that the next game would be slightly different and that either an 
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extra tunnel would be needed or that just one tunnel would be needed. Children were 
rewarded at the end of their trials with a sticker. 
1.2 Results 
Scoring 
All children named the colour and feel of the ball hidden in the familiarisation 
procedure and passed the familiarisation check (which side of the tunnel allowed looking 
and which side allowed feeling). Therefore, all 72 children took part in the main 
experiment. For the main trials children were given a score of 1 for each correct perceptual 
action chosen in each trial and 0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 1).  
Analysis 
The presentation orders in Experiment 1 had been counterbalanced but analysis was 
also carried out to ensure that no order effects had influenced children‟s performance. 
Independent sample t tests showed that children who had received the “look or feel” 
question order (M = 5.73, SD = 2.09) performed no differently to those who had received 
the “feel or look” question order (M = 6.41, SD = 1.13), t(70) = -1.66, p = .101, r = .19. 
Children‟s performance was not affected by either of the two trial orders (lowest p = .28).3 
Children who had received the discovery trials before the location trials (M = 5.75, SD = 
1.99) performed no differently to those who had received them in the reverse order (M = 
6.31, SD = 1.45), t(70) = -1.35, p = .18, r = .16.  
 
                                                 
3
 The statistical analysis of trial orders is not reported in the remainder of this thesis.  
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Table 1 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 1 
  
Age 
 
Task Type 
 
 
 
Number of trials correct  
 
 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
5-year-olds Discovery (n=36) 1 4 7 12 12 2.83 (1.11)*** 
 Location (n=36) 1 4 11 11 9 2.64 (1.07)*** 
6-year-olds Discovery (n=36) 0 2 2 10 22 3.44 (.84)*** 
 Location (n=36) 1 2 6 8 18 3.14 (1.07)*** 
 
Expected frequencies if 
performance were at chance 
(n=36) 
2.25 9 13.5 9 2.25 2 
 
N.B. Performance significantly different than would be expected by chance is indicated 
throughout this thesis by * (p < .05), ** (p < .01), *** (p < .001) and ns = not significant. 
Frequencies for looking and feeling trials for all experiments are displayed in cross 
tabulation format in the appendix of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out with age (5-
year-olds and 6-year-olds) as a between-subject factor and task type (discovery and 
location) and modality (looking trials and feeling trials) as within-subject factors. A main 
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effect of age was found, F(1, 70) = 7.95, p = .006, ²p = .10, where 6-year-olds (M = 6.58, 
SD = 1.65) performed better than 5-year-olds (M = 5.47, SD = 1.70). There was no effect 
for task type or modality, nor were there any interactions (highest F = 3.17, lowest p = .08, 
indicating that modality was approaching significance as performance on feeling trials was 
slightly better than performance on looking trials).  
While there was no difference in children‟s performance on the discovery and 
location tasks, a Pearson‟s correlation was conducted to find out if there was a linear 
relationship between the two tasks. The correlation on the discovery and location tasks was 
significant for 6-year-olds, r = .47, p = .004, but not for 5-year-olds, r = .21, p = .21. These 
results suggest a tendency for younger children to succeed at the discovery task before the 
location task. 
Analysis was also carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
If their performance was better on the later trials than on the earlier trials children may have 
been learning from their mistakes. No difference between the two times would show that 
children who initially choose the wrong mode of access did not realise their error and later 
correct it. Paired-sample t tests showed that in the discovery task children performed no 
differently in their first two trials (M = 1.64, SD = .61) to their last two trials (M = 1.50, SD 
= .71), t(71) = 1.40, p = .17, r = .16. Also in the location task children performed no 
differently in their first two trials (M = 1.40, SD = .73) to their last two trials (M = 1.47, SD 
= .67), t(71) = -.71, p = .48, r = .08. 
Finally, analysis was carried out to discover whether children were guessing, or 
whether some of them were performing well and some were performing poorly. Pearson‟s 
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Chi-square tests allowed comparisons of the goodness of fit between individual children‟s 
performance and the values expected if they were performing at chance. The interest here 
(and in the other experiments in this thesis) was whether individual children were getting 
more trials correct than would be expected by chance. The analysis of the Chi-square tests 
showed that 5-year-olds performed better than would be expected by chance in the 
discovery task, 2 (4, N = 36) = 49.85, p < .001 and in the location task, 2 (4, N = 36) = 
24.63, p < .001. Six-year-olds also performed better than would be expected by chance in 
the discovery task, 2 (4, N = 36) = 190.96, p < .001 and in the location task, 2 (4, N = 36) 
= 120.56, p < .001. 
1.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 assessed whether young children‟s understanding of aspectuality was 
robust enough to deal with choosing whether to look or feel to gain perceptual information 
in different contexts. This was done by comparing their ability to choose the correct 
perceptual action to discover information about and locate hidden items. Five and 6-year-
olds performed well at both tasks, although 6-year-olds were overall more successful than 
5-year-olds. These findings will now be discussed in more detail, specifically how they 
relate to the existing aspectuality literature and the three possible outcomes considered in 
the introduction to this experiment. 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that children performed no different on the 
location task to the discovery task. They also performed well above chance levels, although 
they were not correct on all their trials. This supports O‟Neill et al.‟s (1992) suggestion that 
by the ages of 5 or 6 years, children show an understanding of aspectuality. The current 
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findings also demonstrate that children of this age have a robust enough understanding of 
aspectuality to be able to deal with these two different situational contexts. They realised 
that it did not matter whether they had to discover information about a hidden item or locate 
a hidden item, if they wanted to find out colour they chose to look, and if they wanted to 
find out tactile information they chose to feel.  
Perner and Ruffman (1995) proposed that children‟s performance on aspectuality 
tasks was dependent on the number of links that children have to make from their initial 
contact with the items to their final consideration of the items. This was interpreted to 
suggest that based on the cognitive effort required, children would find the location task 
easier. This was because children would have to consider two items in the familiarisation 
procedure before the task and two items in the task itself. Therefore, they would not have to 
think about the items in any different way when they were asked the test question. In the 
discovery task, however, children would consider the two items in the familiarisation 
procedure and then one item in the task itself. In this case they would have to consider that 
one of the items was hidden, thus adding an extra step in their reasoning processes before 
they answered the test question. However, the results of Experiment 1 showed that children 
did not find the discovery task any harder than the location task. This suggests that in the 
final stage of the aspectuality task children do not find it any more effortful to consider two 
items than to consider one item.  
In contrast, research carried out by O‟Neill et al. (1992) and Pillow (1993) 
suggested that young children might have more difficulty with a location version of the 
aspectuality task. O‟Neill et al. (1992) implied that it may be more difficult for children to 
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compare two things than consider them in turn and Pillow‟s (1993) data suggested that 
young children might find an aspectuality task easier if they have to consider only one 
hidden item. Also, the visual search literature (e.g., Logan, 1975) implied that identification 
is less effortful than location, and this was interpreted to suggest that children might find 
the location task more difficult. However, the results of Experiment 1 showed that neither 5 
nor 6-year-olds found the location task any harder than the discovery task. In fact, 6-year-
old‟s performance on the two tasks was highly correlated suggesting that a strong 
dependence exists between them. 
What must be considered is that Pillow‟s (1993) location tasks were carried out with 
children no older than 4 years of age. In the current experiment 5-year-olds were tested and 
performed above chance levels, but the findings showed a slight decrease in their 
performance on the location task. Their performance on the two task types did not correlate 
and suggested that they had a tendency to be able to succeed at the discovery task before 
they could succeed at the location task. It is possible that the younger the child is, the 
harder they will find the location task. However, Pillow‟s (1993) 4-year-old‟s performance 
was no better than would be expected by chance and, as stated previously, the discovery 
and location tasks were not directly studied or compared. If future research compared 4-
year-old‟s performance on these two tasks it may reveal whether young children can 
succeed on the discovery task before the location task. 
In summary, Experiment 1 aimed to find out whether young children had the ability 
to understand what perceptual access they needed to find out particular perceptual 
information. More specifically the intention was to discover whether children were able to 
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understand aspectuality regardless of whether they had to discover information about a 
hidden item or locate a hidden item. This was based on the assumption that someone with a 
robust understanding of aspectuality would have no difficulty with either task. The 
suggestion was that if young children performed well at both of these tasks, then their 
comprehension of aspectuality could be described as robust and that this would support 
some of the extant literature (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992). The findings from Experiment 1 
showed that 5 and 6-year-olds performed equally well on both tasks. Young children did 
not have any difficulty dealing with different contextual presentations of aspectuality tasks. 
This provides a valuable addition to the field of study, increasing the possibilities for 
manipulation of method and design in experiments assessing young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality. The following experiments have made use of these findings 
by using either discovery or location tasks according to experimental design requirements. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE ROBUSTNESS OF YOUNG CHILDREN‟S 
UNDERSTANDING OF ASPECTUALITY: IGNORING IRRELEVANT 
INFORMATION 
 
The study referred to here as Experiment 4 has been published as: Waters, G. M., & 
Beck, S. R. (2009). The development and robustness of young children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 103, 108-114. 
 
The previous experiment showed that young children were able to choose correctly 
whether to look or feel to either discover information about a hidden item or locate a hidden 
item. The conclusion was that in this area, at least, 5 and 6-year-old children seemed to 
have robust understanding of aspectuality. They understood which perceptual access would 
lead to a specific piece of knowledge, regardless of the situational context. However, 
possessing a robust understanding of aspectuality means more than just knowing how to 
locate or discover information about a hidden item. The aim in the following three 
experiments was to establish further the robustness of young children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality. This was done by assessing their ability to recognise that irrelevant 
information included in the task would not be useful to them. 
An understanding of aspectuality, as defined by O‟Neill et al. (1992) requires 
comprehension of how an item is made up of many separate factors, each of which can be 
identified by different perceptual actions. When it is clear what type of perceptual access 
will lead to specific perceptual information, no difficulty should be experienced. For 
example, someone with a robust understanding of aspectuality will always comprehend that 
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looking is the best way to find out the colour of something. Evidence suggests that when 
someone is skilled in a task, the presence of irrelevant information offers no distraction 
(e.g., Haider & Frensch, 1999). So, one would expect that someone with a robust 
understanding of aspectuality would be able to ignore irrelevant information regarding 
other perceptual qualities.  
For example, imagine several cans of soda on a table. If told to find out which one 
was half-full, an adult (with a robust understanding of aspectuality) would pick up each in 
turn rather than examine the different labels on the cans. How the cans looked would be 
irrelevant. Looking would not give the information required. Similarly, if told to identify a 
can of a particular brand of soda, a robust thinker about aspectuality would visually 
examine each can rather than base her decision on how each can felt. This time how the 
cans felt would be irrelevant: feeling would not give the information required. One way to 
examine the robustness of young children‟s understanding of aspectuality is to include 
irrelevant information in the task and assess their ability to disregard it. 
Evidence suggests that young children can show quite advanced understanding of 
how to deal with irrelevant information. For example, children as young as 3 years of age 
are able to select information that is relevant and ignore information that is irrelevant in 
visual search tasks (e.g., Sophian & Wellman, 1980). However, young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality has never been tested in terms of whether they can 
differentiate relevant and irrelevant information. If they possess a robust understanding of 
aspectuality, then they should be able to deal with situations where an aspectuality task 
contains additional, but irrelevant information. They should realise that the irrelevant 
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information can be disregarded. However, a more fledgling understanding may be upset by 
the introduction of irrelevant information. 
The following three experiments used an adapted version of a location aspectuality 
task used by Pillow (1993). In his task, children had to choose the correct perceptual access 
needed to locate one of three hidden items. Using multiple items in this way in the current 
experiment allowed different types of manipulation to take place, with regard to the 
inclusion of irrelevant information. A version of the task as used by O‟Neill et al. (1992), 
where one item was hidden and information about it had to be discovered, would not have 
allowed such manipulations to take place.  
The first experiment of this chapter (Experiment 2) aimed to clarify whether 4 to 5-
year-olds could pass an aspectuality task. Although many researchers (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 
1992; Perner & Ruffman, 1995) had suggested that children of this age might have 
difficulty with this task, the findings from Experiment 1 suggested otherwise. The 5 and 6-
year-olds tested in Experiment 1 performed well above what would be expected by chance 
so it was possible that 4 to 5-year-olds could be correct on a significant proportion of trials. 
Experiment 2 also aimed to assess the robustness of children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality by introducing an irrelevant piece of information to the test question. In the 
aspectuality literature the test question usually referred to either the identity of the object 
(e.g., “which one is it”), or just referred to the differentiating modality (e.g., “is it the red 
one”) (but see Experiment 7 for further investigations concerning the phrasing of the test 
question). In Experiment 2 the manipulation that was introduced meant that both the 
perceptual modalities of the target were stated in the test question, including the modality 
that offered no differentiation of the target from the other items. For example, children were 
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asked to find „the red heavy one‟ when both items were heavy and differed only in colour. 
In this case mentioning the tactile quality of the target was irrelevant.  
Children should ignore the irrelevant information in the test question. They should 
realise that it was unhelpful. They should realise that it would not help them decide whether 
they needed to look or feel to find the target. As such the irrelevant information should be 
ignored by those with a robust understanding of aspectuality. If children who heard both 
features of the target mentioned were still able to choose the correct perceptual modality to 
locate the target, then it could be said that their understanding was robust: they realised 
which information they could ignore. However, if they were unable to ignore the irrelevant 
description, then they would have difficulty choosing the correct modality to locate the 
target.  
If an individual‟s performance is disrupted by the addition of irrelevant information, 
then their understanding cannot be robust. It would mean that they could not remember that 
the items differed by colour or tactile quality. They must depend on the information in the 
test question to direct them towards the correct perceptual access. For example, if they are 
asked to find something that is red then they understand that they must look. When this 
information in the test question includes irrelevant descriptions their understanding is 
disrupted. What this suggests is that children might be able to succeed at aspectuality tasks 
just by making an association. In other words, they might associate the quality mentioned 
(if one is mentioned) in the test question with the relevant perceptual modality, for 
example, finding the “red” one and “looking”. 
In the second study in this chapter (Experiment 3) this manipulation was repeated 
with 5 and 6-year-old children. An additional piece of irrelevant information was also 
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introduced in the array of items that were used in the task. This additional information in 
the array of items would also not assist in the decision of whether to look or feel to locate 
the hidden target and could be ignored by those with a robust understanding of aspectuality. 
Again, it was proposed that if children were able to ignore this irrelevant information, then 
this would demonstrate the robustness of their understanding. If, however, they had 
difficulty dealing with this irrelevant information, then this would suggest that their 
understanding was fragile and they were vulnerable to variations in the task. Experiment 4 
aimed to clarify the influence that this irrelevant information in the array of items had on 6-
year-old children‟s performance. 
 
1. Experiment 2 – Are young children able to ignore irrelevant information included in 
the test question? 
In this experiment the intention was to investigate whether 4 to 5-year-old children 
were capable of understanding aspectuality by assessing their ability to choose the 
perceptual access necessary to find a hidden item under different conditions. A location 
task was used, where two items were hidden and one had to be found. The items shared one 
perceptual modality (e.g., both were soft) and differed in another (e.g., one was red and one 
was blue). In one condition (the simple question condition) children were asked to choose 
whether they wanted to look or feel to find one of the items, for example, one that was red. 
A second condition assessed whether the children possessed a robust understanding of 
aspectuality. In this condition (the complex question condition) children also received 
irrelevant information about the target item that they had to find. For example, children 
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were asked to choose whether they wanted to look or feel to find an item that was red and 
heavy (when both the items in that trial had felt the same and only differed by colour).  
According to the existing literature children of this age would not perform well in 
either condition. For example, Perner and Ruffman (1995) proposed that only when 
children reached 6 years of age would they be able to choose the necessary perceptual 
access to find an aspect of an item. However, the findings from Experiment 1 showed that 
even 5-year-olds performed well above what would be expected by chance. It was also 
important to establish whether children younger than the literature suggested could succeed 
at an aspectuality task. Therefore, as well as assessing their ability to deal with irrelevant 
information, the intention was to investigate whether or not 4 to 5-year-old children could 
succeed at choosing the correct mode of perceptual access to find an aspect of a hidden 
target item.  
1.1 Method 
Participants  
Thirty-one children (16 girls) participated from a school serving a predominately 
working class population in Birmingham, U.K.  Their ages ranged from 4;5 to 5;4 (mean 4 
years and 10 months) and they were all reported by their class teachers as possessing a 
good understanding of English. Ethnicity was distributed as follows: Asian (20), White (9) 
and Black (2). One child did not appear to understand the instructions and was unable to 
complete the task therefore the final sample consisted of 30 children. 
Materials 
The materials consisted of the target items (sixteen balls), four bags in which they 
were to be hidden and an opaque bag and cloth. The balls were similar to those used in 
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Experiment 1. They were approximately 7cm diameter and covered in a plastic-coated 
fabric that was red, blue, green or purple. One ball of each colour contained one of the 
following fillings – soft foam all the way through (known as soft), a thin soft foam outer 
layer with a wooden cotton reel inside (knobbly), a thin soft foam outer layer filled with 
polystyrene beads (bobbly), or a thin soft foam outer layer with a solid plaster middle 
(heavy).  The fillings were all round and fitted exactly inside the fabric cover so that four 
balls of the same colour but different „feels‟ were indistinguishable by sight.  
Four fabric drawstring bags (each approximately 30cm x 20cm) were used to hide 
the balls during the procedure. The bags replaced the tunnels used in Experiment 1. This 
was because of several suggestions of biases towards looking or feeling when using the 
tunnel format (e.g., Robinson et al., 1997). Using the tunnel gave children the opportunity 
to use their hands to feel inside, and to lift up a curtain to look inside. However, using the 
bag made it easier for the experimenter to take control of the children‟s perceptual actions. 
The experimenter could offer the base of the bag to the children and allow them to feel the 
ball through the bag, or the experimenter could open the bag towards the children and allow 
them to see the ball inside the bag. In this way, the children were carrying out only the 
actions that they chose and not associated secondary actions. 
The bags were constructed of thin double layers, with black fabric on the outside, so 
that the bags were opaque. Pale yellow fabric was used to line the bags so that when 
looking at a ball in the bottom of the bag, the colour of the ball was easy to see.  
Design 
Every trial consisted of two balls being hidden, each in a bag. The balls in each trial 
either looked the same and felt different, or felt the same and looked different. Children had 
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to decide whether to look inside or feel both bags to find out which bag contained the target 
item. Children were allocated in turn to one of two question type conditions according to 
their position on the teacher‟s class list. Those in the simple question condition were asked 
to find the target ball with only the relevant modality description mentioned (e.g., “find the 
red one”). Those in the complex question condition were asked to find the target item with 
both the modality descriptions mentioned (e.g., “find the red heavy one”). 
Every child had four experimental trials, two that required looking to find the target 
item and two required feeling. Children were allocated in turn to one of four orders of these 
trials as follows: (i) Look, Feel, Look, Feel (LFLF), (ii) LLFF, (iii) FFLL, (iv) FLFL.  
Procedure 
Familiarisation. First, children were familiarised with the materials. They were 
presented with four balls that felt the same (soft) but were different colours (red, blue, 
green, and purple). The experimenter described these perceptual qualities while the children 
were encouraged to look at and feel the balls. The experimenter then placed each ball into a 
bag and explained that “if we want to know what colour one is in each bag we don‟t need to 
take it out and have a look – we can look inside the bag” before demonstrating the action. 
The children were then asked to look inside each bag and say the colour of the ball within. 
Second, the children were encouraged to look at and feel four balls that were the same 
colour (blue) but felt different (soft, knobbly, bobbly and heavy), while receiving verbal 
descriptions from the experimenter. The experimenter then placed each ball into a bag and 
explained that “if we want to know what each one feels like in its bag we don‟t need to take 
it out and feel it  – we can feel it through the bag” before demonstrating the action. The 
children were then asked to feel each bag and say the “feel” of the ball within.   
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Practice Trials. As younger children were being tested in this study than in 
Experiment 1 they were given practice trials. The purpose was to help children understand 
the task by giving them experience of the procedure and feedback following their 
performance (see O‟Neill et al., 1992). Each child was given a practice trial for looking and 
feeling. Two balls were used in the looking practice (green soft and blue soft).  The child 
was given the balls, encouraged to look at them and feel them and told that they felt the 
same but looked different. The child was then asked to put them each in a bag. The 
experimenter then took the bags from the child and moved the bags around saying “I‟m 
going to jumble the bags up like this”, whilst being careful that the bags‟ final resting place 
was out of reach of the child. The child was then told, “I want you to find the green one, but 
you can only do one thing – you can either look in the bags or you can feel the bags. What 
do you want to do to find the green one?” If the child chose the correct action they were 
allowed to carry it out and told that they were right. If the child chose the incorrect action 
they were told, “No, we need to find out what colour it is, so we have to look” and were 
shown the correct action. A similar procedure was carried out for the feeling practice with 
two balls that looked the same but felt different. On the practice trials twenty children 
correctly chose to feel to discover the tactile aspect and thirteen correctly chose to look to 
discover the visual aspect. 
Main Trials.  The experimental trials were similar in procedure to the practice trials. 
Children were shown and told about the balls in each trial and encouraged to look at them 
and feel them before they put them into bags. Then children were told the target ball they 
had to find (using the appropriate question type for their condition) and asked whether they 
wanted to look or feel (or feel or look) to find it. To recap, those children given the simple 
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question were asked to find, for example, “the red one”. Those given the complex question 
were asked to find, for example, “the red heavy one” (when heavy was irrelevant as both 
balls in that trial felt that way). The relevant, differentiating modality was always 
mentioned first. 
Once children had been given their appropriate test question their responses were 
noted and they carried out their chosen action. They were then asked to indicate to the 
experimenter which bag they thought contained the target item. Unlike the practice trials 
they were not given any feedback or corrected. Children were only allowed to carry out the 
access they had chosen for that trial. That is, they were not permitted to carry out the 
alternative mode of access. Children were handed the item from their chosen bag without 
any comment from the experimenter. The items were retrieved from the children and the 
other bag before the next trial began. At the end of their trials every child was rewarded 
with a sticker. 
1.2 Results 
Coding 
Thirty children were able to name the colours and feels of the balls hidden in the 
familiarisation procedure and so took part in the main experiment. For the main trials 
children were given a score of 1 for each correct perceptual action chosen in each trial and 
0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 2).  
Analysis 
The first analysis was to find out if being corrected by the experimenter during the 
practice trials affected children‟s subsequent performance in the main experimental trials. 
Therefore, children‟s scores on their practice trials were recoded into those who were 
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correct on both their trials (N = 12) and those who were incorrect on one or both trials (N = 
18). An independent samples t test was used to compare these groups‟ performance on the 
main trials. Children who were right on both their practice trials (M = 2.75, SD = .97) 
performed no differently in the main trials to those who did less well in their practice trials 
(M = 2.56, SD = 1.10), t(28) = -.50, p = .62, r = .09.  
 
Table 2 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 2 
 
Question Type  
 
 
Number of trials correct                  
Number of pairs correct  
 
 
 
Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Simple (n = 16) 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
7 
 
2 
 
5 
 
2.63 (1.09) ** 
 
Complex (n= 14) 
 
0 
 
1 
 
7 
 
2 
 
4 
 
2.64 (1.01) ** 
 
Expected frequencies if 
performance 
were at chance  (n=16) 
1 4 6 4 1 2 
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A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with question type (simple and 
complex) as a between subject factor and modality (looking trials and feeling trials) as a 
within subject factor. The results showed a main effect of modality, F(1, 28) = 5.47, p = 
.027, ²p = .16. Children performed better on the feeling trials (M = 1.54, SD = .57) than on 
the looking trials (M = 1.10, SD = .85). There was no effect of question type and no 
interaction (highest F = .112, lowest p = .741).  
Analysis was then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
Paired-sample t tests showed that children who received the simple question type 
performed no differently in their first two trials (M = 1.38, SD = .62) to their last two trials 
(M = 1.25, SD = .68), t(15) = .70, p = .50, r = .18. Also, children who received the complex 
question type performed no differently in their first two trials (M = 1.36, SD = .50) to their 
last two trials (M = 1.29, SD = .61), t(13) = .56, p = .58, r = .15.   
Analysis was carried out to assess whether children were guessing, or whether some 
of them were performing well and some were performing poorly. In both the simple and 
complex question conditions, there was a peak of children getting half their trials correct. In 
the complex question group, five of the seven children who were correct on half their trials 
were biased towards feeling: they achieved a score of two because they asked to feel on all 
their four trials. The other two children were correct on one looking trial and one feeling 
trial: they were guessing. In the simple question condition, however, only two of the seven 
children showed the bias towards feeling. Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were 
compared to chance. Children who received the simple question performed better than 
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would be expected by chance, 2 (4, N = 16) = 19.17, p = .001, as did those who received 
the complex question, 2 (4, N = 14) = 15.05, p = .005.  
 
1.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 showed one main effect: that 4 to 5-year-old children 
performed better in their feeling trials than in their looking trials. The bias towards feeling 
was apparent both in the practice trials and the main trials. As mentioned in the literature 
review, children who show biases towards particular modalities do not have an 
understanding of the modality specific aspects of knowledge. Nevertheless, the results of 
the current experiment suggest that more children than would be expected by chance were 
correct on all of their trials, and therefore did not show biased behaviour. The 4 to 5-year-
olds tested in Experiment 2 performed better overall than the existing literature had 
suggested they would (e.g., Naito, 2003; Perner & Ruffman, 1995). 
Despite the bias towards feeling, it is still possible to examine the effect of the 
question manipulation. The current findings demonstrated that the 4 to 5-year-olds tested 
understood that they could ignore the irrelevant information in the test question. Children 
who were given the complex question performed no differently from those given the simple 
question. Contrary to what was hypothesised, the presence of irrelevant information about 
the target item in the test question caused children no extra difficulty. Four to 5-year-old‟s 
understanding of aspectuality was robust enough to withstand this variation to the test 
question, challenging the assumptions made by the aspectuality literature (e.g., O‟Neill et 
al., 1992). The current findings support research in other areas of cognitive development 
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which suggests that young children are able to ignore irrelevant information (e.g., Sophian 
& Wellman, 1980). 
Although the children tested in this experiment performed surprisingly well, it is 
possible that by always describing the relevant modality first in the complex question their 
decision making was unintentionally influenced. They may have focused on this initial 
word and disregarded the second modality mentioned. This may have made the complex 
and simple questions functionally equivalent. Nevertheless, there is no evidence here to 
suggest that children ignored the second part of the description. However, future research 
could investigate whether children only ever attend to the first part of a verbal description. 
On a similar point, always mentioning the relevant modality first in the complex 
question may have led to descriptions that were not always what would be expected in 
English language and this may have drawn children‟s attention to unusual word 
arrangements. For example, there is a tendency in English for the canonical order effect to 
occur, where a colour term is used after any other description, rather than before (e.g., 
Martin, 1969; Martin & Molfese, 1972). In Experiment 2, the description used in a looking 
trial (e.g., “find the red heavy one”) would have been more unusual than the description 
used in a feeling trial (e.g., “find the heavy red one”). If the unusual description had 
attracted children‟s attention more, one might have expected performance on these trials to 
be at ceiling level. However, this was not found. In fact, it may have been that children 
preferred the more standard description as they showed a bias towards feeling in this study 
(although there is no evidence from the other experiments in this thesis that such word 
arrangements were responsible for modality biases). 
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It is possible that the differentiating modality could have been mentioned second, 
rather than first. In some contexts, the more specific an adjective is to a noun, the closer it 
tends to be to it (Belke, 2006). For example, it may be more usual to describe an item as 
“the big red bus” rather than “the red big bus.” This is because all buses tend to be big, but 
the colour is more specific; the bus could be any colour. However, evidence also suggests 
that it is beneficial to hear the distinctive features of a target before hearing about features 
that do not distinguish it from others (e.g., Belke, 2006; Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995). It seems that the existing evidence is inconclusive regarding 
the correct positioning of the relevant descriptive word. Further research is required to 
determine whether either of these descriptive arrangements would make a difference to 
young children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks. 
As another alternative, one modality could always have been mentioned first in the 
test question, rather than the relevant modality. For example, the colour could always have 
been stated after the tactile quality to ensure a less unusual conjunction of words. However, 
this in turn may have influenced children‟s preference for a particular perceptual action by 
drawing their attention to the fact that the colour was always mentioned first. Once again, 
further research is needed to determine whether this arrangement would have any effect on 
children‟s performance, but there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the phrasing 
used in the current research caused any particular difficulty. 
In conclusion, 4 to 5-year-olds were able to pass the tactile simple and complex 
questions in Experiment 2. It appeared that children of this age were not affected by 
including irrelevant information in the test question. Despite all the possibilities just 
mentioned, the descriptions used in Experiment 2 did not seem to be considered to be 
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unusual by the children tested. While a bias towards feeling was found, it is more likely that 
this was influenced by the use of bags to hide the items, rather than how the descriptions of 
the items were presented. The bags provided a novel action of feeling an item through cloth 
that the children seemed to prefer. The modality bias prevented a thorough evaluation of 
the robustness of children‟s ability to succeed at this task. Another experiment was 
necessary to investigate more fully the effect of irrelevant information on young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality. 
 
2. Experiment 3 – Young children‟s ability to ignore irrelevant information in 
alternative contexts 
The 4 to 5-year-olds that were tested in Experiment 2 had not been affected by the 
irrelevant information in the complex test question in the aspectuality task. However, 
including irrelevant information in the test question is not the only way of testing robust 
understanding of aspectuality: a robust understanding should be sturdy enough to be able to 
withstand different changes and variations. In an aspectuality task there are alternative 
contexts for including irrelevant information that someone with a robust understanding 
should have no difficulty dealing with. One alternative involves introducing an irrelevant 
factor in the array of items that are presented. 
According to Piaget (1941), young children can find it difficult to focus on more 
than one feature of a display: a behaviour known as centration. For example, in the classic 
conservation task, children observe a number of counters being arranged in a row. When 
the counters are moved closer together children are asked whether there are now the same 
number of counters, or fewer, or more. Children who centrate, believe that there are fewer 
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counters even though none have been removed from the display. These children focus on 
the fact that the arrangement is now smaller, rather than take into account that the number 
of counters has stayed the same. They focus on the physical size of the display, not the 
contents. When children are able to decentre, or focus on more than one feature, then they 
are potentially able to recognise which feature is relevant. In particular, which feature is 
relevant for the question that they have been asked and which is irrelevant.  
An understanding of sources of knowledge also requires the ability to focus on more 
than one feature of an item and decide which is relevant. This is particularly so when 
multiple items are presented, for example, in an aspectuality task. In this situation, the items 
presented would share one perceptual modality and be different in another. Two features of 
one of these items must, therefore, be recognised; the modality that makes the item the 
same as the others and the modality that makes the item different to the others. 
Understanding aspectuality requires the realisation that the way in which the item is 
different is what determines the way in which that item can be identified, when hidden. The 
way in which the items are the same is irrelevant.   
In Experiment 3, therefore, the robustness of children‟s understanding was tested by 
introducing a different new type of irrelevant information. This time, as well as verbally 
mentioning irrelevant information to the children in the complex test question, irrelevant 
information was included in the array of items. This additional irrelevant information 
concerned the different and shared features of the items used in the task. In a standard 
aspectuality task the irrelevant information in the array is the modality that the items share 
(e.g., two items that are both soft),whereas the relevant information is the modality that 
makes the items different (e.g., one is red and one is blue). Children who understand 
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aspectuality focus on the latter: they understand how the items differ. When the items are 
hidden and they are asked to find one of them they realise that it is how the items differ that 
is important.  
The current experiment investigated children‟s ability to recognise how the items 
differed. It aimed to assess their understanding of what information was important and what 
information was irrelevant and could be disregarded. This was done by presenting an array 
of items where one modality (e.g., colour) would offer some differentiation between the 
items, but not enough to differentiate them completely. This modality would be irrelevant. 
The other modality (e.g., feel) would offer full differentiation (FD) and be relevant.  
In Experiment 3, therefore, partially differentiating (PD) trials were introduced. 
They consisted of an array of four items as such manipulations were not possible with the 
two item task used in previous experiments. In the four item array one modality would offer 
partial differentiation (e.g., two red and two blue) and the other would offer full 
differentiation (e.g., all feel different). The intention was to compare children‟s ability to 
deal with this type of information with the type of trial that they could succeed at: the type 
used in Experiment 2 where the items only differed in one perceptual modality. Hence, 
children‟s performance on standard trials with two items and full differentiation was 
compared against their performance with four items (and PD). Children who had a robust 
understanding of aspectuality would have no difficulty dealing with the PD trials. If 
children did find the PD trials more difficult then further investigations would be needed to 
ensure that this was not caused by the increase in the number of items.  
The findings from Experiment 2 suggested that 4 to 5-year-olds had no difficulty 
with the complex question. However, due to the feeling bias found in Experiment 2, it was 
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necessary to continue the investigations concerning young children‟s ability to deal with 
irrelevant information. Thus, Experiment 3 aimed to investigate whether children 
demonstrated a robust understanding of aspectuality by assessing their performance with 
the complex question type and the inclusion of the PD information. The apparatus was 
changed from bags back to tunnels to bring the equipment more in line with that used in the 
existing research (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992) and to attempt to remove the bias towards 
feeling that was found in Experiment 2.  
2.1 Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and eighty four children participated from two schools serving 
predominately working class populations in Birmingham, U.K. Ninety-two 5-year-olds 
(range 5;3 to 6;2, mean 5 years and 9 months; 49 girls) and 92 6-year-olds (range 6;3 to 7;2, 
mean 6 years and 8 months; 53 girls) participated. They were all reported by their teachers 
as possessing a good understanding of English. The ethnicity of the children was distributed 
as follows: Asian (95), White (68), other (13), and Black (8).  
Materials 
The sixteen target items were 7cm diameter balls, as described in Experiment 2. 
Additionally, in the familiarisation task, an orange ball that contained a hollow hard 
cardboard sphere was used. To attempt to reduce the feeling bias found in Experiment 2 
and to facilitate a direct comparison with existing research, the tunnel apparatus from 
Experiment 1 was used. Therefore, the remainder of the materials consisted of four 
identical grey tunnels, an opaque cloth, and an opaque bag. 
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Design  
As in Experiment 1 children were familiarised with the equipment and then went 
straight on to their experimental trials. Children in the two age ranges were allocated in turn 
to one of the following four conditions: FD/simple question; FD/complex question; 
PD/simple question; PD/complex question.  
The simple and complex question types were the same as used in Experiment 2. The 
FD trials had only one differentiating modality (e.g., two balls that were red but they felt 
different). The PD trials had a partially differentiating (PD) secondary modality (e.g., four 
balls that all felt different but two were red and two were blue). The looking and feeling 
trials were arranged to give four fixed orders of presentation; the same as those used in 
Experiment 2.   
Procedure 
Familiarisation. The findings from Experiment 2 showed that practice trials did not 
improve children‟s performance or reduce modality bias. In Experiment 1 it was clear that 
5 to 6-year-olds performed well above what would be expected by chance without practice 
trials. Therefore, in the current study children were not given practice trials and were 
familiarised with the tunnels as in Experiment 1.  
Children were told that the real game was going to begin soon and the other 
tunnel(s) was/were brought out and stacked underneath the original one. The tunnels 
formed a tower, so that all the windows were on one end and all the feeling holes on the 
other end. The experimenter then explained that, “for every go of the game I‟m going to 
hide two/four balls, one in each of the tunnels and then I‟m going to ask you to find one of 
them for me. You have to decide what you want to do to find it and you‟ll only be allowed 
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to do one thing, so you have to decide whether you want to look through the windows or 
whether you want to feel through the holes”. As in Experiment 1 and in all subsequent 
studies children‟s understanding of the difference between the two modes of access was 
checked.  
Main trials. Before every trial the children were presented with the balls that were 
going to be used in that trial and asked to make sure that they looked at them and felt them, 
whilst the experimenter described the perceptual attributes of each ball in turn, for example, 
“this one is red and heavy”. The descriptions were carried out in a predetermined and 
counterbalanced order for each trial, with the modality that distinguished the target item 
always mentioned first.  
After the children had examined the balls, they were hidden in the tunnels in a 
predetermined order, so that the target item‟s position varied in the tower. This took place 
underneath the cloth so that the children could not see. The children were then asked to find 
the target item with a question type (simple or complex) determined by the experimental 
condition that they had been allocated to. For example, children that were given the simple 
question were asked to “find the red one”, whereas children that were given the complex 
question were asked to find the “red heavy one”. 
The children‟s responses were noted and they carried out their chosen action. They 
were then asked to indicate to the experimenter which tunnel they thought contained the 
target item. They were not permitted to carry out the alternative action. The ball was 
retrieved from the tunnel chosen and passed to the child, but no correction or feedback was 
offered by the experimenter. The remaining balls were removed from the tunnels and the 
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chosen ball retrieved from the child before the next trial was started. At the end of their 
trials children were rewarded with a sticker.
4
  
2.2 Results 
Coding 
All children passed the familiarisation task and so took part in the main experiment. 
Children were given a score of 1 for every correct perceptual action chosen in each trial and 
0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 3).  
Analysis 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with question type (simple and 
complex), array type (FD and PD) and age (5-year-olds and 6-year-olds) as between subject 
factors and modality (looking trials and. feeling trials) as a within subject factor. The results 
showed a main effect of modality, F(1, 176) = 10.30, p = .002, ²p = .06. Children 
performed better on the looking trials (M = 1.40, SD = .68) than on the feeling trials (M = 
1.18, SD = .70). There was an interaction between modality and array type, F(1, 176) = 
4.47, p = .036, ²p = .03. Paired sample post hoc t tests (making a Bonferroni correction for 
4 tests, p < .0125) revealed that children who received PD trials performed better on their 
looking trials (M = 1.42, SD = .68) than feeling trials (M = 1.05, SD = .72), t(91) = 3.43, p = 
.001, r = .34. There was no effect of question type, array type, age or any other interaction 
(highest F = 3.52, lowest p = .062, indicating that an interaction between age and question 
type approached significance and suggesting that 6-year-olds who received the complex 
 
                                                 
4
 The procedure following children‟s responses to the test question was repeated in all subsequent 
experiments 
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question performed less well than those who received the simple question). Analysis was 
then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. Paired-sample t tests 
showed no difference in any condition between performance on the first two trials and 
performance on the last two trials (lowest p = .09).  
Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were compared to chance. Analysis showed 
that children who received the simple question with FD performed better than would be 
Table 3 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 3 
 
 
Question 
Type 
 
Item 
number 
 
 
Number of trials correct  
 
 
Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Simple 
2 (n= 46) 0 4 16 14 12 2.74 (.95) *** 
4 (n= 46) 1 6 16 10 13 2.61 (1.11) ** 
Complex 
2 (n= 46) 0 4 21 14 7 2.52 (.86) *** 
4 (n= 46) 2 4 20 12 8 2.43 (1.03) ** 
 
Expected frequencies if 
performance were at  
chance (n= 46) 
 
 
 
2.875 11.5 17.25 11.5 2.875 2 
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expected by chance, 2 (4, N = 46) = 37.36, p < .001, as did those who received the simple 
question with PD, 2 (4, N = 46) = 15.04, p = .005. Children who received the complex 
question with FD also performed better than would be expected by chance, 2 (4, N = 46) = 
39.80, p < .001, as did those who received the complex question with PD, 2 (4, N = 46) = 
14.75, p = .005.  
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 showed that the presence of irrelevant information in 
the complex question had no effect on children‟s performance. That is, there was no 
difference between performance with the complex question and performance with the 
simple question. These results replicate the findings of Experiment 2. Children aged 5 and 6 
years of age were able to deal with irrelevant information that was included in the test 
question.  
No difference in performance was found between the two age groups. Five-year-
olds performed just as well overall as 6-year-olds. However, it is also of interest to compare 
children‟s performance on the FD trials in the current experiment to children‟s performance 
in Experiment 2. They were functionally equivalent in that both used a FD location task 
with simple and complex questions, but differed in the ages of the children tested. The 
mean scores from the FD trials in the current experiment showed that  5 and 6-year-old‟s 
performance was identical to each other (both M = 2.67, SD = 1.03), and very close to the 
mean scores from the 4 to 5-year-olds that were tested in Experiment 2 (M = 2.63, SD = 
1.09). This suggests that children‟s performance did not improve between the ages of 4 and 
6 years. This is in contrast to many suggestions in the literature that young children‟s 
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understanding of aspectuality gradually develops up until the ages of 5 or 6 years, or even 
higher (e.g., Naito, 2003: O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner, 1991).  
 Despite no differences between the age groups or question types, children in 
Experiment 3 performed much better in their looking trials than in their feeling trials. Post-
hoc analysis showed that this main effect of modality was driven by the array type. 
Although there was no main effect of array type, children‟s performance on PD feeling 
trials was at chance level. Performance on all other feeling and looking trials was 
significantly above what would be expected by chance.  
As previously mentioned, existing research has revealed tendencies for children to 
prefer one form of perceptual access to another, but has not shown any fixed pattern to or 
explanation for this behaviour, especially in older age groups (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; 
Pillow, 1993). Initially it was thought that the change in apparatus from bags back to 
tunnels may have been responsible for the difference in modality bias between Experiments 
2 and 3. However, no bias was found when the tunnels were used in Experiment 1. It is 
possible that some school classes had focussed on particular perceptual modalities in 
lessons during the period prior to the current experiments being run. This may have 
influenced children‟s tendency to prefer one mode of access over another. Nevertheless, the 
reason for such biases has yet to be established. 
Taking into account the bias towards looking, the comparison carried out between 
observed and expected frequencies suggested that some children had a tendency to perform 
less well on the four object trials. It is possible that these children found the PD array 
slightly more difficult because of the PD information that was included. That is, the 
presence of this irrelevant information in this format may have caused the children some 
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problems understanding what information would be gained from what access. There is an 
alternative possibility, however. Children might have found the PD trials more difficult due 
to the increase in the number of items presented in the array. There were four balls in the 
PD trials and only 2 balls in the ND trials. This larger array combined with the preference 
towards looking could have caused problems for children‟s working memory. There is 
evidence to suggest that the central executive in working memory is limited in that it can 
maintain either storage, or enable processing, but has difficulty allowing both to happen at 
the same time (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992). Therefore, an 
increase in complex information in the present study could have increased the need for 
storage, but reduced the ability to focus on the test question and the appropriate answer. 
This complex information could be either the increase in the array or the PD information. 
Therefore, a further experiment was needed to further investigate whether it was an 
increase in the number of items, or the inclusion of PD information that influenced 
children‟s performance. 
 
3. Experiment 4 – Young children‟s ability to ignore irrelevant partially differentiating 
perceptual information  
This experiment was designed to clarify whether young children were able to ignore 
irrelevant information that was included in the array of items (PD information). A four item 
PD condition was compared to a condition that used four items but included no PD 
information (ND). For example, in PD looking trials there could be four balls that were all 
different colours (so colour gave full differentiation) but two were hard and two were soft 
(so feel gave partial differentiation); for PD feeling trials the balls would all feel different 
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but two were red and two were blue. In contrast, in ND looking trials there could be four 
balls that were all different colours but would all feel the same; for ND feeling trials the 
balls would all feel different but look the same. Any difference found in performance 
would therefore be due to the PD information rather than the number of balls in the array. 
The results of Experiment 3 showed no difference in performance between 5 and 6-year-
olds, so in Experiment 4 a group of children whose ages ranged between 5 and 6 years were 
tested.  
3.1 Method 
Materials 
The materials from Experiment 3 were used. 
Participants 
Thirty-two 5 to 6-year-olds participated from a school that served a predominately 
working class population in Birmingham, U.K. Their ages ranged from 5;10 to 6;9 (mean 6 
years and 4 months; 9 girls – the smaller proportion of female participants was 
representative of the school‟s intake that year). They were all reported by their teachers as 
possessing a good understanding of English. The ethnicity of the children was distributed as 
follows: White (26), Asian (2), Black (2) and other (2).  
Design 
Each child received eight trials, four where PD information was present and four 
where ND information was present. Each child received four trials where the target 
modality was colour (2 x PD and 2 x ND) and four trials where the target modality was 
tactile (2 x PD and 2 x ND). These trials were presented in one of the four fixed orders 
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(FLFLFLFL or LFLFLFLF or FLLFLFFL or LFFLFLLF) with PD and ND trials 
alternating within those orders.  
Procedure 
The same familiarisation process was used from Experiment 3. The main trials were 
the same as in the simple question condition used in Experiments 2 and 3 (that is, children 
were asked to find the target item using only the relevant modality, e.g., “find the red one”).  
3.2 Results 
Coding 
All children passed the familiarisation task and so took part in the main experiment. 
Children were given a score of 1 for every correct perceptual action chosen in each trial and 
0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 4).  
Analysis 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with modality (looking trials and feeling 
trials) and information type (PD and ND) as within subject factors. The results showed a 
main effect of information type, F(1, 31) = 8.75, p = .006, ²p = .22. Children performed 
better on the ND trials ((M = 3.00, SD = .88) than on the PD trials (M = 2.47, SD = 1.11). 
No effect of modality and no interactions were found (highest F = 2.97, lowest p = .10). As 
there were twice as many trials in Experiment 4 as in Experiment 2 (where a feeling bias 
was apparent) and Experiment 3 (where a looking bias was apparent), further investigation 
was carried out. When only the first four trials were considered, a preference was found for 
looking (M = .77, SD = .28) over feeling (M = .56, SD = .35), t(31) = 2.88, p = .007, r = 
.46, replicating the bias found in Experiment 3.  
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Analysis was then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
Paired-sample t tests showed that children performed no differently in their first two ND 
trials (M = 1.47, SD = .57) to their last two ND trials (M = 1.56, SD = .50), t(31) = -.83, p = 
.41, r = .15. Also, children performed no differently in their first two PD trials (M = 1.19, 
SD = .74) to their last two PD trials (M = 1.28, SD = .63), t(31) = -.65, p = .52, r = .12. 
Table 4 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 4 
 
Trial Type  
 
 
 
    
  Number of trials correct  
 
Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 0 1 2 3 4 
Partial Differentiation (n = 32) 11 5 11 8 7 2.47 (1.11) ** 
No Differentiation (n = 32) 0 1 9 11 11 3.00 (.88) *** 
Expected frequencies if 
performance were at chance 
 (n = 32) 
2 8 12 8 2 2 
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Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were compared to chance. Analysis showed 
that, for the PD array, children performed better than would be expected by chance, 2 (4, N 
= 32) = 14.21, p = .007, as they also did for the ND array, 2 (4, N = 32) = 50.50, p < .001.  
3.3 Discussion 
Children‟s performance was better in the ND trials than in the PD trials. They were 
more successful at choosing the correct perceptual access to find a target when they had an 
array of items offering no secondary modality differentiation, than when the array included 
a partially differentiating secondary modality. In other words, children‟s difficulty was in 
dealing with irrelevant information included in the array, rather than due to more items 
being used in the tasks. They performed well above chance with the four item array when 
irrelevant information was not included.  
The results demonstrate that 5 to 6-year-olds are able to succeed at a task assessing 
aspectuality, even when that task uses four items, but that their understanding is not robust. 
Children did not treat the partially differentiating information in the array of items as 
irrelevant information. They appeared not to realise that it was not helpful to their decision 
as to what perceptual action to take to find, for example, the red item.  
4. Discussion of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 
The experiments in this chapter aimed to clarify not only when young children 
understand aspectuality, but also how robust this understanding was. This was done by 
examining their ability to deal with irrelevant information. The findings of Experiment 2 
showed that 4 to 5-year-old children were able to ignore irrelevant perceptual information 
in the test question. In Experiment 3, 5 and 6-year-olds were also not affected by the 
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presence of irrelevant information in the test question. The children tested in Experiment 3 
did, however, experience problems dealing with an array of items that included irrelevant 
PD information. The results of Experiment 4 clarified that this difficulty was caused by the 
irrelevant PD information and not by the increase in the number of items used in this task.  
The results from this chapter raise two important points. The first point is how an 
understanding of aspectuality can be hindered and why. Many researchers (e.g., O‟Neill et 
al., 1992; Perner, 1991; Perner & Ruffman, 1995) have suggested that it is not until 5 or 6 
years of age that children understand aspectuality, but have based these proposals on basic 
tasks. They had given the impression that when children could pass an aspectuality task 
their understanding was complete. However, it was not known how much children who 
could pass these tasks really understood. The robustness of their understanding of 
aspectuality had not been investigated. The complex question and PD information in the 
current experiments enabled a much more in-depth assessment of young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality, by including irrelevant information in the tasks and testing 
when children show a robust understanding.  
The findings from this chapter allow a re-assessment of what constitutes an 
understanding of aspectuality and how this understanding can be tested. It is now apparent 
that 4 to 5-year-olds can pass a standard aspectuality task, contrary to suggestions made in 
the literature (e.g., Naito, 2003; Perner & Ruffman, 1995) and yet even 6-year-old 
children‟s understanding of aspectuality cannot be described as robust. Although children 
from 4 years of age were not affected by the complex question, even those aged 6 years had 
problems with the PD information. The ability to deal with the complex question 
information shows some ability to identify the relevant information, but the argument here 
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is that a robust understanding should also allow children to ignore irrelevant information in 
the array of items presented.  
It is possible that the two types of irrelevant information used in the current 
experiments (verbal descriptions in the complex question and the items themselves in the 
PD trials) were assessing different abilities. O‟Neill et al. (1992) suggested that 5 to 6-year-
old children are starting to think like adults about evidence and how that evidence relates to 
the modality specific aspects of knowledge. In other words, children of this age should 
understand that in order to gain knowledge the supporting evidence must be unambiguous. 
However, evidence can vary in significance and may require different processes of 
evaluation. In the current experiments the evidence in the complex question and PD 
information conditions differed to some extent. In the complex question, the critical 
evidence was the sole differentiating factor between the FD and this factor had to be 
recognised during children‟s experience of the items before they were hidden (due to the 
content of the question). For example, children had to recognise the relevance that the items 
differed only by colour, because both the colour and feel were mentioned in the test 
question.  
In the PD trials, however, the critical evidence was the entirely (not partially) 
differentiating factor that could be discovered during the pre-trial experience. For example, 
children had to recognise the relevance that the items only completely differed by colour, 
and that those other differences were irrelevant. So, the irrelevant factor in the PD condition 
causes difficulty because it competes as a potential source of evidence. Research 
investigating young children‟s ability to evaluate evidence suggests that 5-year-olds might 
be able to encode evidence, but can have difficulty interpreting and using this evidence to 
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justify a knowledge state (Fay & Klahr, 1996). If children have more difficulty evaluating 
this type of PD evidence and understanding what it means, then maybe they do not think 
about evidence in the way that adults do.  
The second point raised by the current findings regards children‟s understanding of 
the test question. It appears to be contradictory. On one hand, children performed 
surprisingly well when they were given the complex question. They understood that only 
one feature was relevant when they were asked to find the “red heavy one”. They were not 
distracted by the presence of the irrelevant information in the question. On the other hand, 
children did not seem to understand the relevance of the information in the simple test 
question. They did not realise that this information could lead them to the correct response 
(looking or feeling). For example, if children were confused by the irrelevant PD 
information in the array in Experiment 4, they could have simply considered the question 
they were asked to, “Find the red one”.  
When asked to find “the red one”, why did children not realise that the only action 
that would tell them that information was looking and that they did not need to remember 
the array? It is possible that they believed they had to recall their experience of the items to 
succeed at the task. This belief was so strong that it disrupted their realisation that they 
could succeed at the task by just listening to the information in the test question. Further 
investigation is required to determine what young children understand about relevant 
information included in these tasks. Nevertheless, what this does demonstrate is that it is 
not necessary to have any perceptual contact with the items at all to be able to succeed at 
some aspectuality tasks. You do not need to see an item beforehand to understand that you 
will need to look to find out if it is red.  
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In the introduction to this thesis it was suggested that to have a robust understanding 
of aspectuality required being able to cope effectively with changes and variations. A 
robust understanding of aspectuality means that your comprehension of the link between 
perception and knowledge can deal with the unexpected. It is also possible that one of the 
features of a robust understanding of aspectuality is being able to hold in mind what is 
relevant or important. Therefore, when information is more complex, it is increasingly 
difficult to hold that information in mind. It may have been that in Experiment 4 children 
were attempting to remember the perceptual qualities of the items, even though no recall of 
the items was actually required to succeed at the task. After all, in real-world situations we 
most probably try to remember all potentially relevant information, especially if we are 
unsure of any future need for that information. While children could succeed at this task by 
making a simple association between, for example, colour and looking, they could have 
found it more difficult to recall the more complex perceptual information in the PD array.  
There are suggestions in the existing literature that young children can have 
difficulty recalling information they have experienced. In fact, Perner and Ruffman (1995) 
suggest that 6-year-old‟s increasingly advanced ability to remember experienced events 
underpins their understanding of aspectuality. They found a significant correlation between 
performance on aspectuality tasks and performance on free recall tasks (where children had 
to recall, unprompted, some pictures that they had previously been shown). It does seem 
that being able to remember when and how you found out information may be a pre-
requisite for being able to understand how you can find out further information. The current 
data suggest that children‟s memory deficits may limit their ability to demonstrate 
understanding of aspectuality (see the General Discussion). Children seemed to have some 
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difficulty in recognising and holding in mind what information was useful to them in the 
current task. It appears that it is being able to remember the relevant information, rather 
than the overall event, that is important for a robust understanding of aspectuality. Further 
investigation is required to determine why children have difficulty in recognising and 
processing certain information that is relevant to their understanding of aspectuality.   
In summary, the results of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 suggest that 4 to 5-year-old 
children show some understanding of aspectuality, using the criteria suggested by the 
existing literature. However, it is proposed that a robust comprehension of aspectuality is 
not apparent until over 6 years of age, that is, older than the children tested in the current 
experiments. The findings from this chapter demonstrated that young children possessed a 
somewhat surprising ability to deal with irrelevant verbal descriptions included in the test 
question. This ability suggests that children had already understood how the balls differed 
and what perceptual action they needed to take before the test question had been asked. 
This means that they had gained awareness of the similarities and differences between the 
balls through their experience of them during the familiarisation procedure. The next 
chapter investigated this matter further by focusing on the way the perceptual qualities of 
the balls were introduced during familiarisation.       
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CHAPTER 4 – THE EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE ON YOUNG CHILDREN‟S 
PERFORMANCE IN ASPECTUALITY TASKS  
 
Experience is generally considered to be a positive thing. We tend to think that if 
you possess experience then you are more likely to have increased knowledge, to be more 
skilled and to show better performance. It is possible to have different types of experience, 
for example, being familiar with a procedure, or having had practice at carrying out an 
action. Being experienced at something means that your understanding of it is robust. If you 
are familiar with an action then you are more likely to be able to resist variations or 
changes that affect it. However, experience does not always need to be direct: first-hand 
experience involves a person witnessing or taking part in an event whereas second-hand 
experience involves gathering information from others. Even young children can benefit 
from having second-hand experience, for example, by having knowledge about an event 
before it happens (e.g., Sutherland, Pipe, Schick, Murray, & Gobbo, 2003). However, 
having experience of the items beforehand has been suggested as having a negative effect 
on young children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks (Perner & Ruffman, 1995). The 
current experiment aimed to clarify whether particular types of prior experience might have 
an influence on young children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks, and so reveal more 
about the robustness of their understanding. 
The effect of prior experience on young children‟s cognitive abilities has been the 
subject of much research (e.g., Conroy & Salmon, 2006; Gobbo, Mega, & Pipe, 2002). It 
has tended to focus on how previous experience affects children‟s ability to remember the 
details of an event. For example, Sutherland et al. (2003) demonstrated how receiving 
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relevant information beforehand increased 5 to 7-year-olds‟ subsequent recall of a novel 
event. Children were either read a detailed story about what would happen when they 
“visited a pirate” the following day, or took part in a related, or non-related, discussion. 
Those who were given the most relevant experience (the story) showed better recall of the 
visit, both one day and four months later. Overall, it is suggested that prior experience 
assists in young children‟s retention of knowledge, although the benefit of different types of 
experience can vary. 
In contrast, Perner and Ruffman (1995) propose that giving children prior 
experience may not help them succeed at aspectuality tasks. As previously mentioned, in 
aspectuality tasks, children are typically presented with two items that share one perceptual 
aspect, but are different in another. For example, they might feel identical, but differ in 
colour. When one or both are hidden, children have to decide whether they need to feel or 
look to find out particular perceptual information. What is important here is that giving 
children prior experience of the items in this task is intended to help them. It is supposed to 
make them more aware of the differences and similarities between the items and make it 
easier for them to choose the correct perceptual action when asked (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 
1992; Pillow, 1993; Robinson et al., 1997). Yet it is this pre-trial experience that has been 
implied by Perner and Ruffman (1995) as being detrimental to children‟s performance. 
Perner and Ruffman (1995) introduced a different version of the aspectuality task 
that demonstrated how pre-trial experience might influence performance. They designed 
the task primarily to obtain a more sensitive measure of children‟s understanding. In this 
new task children did not have any experience of the items prior to their trials. Instead, one 
item was hidden (out of their sight) and children were asked whether they would like to 
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look or feel to find out whether it was, for example, black or white. Children found this 
“one item” task considerably easier than the traditional “two item” task in a direct 
comparison (although see Chapters 5 & 6 of this thesis regarding the impact of the 
differences in question phrasing in these two tasks). Perner and Ruffman (1995) suggested 
that this was because in the two item task children attempt to remember their pre-trial 
experience. They have difficulty encoding this experience and this then disrupts their 
performance in the task.  
One point of view then is that prior experience is beneficial, although some types of 
experience may be more useful than others. For example, Murachver, Pipe, Gordon, 
Owens, and Fivush (1996) gave 5 and 6-year-olds experience of a novel event. Children 
who directly experienced the event themselves showed better recall than those who 
watched another child taking part, or listened to a story about a child taking part. Also, 
McGuigan and Salmon (2005) showed how combining particular relevant information (e.g., 
pictures and narration) prior to a trip to a pretend zoo improved 5 and 6-year-olds later 
recall of the event. Offering pictures, narration and other types of information (e.g., written 
goals or labels) independently did not improve recall.  
A second point of view, in the aspectuality literature, is that prior experience 
cause‟s children difficulty (Perner & Ruffman, 1995). However, in this view there has been 
no suggestion regarding particular types of experience and any influence they might have 
on children‟s performance. The first aim in the current experiment, therefore, was to clarify 
whether young children have difficulty dealing with prior experience of the items hidden in 
aspectuality tasks, or whether they find it beneficial. The second aim was to find out 
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whether the type of prior experience children receive in these tasks affects their 
performance on the task.  
 
1. Experiment 5 – Is young children‟s performance on aspectuality tasks 
influenced by the type of pre-trial experience they are given? 
In tasks assessing aspectuality understanding, a standard procedure is typically 
followed regarding children‟s pre-trial experience (see Experiments 1 to 4; O‟Neill et al., 
1992; Perner & Ruffman, 1995). In this pre-trial experience children are allowed to look at 
and feel the items before they are hidden. Also the perceptual qualities of the items are 
pointed out by the experimenter: For example, the experimenter will state that one item is 
red and one is blue but both are soft. Children‟s pre-trial experience of the items can 
therefore be easily separated in two distinct categories: the self accessed experience that 
they gain through looking at and feeling the items and the verbally accessed experience that 
they gain from being told about the perceptual qualities of the items by the experimenter. 
Experiment 5 investigated whether these types of experience influenced children‟s 
performance. 
1.1 Method 
Participants 
One hundred children (49 girls) participated from two schools serving 
predominately working class populations in Birmingham, U.K.  Their ages ranged from 
5;10 to 7;2 (mean 6 years and 5 months) and they were all reported by their teachers as 
possessing a good understanding of English.  Ethnicity was distributed as follows: White 
(53), Asian (37), Black (4) and other (6). 
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Materials 
The materials from Experiment 1, 3, and 4 were used. 
 
 
Design 
A location version of the aspectuality task was used, where two items were hidden 
in two tunnels. Children were familiarized with the equipment and were then given eight 
 
 
Verbally Accessed Experience 
 
Self Accessed 
Experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Experience 
(13 girls, 12 boys;  
age range 5:10 to 7;2) 
Verbal Experience 
(10 girls, 15 boys;  
age range 5:10 to 7;2) 
 
 
Self Experience 
(14 girls, 11 boys;  
age range 5:10 to 7;1) 
Combined Experience 
(12 girls, 13 boys;  
age range 5:10 to 7;0) 
 
Figure 2 
Factors and conditions used in Experiment 5 
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experimental trials. The factors of self accessed information and verbally accessed 
information were manipulated to create four separate conditions: including one, both or 
neither of the factors (see Figure 2). Therefore, children were allocated in turn to one of the 
following four conditions: no experience; verbal experience; self experience; combined 
experience. The looking and feeling trials were arranged to give two fixed orders of 
presentation: Look, Feel, Feel, Look, Feel, Look, Look, Feel (LFFLFLLF); FLLFLFFL.   
Procedure 
Familiarisation. The familiarisation procedure was the same as Experiment 1. 
Main trials. Prior to each trial children were given the appropriate experience 
determined by their allocated condition. In the no experience condition the balls for each 
trial were hidden directly in the two tunnels, without any description by the experimenter 
and without the children having access to them. The children were just told that two balls 
would be hidden. In the verbal experience condition the experimenter described the colours 
and feels of the balls before they were hidden, but the children had no direct perceptual 
access. For example, „I‟m going to hide two balls, one is hard and blue and the other is soft 
and blue‟. The descriptions were carried out in a predetermined and counterbalanced order 
for each trial, with the modality that distinguished the target always mentioned first. In the 
self experience condition no verbal description was offered, the children were told that two 
balls would be hidden while the experimenter put the balls on the table in front of them and 
encouraged them to look at them and feel them. In the combined experience condition the 
experimenter described the perceptual qualities of the balls for that trial (as in the verbal 
experience condition) and encouraged the children to look at them and feel them (as in the 
self experience condition).  
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The two balls were then hidden, one in each tunnel, underneath the cloth so that the 
children could not see. The children were then asked to find the target (using the simple 
question format). The remainder of the procedure was carried as in Experiments 1 to 4. 
1.2 Results 
Scoring 
All children passed the familiarisation task and so took part in the main experiment. 
Children were given a score of 1 for every correct perceptual action chosen in each trial and 
0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 5).  
Analysis 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with verbal information type 
(verbally accessed information and no verbally accessed information) and self information 
type (self accessed information and no self accessed information) as between subject 
factors and modality (looking trials and feeling trials) as a within subject factor. The results 
showed a main effect of verbal information type: Children who received no verbally 
accessed information (M = 6.44, SD = 1.53) performed better than those who received 
verbally accessed information (M = 5.58, SD = 1.54), F(1, 96) = 7.87, p = .006, ²p = .08. 
No other effects were found (highest F = 1.88, lowest p = .17). 
In order to directly compare the current findings with the aspectuality literature 
(where combined experience is most commonly used) a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
carried out with information condition (no experience; verbal experience; self experience; 
and combined experience) as a between subject factor and modality (looking trials and 
feeling trials) as a within subject factor.
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Table 5 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 5 
 
Information 
Condition 
 
Number of trials correct 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
No Experience (n= 
25)  
0 0 0 2 3 3 4 7 6 
6.16 (1.63) 
*** 
Verbal Experience 
(n= 25) 
0 0 1 2 3 7 5 5 2 5.44 (1.56) 
*** Self Experience (n= 
25) 
0 0 0 1 1 2 6 5 10 
6.72 (1.40) 
*** 
Combined Experience 
(n= 25) 
0 0 1 1 2 7 7 3 4 
5.72 (1.54) 
*** 
Expected 
frequencies if 
performance  
were at chance (n = 
25) 
.09
75 
.77
5 
2.
75 
5.5 
6.7
5 
5.5 
2.7
5 
.77
5 
.09
75 
4 
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The results showed a main effect of information condition, F(3, 96) = 3.32, p = .023 ²p = 
.09. Independent-samples t tests showed that children in the self experience condition (M = 
6.72, SD = 1.40) performed better than those in the verbal experience condition (M = 5.44, 
SD = 1.56), t(48) = -3.06, p = .004, r = .40, and better than those in the combined 
experience condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.54), t(48) = 2.40, p = .02, r = .33. Children in the 
no experience condition (M = 6.16, SD = 1.63) performed no different to children in any 
other condition. There was no effect for modality and no interactions were found (highest F 
= .60, lowest p = .62). 
Analysis was then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
Paired-sample t tests showed that children performed no differently in their first four trials, 
compared to their last four trials in any condition (lowest p = .14). 
Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were compared to chance. Analysis showed 
that in every condition children performed better than would be expected by chance: no 
experience, 2 (8, N = 25) = 416.88, p < .001; verbal experience, 2 (8, N = 25) = 68.69, p < 
.001; self experience, 2 (8, N = 25) = 1046.83, p < .001; combined experience, 2 (8, N = 
25) = 178.54, p < .001.  
1.3 Discussion 
This experiment aimed to test two hypotheses. The first was proposed by Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) who suggested that young children performed worse at aspectuality tasks 
when they had pre-trial experience of the items. The second was implied by the event 
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memory literature which suggested that the type of pre-trial experience that children 
received influenced their performance.  
With regard to the first hypothesis, when Perner and Ruffman (1995) removed the 
pre-trial experience from their experiment, they removed the whole experience. In other 
words, instead of assessing children‟s performance when they had received experience 
(which in effect was combined experience) they were assessing their performance when 
they had received none (no experience). They found that children performed better when 
they received no experience and concluded that (combined) experience caused children 
difficulty. The current findings do not support Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) suggestion. No 
difference was found in performance between children who had received no experience and 
children who had received combined experience (or indeed any other type of experience). It 
is possible that testing more participants could increase the level of confidence (power) in 
these results and reveal a small effect that is currently undetectable. However, it is likely 
that such an effect would be much smaller than those that have been detected with the 
existing number of participants. With regard to the second hypothesis, the event literature 
proposed that the type of pre-event experience children received might have an important 
impact on their recall (e.g., Murachver et al., 1996). This was interpreted to suggest that the 
type of pre-trial experience given to children in aspectuality tasks might influence their 
performance. This proposal was upheld. Particular types of experience were found to have 
a significant effect on children‟s behaviour and these effects will now be discussed in turn. 
First, the analysis of the four experimental conditions (self, verbal, combined, and 
no experience) will be assessed. Children who only received self experience performed 
better than those who received only verbal experience and better than those who received 
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both (combined experience). At an initial glance, this implies that children perform best 
when they are allowed to experience the perceptual qualities of the items themselves; when 
they were shown the items and allowed to look and feel but the experimenter gave no 
descriptions. However, as stated before, children who had this type of experience were no 
more successful in the final task than children who had received no experience of the items 
at all. Finding out about the items by looking at them and feeling them did not help 
children. 
So, how can the difference found between the four experimental conditions be 
explained? Children in the verbal experience and combined experience conditions showed 
the lowest performance. Children‟s performance in these conditions was not worse than 
receiving no experience at all, but was worse than receiving self experience. This means 
that children who were shown and told about the items, and children who were just told 
about them, performed worse than those who were just shown them. Being told about the 
items seemed to make the task more difficult. 
The main analysis showed the full extent of this effect. By examining the influence 
of verbally accessed and self accessed information it was confirmed that children did not 
benefit from looking at and feeling the items. This is in contrast to Murachver et al.‟s 
(1996) findings where direct prior experience gave better recall than more indirect methods. 
However, children‟s performance was adversely affected by the presence of verbal 
information. Children who were told about the items found the task harder. This means that 
telling children about the perceptual qualities of the items was the least effective way of 
transmitting the information to them. It had this effect when it was the only way that 
                                                                                                          The Effect of Experience
   
96 
 
children found out about the items and when it accompanied them looking at and feeling 
the items. 
This difficulty dealing with verbal descriptions of the items has never before been 
suggested in the aspectuality literature. Indeed there is little consideration of pre-trial 
experience at all. What does exist is based on combined experience of the items and focuses 
on children‟s episodic memory abilities. Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) proposal that 
children found aspectuality tasks more difficult when they had received experience of the 
items, was based on their ability to recall information. Their theory relies on the concept 
that children attempt to remember the experience. When they are asked information about 
the target item they try to recall their previous experience; they try to remember how they 
had found out the perceptual qualities of the items. Perner and Ruffman (1995) suggest that 
until approximately 6 years of age, young children have a deficit in their episodic memory. 
They do not have the ability to recall events as having been experienced. They cannot 
remember looking at and feeling the items, and being told about them. When they are asked 
the test question they cannot remember how the items differed. If children are indeed 
attempting to recall their experience, then the findings from Experiment 5 suggest that it is 
the verbal description that is causing them problems. They did not seem to have difficulty 
recalling their self experience, but they may have had difficulty remembering what they 
have been told. 
Research in other areas supports this idea that young children can have more 
difficulty remembering verbal information than other types of information. In the event 
literature there have been proposals that children recall less following verbal descriptions of 
an event. For example, Gobbo et al. (2002) found that 3 to 5-year-old children recalled less 
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about an event (when asked immediately and a week later) if they had heard about it 
through a story, rather than when they had observed it, or participated in it directly. This 
suggests that children might find it harder to remember information they have been told, 
than information that had been gained in any other way.  
However, some studies have shown that verbal experience is actually better than no 
experience at all. For example, McGuigan and Salmon (2005) gave 6-year-old children 
prior information about an event and then later asked them to recall details of that event. 
Children who had received prior narrative information recalled more about the event than 
those who had received no prior information at all (although those who received a 
combination of narration and photographs recalled the most).  
Relevant verbal experience can, in some cases, even improve recall. For example, 
Sutherland et al. (2003) showed that 5 to 7-year-olds recalled most about an event when 
they had been given specific verbal information prior to the event occurring, rather than 
being given unspecific or irrelevant verbal information. Relevant verbal experience can 
provide children with appropriate labels and connections between factors that they would 
otherwise not possess (Sutherland et al., 2003).  
In summary, the evidence regarding the advantages or disadvantages of verbal 
information to young children‟s recall is inconclusive.  The effect of verbal information on 
young children‟s understanding of aspectuality has never been investigated. The subsequent 
experiment was designed to shed light on this matter. It aimed to confirm whether, in 
aspectuality tasks, children found dealing with verbal experience of the items harder than 
when they received no experience at all of the items. It also aimed to clarify whether 
children were attempting to recall the verbal descriptions of the items in this task. This was 
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done by manipulating the quantity and relevance of the verbal descriptions they were given 
during their pre-trial experience. 
 
2. Experiment 6 – The effect of verbal pre-trial experience on young children‟s 
understanding of aspectuality 
It was possible that children found it difficult to remember the verbal descriptions of 
the perceptual qualities of the items that they received in Experiment 5. Evidence suggests 
that the development of young children‟s verbal working memory is related to their 
increasing ability to generate speech (Baddeley, 1986). Their capacity for articulatory 
rehearsal of information is also limited, especially before the age of 8 years (e.g., Kemps, 
De Rammelaere, & Desmet, 2000). This suggests that young children might find it difficult 
to hold verbal information in mind and recall what they have been told. Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that young children might find the current task easier if they had less to 
remember and, consequently, less to hold in mind. The manipulation in Experiment 6 
involved reducing the number of descriptive words used to refer to the items in the pre-trial 
experience. 
The way in which these words were reduced was easily determined. In Experiment 
5 (and in previous aspectuality tasks), the items are described by referring to how they are 
the same and how they differ. For example, O‟Neill et al. (1992) pointed out the perceptual 
quality that the items shared and then indicated how they differed. Nevertheless, to succeed 
at an aspectuality task it is only necessary for children to realise how the items differ. It is 
this difference that will determine what perceptual action they take later on in the task. For 
example, if the items are different colours then children should understand that they will 
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need to look to locate one of them. There is other evidence to suggest that pointing out the 
relevant features helps with recall. For example, Conroy and Salmon (2006) suggested that 
young children‟s ability to remember an event improves if the relevant components are 
highlighted verbally. Also, verbal descriptions can be beneficial to 6-year-old children‟s 
recall, if those descriptions define the most relevant features (e.g., Bacharach, Carr, & 
Mehner, 1976; Olson 1970).  
In Experiment 6, therefore, the number of descriptive words used was reduced by 
removing those that described how the items were the same. It was then possible to 
compare children‟s performance with three different quantities of verbal descriptions: none 
at all, just the relevant, differentiating modality information about the items, and all the 
visual and tactile information. The 6-year-olds tested in Experiment 5 performed well 
above chance in all conditions and this may have reduced the size of the effects that were 
found. For that reason, in Experiment 6 both 5 and 6-year-olds were tested. 
2.1 Method 
Participants 
One hundred and sixteen children participated from three schools serving 
predominately working class populations in Leeds and Sheffield, U.K.  Sixty-four 5-year-
olds (range 4;10 to 5;11, mean 5 years and 5 months; 34 girls) and 52 6-year-olds (range 
6;0 to 7;1, mean 6 years and 5 months; 26 girls) participated. They were all reported by 
their teachers as possessing a good understanding of English.  Ethnicity was distributed as 
follows: White (86), Asian (24), Black (3), and other (3). 
Materials 
 The materials from Experiment 1, 3, 4, and 5 were used. 
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Design 
Children were given eight experimental trials. They were allocated in turn to one of 
the following three conditions: no experience; verbal experience; relevant experience.  
Procedure 
The procedure and the no experience and verbal experience conditions were the 
same as in Experiment 5. In the relevant experience condition the experimenter described 
only the differentiating factor between the two balls in each trial. For example, “I‟m going 
to hide two balls, one is hard and the other is soft”.  
 2.2 Results 
Scoring 
All children passed the familiarisation task and so took part in the main experiment. 
Children were given a score of 1 for every correct perceptual action chosen in each trial and 
0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 6).  
Analysis 
 A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with information condition (no 
experience and verbal experience and relevant experience) and age (5-year-olds and 6-
year-olds) as between subject factors and modality (looking trials and. feeling trials) as a 
within subject factor. The results showed a main effect of age, F(1, 110) = 15.56, p < 
.0001, ²p = .12, with 6-year-olds (M = 6.199, SD = 1.70) performing better than 5-year-
olds (M = 4.95, SD = 1.82). The results also showed a main effect of information 
condition, F(2, 110) = 4.39, p = .015, ²p = .07.
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Table 6 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 6 
Age and Information Condition Number of trials correct Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5-year-olds           
No Experience (n = 23) 0 0 0 1 5 4 4 4 5 5.87 (1.60) *** 
Verbal Experience (n = 21) 0 1 0 7 3 6 2 2 0 4.29 (1.52) ns 
Relevant Experience (n = 20) 0 0 2 5 5 3 0 2 3 4.60 (1.98) *** 
6-year-olds           
No Experience (n = 17) 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 4 6 6.53 (1.51) *** 
Verbal Experience (n = 17) 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 3 4 6.00 (1.62) *** 
Relevant Experience (n = 18) 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 7 6.06 (1.98) *** 
Expected frequencies if 
performance were at chance  
(n = 20) 
.078 .62 2.2 4.4 5.4 4.4 2.2 .62 .078 4 
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Independent samples t tests showed that those in the no experience condition (M = 6.15, SD 
= 1.58) performed better than those in the verbal experience condition (M = 5.05, SD = 
1.77), t(76) = 2.89, p = .005, r = .31 and better than those in the relevant experience 
condition (M = 5.29, SD = 2.09), t(76) = 2.06, p = .043, r = .23 No difference was found 
between the verbal experience (M = 5.05, SD = 1.77) and relevant experience conditions (M 
= 5.29, SD = 2.09), t(76) = -.53, p = .60, r = .06.  
No interaction was found between age and condition, F(2, 110) = .92, p = .40, ²p = 
.016. However, independent samples t tests showed that 5-year-olds in the no experience 
condition (M = 5.87, SD = 1.60) performed better than those in the verbal experience 
condition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.52), t(42) = 3.53, p = .002, r = .48 and better than those in the 
relevant experience condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.98), t(41) = 2.32, p = .025, r = .34. No 
difference was found between the verbal experience (M = 4.29, SD = 1.52) and relevant 
experience conditions (M = 4.60, SD = 1.98), t(39) = -.57, p = .57, r = .09. However, 6-
year-olds in the no experience condition (M = 6.53, SD = 1.51) performed no different to 
those in the verbal experience condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.62), t(32) = .99, p = .33,  r = .17 
and those in the relevant experience condition (M = 6.06, SD = 1.98), t(33) = .79, p = .43, r 
= .14. No difference was found between the verbal experience (M = 6.00, SD = 1.62) and 
relevant experience conditions (M = 6.06, SD = 1.98), t(33) = -.09, p = .93, r = .016. 
Analysis was then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
Paired-sample t tests showed that 5-year-olds performance did not improve from their first 
two trials to their last two trials in any condition. However, the performance of 6-year-olds 
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in the verbal experience condition improved from their first two trials (M = 2.65, SD = 
1.17) to their last two trials (M = 3.35, SD = .93), t(17) = -2.14, p = .048, r = .46.  
Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were compared to chance. Analysis showed 
that 5-year-olds performed better than would be expected by chance in the no experience 
condition, 2 (8, N = 23) = 290.89, p < .001, and the relevant experience condition, 2 (8, N 
= 20) = 115.98, p < .001, but not the verbal experience condition, 2 (8, N = 21) = 8.40, p = 
.40. Six-year-olds performed better than would be expected by chance in the no experience 
condition, 2 (8, N = 17) = 565.75, p < .001, the relevant experience condition, 2 (8, N = 
17) = 254.29, p < .001 and the verbal experience condition, 2 (8, N = 18) = 695.27, p < 
.001. 
2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 6 had three aims; first, was to confirm the findings from Experiment 5 
that children had difficulty dealing with verbal descriptions. Second, was to find out if 5-
year-olds performed any differently to 6-year-olds. The third aim was to examine whether 
reducing the amount of verbal information made the task easier for children. To begin with 
the first two points will be discussed. 
The main analysis confirmed what was found in Experiment 5. Children had 
difficulty dealing with verbal information. However, the findings from Experiment 6 
expanded on the previous results. The children tested in Experiment 6 performed overall 
much better when they were not given any experience of the items before they were hidden, 
offering some support to Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) suggestion. However, why was this 
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effect not found in Experiment 5? To answer this question it is necessary to look more 
closely at the performance of the different age groups in Experiment 6. 
In the current study it was found that, overall, 6-year-olds performed better than 5-
year-olds. However, 6-year-olds performed just as well when they received no experience 
as when they were told about the items (thus repeating the effect found with this age group 
in Experiment 5). In contrast, the 5-year-olds seemed to perform better when they had not 
received any experience of the items, than when they had been told about their perceptual 
qualities. Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) third study also showed a marked difference 
between the performances of 5 and 6-year-olds. They found that children under 6 years of 
age performed better at an aspectuality task when they had not had experience of the items 
before they were hidden. However, it is important to remember that Perner and Ruffman 
(1995) believed that experience generally caused children‟s difficulty with the task, 
whereas the current findings have shown that only verbal experience was responsible. 
This brings us to the third point, whether children had more difficulty with the task 
when they were told only the relevant perceptual information. The main analysis showed no 
difference in performance between the verbal experience and relevant experience 
conditions. Children performed the same whether they were just given the differentiating 
perceptual information about the items, or given all the perceptual information. They did 
not find the task easier when they had less information to deal with. However, when 
individual children‟s performance was examined, a different story was told. When the 
pattern of responses was analysed, it was apparent that 5-year-olds performed poorly when 
they were told about all the items‟ perceptual qualities. So although no difference was 
found between the verbal experience and relevant experience conditions with this age 
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group, their performance on the former was no better than would be expected by chance. 
However, further investigation is required to clarify whether there is any substantial effect 
between these two types of verbal experience. 
It was also apparent that 6-year-olds started off performing poorly when they were 
given all the items‟ perceptual qualities. However, these older children improved towards 
the end of their trials (but note that this was the only occurrence in the experiments carried 
out for this thesis of children‟s performance improving as the task progressed). These 
results imply that including the non-differentiating information in the verbal item 
description may make the task harder for children. Nevertheless, these results do not 
conclusively suggest that children perform better if they have less verbal information to 
deal with. 
What is particularly interesting is that even when 5-year-olds were given just the 
relevant verbal descriptions of the items, their performance was poor. For example, even 
when told that a red ball and a blue ball were going to be hidden, and then asked to find the 
red one, these children did not realise that they had to look. Even though the tactile quality 
of the balls was never mentioned, 5-year-olds often chose to feel when asked to find a ball 
of a particular colour. It seems unlikely that any confusion between perceptual modalities 
occurred as the alternative modality was never mentioned. These children‟s performance is 
also surprising as the results of Experiment 2 showed that 4 to 5-year-olds can correctly 
choose the necessary perceptual action to find a specific perceptual aspect. The findings of 
the current study show that 5-year-old‟s understanding of aspectuality can be disrupted by 
telling them about the relevant perceptual qualities of the items before they are hidden. 
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3. Discussion of Experiments 5 and 6 
The two experiments reported here investigated whether prior experience affected, 
or was beneficial to, young children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks. The findings from 
Experiment 5 showed that pre-trial experience in the form of verbal descriptions hindered 
6-year-old children‟s performance whereas pre-trial experience in the form of self-directed 
looking and feeling made no difference to their performance. The findings from 
Experiment 6 showed that 5-year-olds had difficulty with the task even when they were 
given only the relevant verbal descriptions of the differing qualities of the items. 
In many ways, these results are contrary to the implications made in the event 
literature. For example, Murachver et al. (1996) suggested that children recalled the most 
about an event when they had taken part in it directly, rather than been told about it. 
However, it was found here that giving children the opportunity to take part in the pre-trial 
experience did not improve their performance at the task. They were no more successful at 
knowing whether they needed to look or feel to find one of the items when they had 
discovered the perceptual properties of the items themselves, by looking and feeling. Also, 
Gobbo et al. (2002) suggested that while verbal experience may not be the most effective at 
promoting accurate recall, it is better than nothing. However, once again, the current 
experiments found the opposite. Children who were told about the perceptual properties of 
the items performed worse than children who knew nothing about the items. Finally, 
Sutherland et al. (2003) suggested that if experience was relevant, then it should be 
beneficial to recall. Once more, the current findings do not match. It was found that giving 
children just the relevant verbal descriptions of the items did not help them with the task.  
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How do the current findings fit with the suggestion made by Perner and Ruffman 
(1995)? They found that children under 6-years of age found aspectuality tasks easier when 
they did not have any pre-trial experience. This is partially supported by the current 
findings where children did not perform better when they had received no experience of the 
items; they performed worse when they had been given verbal experience. Children found 
the task more difficult when they had been told about the perceptual qualities of the items 
by the experimenter.  However, for the majority of researchers in the aspectuality field, pre-
trial experience is given to children with the idea that it will help them. Pre-trial experience 
is intended to make it clear that the items are the same in one modality and different in 
another, and assist children in their later decision regarding what perceptual access they 
need to take (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992). The results of the current experiments demonstrate 
that this pre-trial experience may actually be reducing children‟s performance levels on 
these tasks. To allow children to perform at their best at aspectuality tasks, it might be that 
verbal descriptions need to be removed from their pre-trial experience. 
Why might children have difficulty dealing with this verbal experience? Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) had suggested that children under 6 years of age have difficulty with 
aspectuality tasks because they attempt, and fail, to recall their initial experience of the 
items. This suggests that if children had difficulty recalling the verbal descriptions they 
were given in Experiment 5, they may find it easier if they had to recall less information. 
However, in Experiment 6 it was shown that 5-year-olds still had difficulty dealing with 
just the relevant verbal descriptions of the items. Nevertheless, children‟s poor ability to 
deal with information they had been told might still be related to their memory abilities.   
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Performance on the aspectuality task (modality-specific task) has been correlated 
with the development of episodic memory (Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007). These 
researchers refer to a distinction in episodic memory between remembering an event 
through direct perceptual contact (e.g., remembering seeing the colour of an item) and 
having knowledge of an event through indirect contact (e.g., being told the colour of an 
item). In the former state, one remembers taking part in the experience and seeing for 
oneself the colour, whereas in the latter state one might know the colour but does not recall 
the experience of actually finding out the colour because one did not learn the information 
in that way. This distinction is important with relation to children‟s attempt to re-experience 
the pre-trial experience in aspectuality tasks. Based on this suggestion, young children 
would have difficulty succeeding at an aspectuality task if their initial experience of the 
items was indirect. They would not be able to re-experience their pre-trial experience if 
they had been told about the items. This would explain why the children tested here 
(particularly the 5-year-olds in Experiment 6) found the task harder when their pre-trial 
experience had included verbal information. Verbal information might be useful in that it 
can transmit knowledge from one person to another, but in the case of aspectuality tasks it 
causes difficulty, as it does not facilitate the recall necessary for children to re-experience 
the event.  
This introduces the next discussion point. Why do children attempt to recall the pre-
trial experience at all? As touched upon in previous chapters of this thesis, children could 
actually succeed at the current task without remembering the items. Regardless of the type 
of experience they had received, they were asked the same question, for example, “Find the 
red one”. Regardless of the type of experience they had received, all they had to do was to 
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realise that to find something that was red they needed to look. This demonstrates the lack 
of robustness of young children‟s understanding of aspectuality. They did not realise that 
they could succeed at this task by making this simple association. It seems that young 
children do not always realise when experiences matter and must be recalled and when 
experiences are irrelevant and can be ignored. 
It must be pointed out, however, that in the aspectuality literature the test question 
does not always refer to the specific aspect of the item. Rather than be asked to find, “the 
red one”, children are sometimes asked to find out “which one” has been hidden. In this 
latter case, children do have to recall their pre-trial experience, as this is the only way that 
they will realise how the items differ. The next experiment focuses on these variations in 
the phrasing of the test question and the implications of their use.  
The conclusion that can be made from the results of Experiments 5 and 6 is that 
young children do not always benefit from experience. Rather, in some situations, 5-year-
olds can have enormous difficulty dealing with pre-trial verbal information, performing 
only at chance level. Based on Perner, Kloo, and Gornik‟s (2007) proposal, it is suggested 
that verbal experience might provide children with knowledge but it does not facilitate their 
ability to re-experience the initial event. Children find aspectuality tasks harder when they 
have been previously told about the perceptual qualities of the items. Giving children this 
verbal experience may even harm any benefits gained from direct perceptual experience. 
The way in which this information limits young children‟s performance on these tasks 
demonstrates that their understanding of aspectuality is not robust. 
The findings from this chapter have shown that verbal descriptions of items could 
have a significant influence on children‟s performance in aspectuality tasks. The next 
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consideration was whether other types of verbal information that tend to be used in 
aspectuality tasks might have a similar effect. It was apparent from the extant aspectuality 
literature that differences in verbal descriptions were not only found within the 
familiarisation procedure. As just mentioned, variations in the descriptions of the items in 
the test questions were used in these tasks. The following chapter focuses on whether 
young children‟s understanding of aspectuality was robust enough to deal with such 
variations in the questions they were asked.
  Question Phrasing
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CHAPTER 5 – DOES YOUNG CHILDREN‟S UNDERSTANDING OF 
ASPECTUALITY DEPEND ON THE PHRASING OF THE QUESTION?  
 
Imagine you owned two pairs of socks that were identical but for their colour. 
Someone then asked you what colour socks you were wearing. What would you do? If you 
could not remember you would probably take a look to confirm the colour socks that you 
were wearing. What if you were asked whether you were wearing your black socks or your 
blue socks? Again, you would choose to look, as looking is the best way to check the 
colour of something. How about if you were asked which pair of socks you were wearing? 
Once again you would take a look to check which pair you had on. These examples 
demonstrate that as adults, we would understand that regardless of the way the question 
was phrased, the questioner was seeking the same information and the same action was 
required. We would recognise that colour can best be determined by looking and that other 
perceptual actions would be of no use. This chapter investigated whether young children‟s 
understanding of the link between perceptual access and subsequent knowledge was 
sufficiently robust to deal with such differences in question phrasing. 
As shown in the earlier chapters, young children‟s understanding of aspectuality is 
typically investigated by asking them to choose the perceptual action necessary to find out 
specific information about a hidden item (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992). However, the tasks 
reported to date are remarkably inconsistent in the test questions they have asked children. 
Three different types of question have been used. First, children have been asked to find out 
“which one” has been hidden (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner & Ruffman, 1995). Second, 
children have been asked to find out, for example, “what colour” item has been hidden 
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(e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Pillow, 1993). Third, children have been asked to find out 
whether the hidden item is, for example “the red one” (O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995; Pillow, 1993). These question types will be referred to in this thesis as, 
respectively, the identity, dimension, and aspect questions. In some cases more than one of 
these references has been used in the same question. For example, Robinson and 
Whitcombe (2003) referred to both the identity and aspect of the target. They hid one of a 
pair of ladybirds (that felt the same but were different colours) in a tunnel and asked 
children, “which bug is in the tunnel – is it the red one or the blue one?” followed soon 
after by, “which one is it?”  
Research investigating young children‟s understanding of language and 
communication had suggested that the phrasing of questions may influence children‟s 
performance (for a review of this literature see Siegal & Surian, 2004). For example, 6-
year-olds do not always understand that an adult might refer to an item in several different 
ways, depending on how they want to emphasise its importance; indeed this 
misunderstanding may cause children to (incorrectly) change their initial response 
(Donaldson, 1978; Siegal, 1991). If this is the case, then tasks that refer to targets in several 
ways (such as Robinson & Whitcombe‟s study mentioned above) may be underestimating 
children‟s understanding. It also suggests that children may respond differently depending 
on the word that is used to refer to an item. Thus, young children‟s poor performance at 
aspectuality tasks may actually be a demonstration of their confusion due to the phrasing of 
the question. Other evidence does support this hypothesis. As mentioned in the introduction 
to this thesis, Pratt and Bryant (1988) demonstrated that 3-year-olds performed better on 
knowledge assessment tasks when the question they were asked was simplified.  
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Several authors in the aspectuality literature have suggested that children might find 
some of questions used in those tasks easier to deal with than others (O‟Neill et al., 1992; 
Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Pillow, 1993).  The identity question was used by O‟Neill et al. 
(1992) and Perner and Ruffman (1995) to assess children‟s understanding of aspectuality. 
Both suspected that this type of question was particularly hard for children to deal with 
(though did not specify their reasons) and used the aspect question in following studies. 
Versions of the dimension question were used by Pillow (1993) (and also O‟Neill et al. in 
parallel with the identity question). Again this type of question was thought to increase the 
difficulty of the task so the aspect question was adopted in later studies.  
The aspect question has been suggested as easier for children to understand because 
it may remind children of the differentiating factor between the two original items (O‟Neill 
et al., 1992). This could be because when the items are initially described to children during 
their pre-trial experience, they tend to be referred to by their perceptual aspect (e.g., it is 
pointed out that one is red and one is blue) (however, refer to the previous chapter for 
findings regarding the impact of verbal descriptions on children‟s performance). On the 
other hand, Pillow (1993) suggested that the aspect question may be easier to understand 
because it refers to a specific quality of an item (e.g., the fact that is red). This specific 
quality is distinct from the dimension of an item (e.g., colour) as that is more of an abstract 
concept and is more difficult for young children to understand. Nevertheless, during the 
pre-trial experience stage of aspectuality tasks the items are often referred to by their 
dimension too (e.g., it is pointed out that they are different colours). 
It is possible that differences in difficulty of the test questions in aspectuality tasks 
may have masked children‟s understanding and their abilities may have been 
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underestimated. Assessing children‟s performance with these questions would also reveal 
more about the robustness of their understanding of aspectuality. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, someone with a robust understanding would not be affected by 
such variations. It would not matter how an item was referred to. They would realise that no 
matter how the question was phrased, the same information was sought. Therefore, 
Experiment 7 aimed to carry out the first ever (known) direct comparison between the test 
questions that tend to be used in aspectuality tasks. 
 
1. Experiment 7 – Does the phrasing of the test question affect young children‟s 
performance in aspectuality tasks? 
To ensure that the only difference in the tasks was between the test questions, a 
discovery aspectuality task was used where two items were initially presented, then one 
item was hidden and had to be identified (see Experiment 1). The results of Experiment 2 
showed that 4 to 5-year-olds can succeed at aspectuality tasks and perform well above what 
would be expected by chance. Therefore, in the current experiment this same age group 
were tested. Based on the evidence from the existing aspectuality literature it was expected 
that children asked the aspect questions would perform better than those asked either the 
dimension or identity questions. However, the literature makes no clear prediction as to 
whether these two latter questions would differ.  
1.1 Method 
Participants 
 Sixty children (30 girls) participated from three schools serving predominately 
working class populations in Leeds, U.K.  Their ages ranged from 4;2 to 5;1 (mean 4 years 
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and 8 months) and they were all reported by their teachers as possessing a good 
understanding of English. Ethnicity was distributed as follows: White (37), Black (10), 
Asian (10) and other (3). 
Materials 
The materials from Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were used. 
Design 
An aspectuality task was used where children were initially presented with two 
items that were the same in one perceptual modality and different in another. One was then 
hidden in a tunnel while the other was returned to a bag. Every child had four experimental 
trials: two required looking and two required feeling. Children were allocated to one of four 
orders of these trials as follows: (i) Look, Feel, Look, Feel (LFLF), (ii) FLFL, (iii) LFFL, 
(iv) FLLF. These orders were used to ensure that the first two trials did not require the same 
modality, which might encourage perseveration.  
Procedure  
Familiarisation. The familiarisation procedure was same as used in Experiments 1, 
3, 4, 5, and 6.  
Main trials. Children were allocated in turn to one of three test question conditions. 
Children given the aspect question were asked about the target ball with the relevant 
modality aspect mentioned (e.g., “find out if the one in the tunnel is the red one or the blue 
one”). Those given the dimension question were asked about the target ball with the 
relevant modality dimension mentioned (e.g., “find out what colour the one in the tunnel 
is”). Those given the identity question were asked about the identity of the target ball (e.g., 
“find out which one is in the tunnel”).  
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For the tactile targets the identity question used the same description (“which one”) 
and the aspect question used the terms “hard or soft”. However, as acknowledged by 
O‟Neill et al., (1992), a true dimension question was difficult to generate for the tactile 
targets. It was not feasible to say “what the one in the tunnel feels like” because that would 
direct children to the correct action of feeling. It was also not possible to identify a child-
appropriate label to describe the softness of the item that was equivalent to describing its 
colour. Therefore, in order to best replicate the existing research, the phrase used by 
O‟Neill et al.‟s (1992) was adopted. The dimension question for feeling trials therefore 
included the phrase “what the one in the tunnel is stuffed with.”  
At the beginning of each trial the children were presented with the two balls that 
were going to be used in that trial and asked to look at them and feel them properly. The 
results of Chapter 4 showed that pre-trial experience was not actually beneficial for young 
children‟s understanding of the task. However, in the present experiment children had to be 
familiar with the different ways of describing the items. This was because these 
descriptions were the basis for the different question phrasings, which was the focus of the 
study.  
When the children were given the balls, therefore, the experimenter pointed out to 
the children how the balls were similar and how they differed, using references to their 
modality aspects and dimensions. This was to ensure that children were equally familiar 
with how the items could be described by their aspect and dimension. This was done while 
the experimenter described the perceptual attributes of each ball in turn, mentioning the 
differentiating modality first. For example, for a feeling trial, “this one is soft because it‟s 
stuffed with cotton wool and it‟s red and this one is hard because it‟s stuffed with a stone 
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and it‟s red. So these two balls are both the same colour aren‟t they? They are both red so 
they look the same. But they feel different don‟t they?”  Or for a looking trial, “this one is 
red and it‟s stuffed with cotton wool and this one is blue and it‟s stuffed with cotton wool. 
So these two balls are both stuffed with cotton wool aren‟t they? They‟re both soft so they 
feel the same. But they look different don‟t they?”  The tactile dimension description 
(“stuffed with...”) was longer than the description used for the visual dimension, and took a 
different format. However, it was believed that if children had any particular difficulty with 
this label then it would become apparent in the analysis between the looking and feeling 
trials for the dimension question. 
As a check that they understood the different visual and tactile descriptions the 
children were then asked to pass each ball to the experimenter. For example, for a pair of 
balls that differed in the tactile dimension they were asked to, “give me the hard one that‟s 
stuffed with a stone” and “give me the soft one that‟s stuffed with cotton wool”, and for 
balls that differed in the visual dimension they were asked to, “give me the one that is the 
colour red” and “give me the one that is the colour blue.” 
The children were told that one of the balls would be hidden in the tunnel and the 
other one would be put back in the bag. This process took place underneath the cloth so that 
the children could not see which ball was placed where. The remainder of the procedure 
was as used in Experiments 5 and 6. 
1.2 Results 
Coding 
All children passed the familiarisation check and so took part in the main experiment.  
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For the main trials children were given a score of 1 for each correct perceptual action 
chosen in each trial and 0 for every incorrect choice (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7 
Number of trials answered correctly in Experiment 7 
 
Test Question Condition 
 
 
 
 
Number of trials correct  
 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Aspect (n= 20) 0 1 5 6 8 3.05 (.95) *** 
Dimension (n= 20) 0 3 8 5 4 2.50 (1.0) ns 
Identity (n= 20) 1 8 8 2 1 1.70 (.92) ns 
Expected frequencies if 
performance were at  
chance (n= 20) 
1.25 5 7.5 5 1.25 2 
 
 
Analyses 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with test question condition (aspect 
and dimension and identity) as a between-subject factor and modality (looking trials and 
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feeling trials) as a within-subject factor. A main effect of test question condition was found, 
F(2, 57) = 10.07, p < .0001, ²p = .26. Independent samples t tests (making a Bonferroni 
correction for 3 tests, p <.0167) showed that children who received the aspect question (M 
= 3.05, SD = .95) performed better that those who received the identity question (M = 1.70, 
SD = .92), t(38) = 4.57, p < .001, r = .60. Children who received the dimension question (M 
= 2.50, SD = 1.0) also performed better that those who received the identity question (M = 
1.70, SD = .92), t(38) = 2.63, p = .012, r = .39. No difference was found between the aspect 
question (M = 3.05, SD = .95) and the dimension question (M = 2.50, SD = 1.0), t(38) = 
1.79, p = .082, r = .28. There was no effect of modality and no interactions were found 
(highest F = 2.82, lowest p = .10).  
Analysis was then carried out to see if children‟s performance improved over time. 
Paired-sample t tests showed no improvement in performance from the first two trials to the 
last two trials in any of the three conditions (lowest p = .45). 
Finally, individuals‟ observed scores were compared to chance. Analysis showed 
that children performed better than would be expected by chance with the aspect question, 
2 (4, N = 20) = 41.93, p < .001, but not the dimension question, 2 (4, N = 20) = 8.13, p = 
.087 or the identity question, 2 (4, N = 20) = 3.73, p = .44.  
1.3 Discussion  
The current experiment aimed to compare the different types of question used in 
tasks assessing young children‟s understanding of aspectuality and to establish any 
influence they might have on children‟s performance. It was hypothesised that if children 
had a robust understanding of aspectuality they would have no difficulty dealing with 
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variations in the phrasing of the test question. However, the existing literature had 
suggested that children receiving the aspect question would perform better than those 
receiving the identity question and the dimension question. The results of Experiment 7 
confirmed this. While children who received the aspect and dimension questions performed 
better than those who received the identity question, only those who received the aspect 
question performed better than would be expected by chance. First, the results will be 
discussed in relation to the suggestions made in the literature. 
Referring to the aspect (e.g., red or soft) of an item in the test question was 
suggested as making it easier for children to understand (O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995). The current findings confirmed this. Children were most successful at the 
task when the specific quality of the item was mentioned in the test question. There is other 
evidence to suggest that children might find it easier to deal with the most explicit 
description of an item. For example, children seem to focus on the most obvious and salient 
feature of items when attempting to categorise them (Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1992). It is 
likely that if children most readily focus on the aspect of an item, then they will find this 
information the easiest to remember. 
Asking children about the dimension of an item (e.g., its colour) was suggested as 
being equivalent to asking them about its identity (e.g., which one it was) (O‟Neill et al., 
1992). The current results showed that this was not so. Performance with the dimension 
question was not equivalent to performance with the identity question. Although 
performance with both question phrasings was no better than would be expected by chance, 
children who received the dimension question performed overall significantly better than 
those who received the identity question. Observation of the raw data suggested that this 
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result might have been driven by children‟s performance on the dimension trials. Children 
who were asked to find out which colour item had been hidden (M = 1.45, SD = .61) found 
the task easier than those who were asked to find out “what the one in the tunnel is stuffed 
with” (M = 1.05, SD = .69). While children‟s performance with the identity question was 
poor for both the looking trials (M = .95, SD = .83) and the feeling trials (M = .75, SD = 
.79). If a functionally equivalent tactile question were found, children‟s performance on the 
dimension question could be even greater to that on the identity question. However, it 
remains to be seen whether this would improve children‟s performance with the dimension 
question to a level greater than chance. 
It was also suggested that children would find the dimension question more difficult 
than the aspect question (O‟Neill et al., 1992) due to the more abstract nature of the 
dimensional description (Pillow, 1993). The findings of the current experiment did not 
consistently support this hypothesis. Although performance on the dimension question was 
no better than chance it was not significantly different to performance on the aspect 
question. Again, it is possible that this was due to the difficulty of matching the phrasing of 
the tactile dimension question with the phrasing of the visual dimension question. 
Nevertheless the main analysis did not show a main effect of modality or an interaction 
between modality and question phrasing. Therefore it is clear that the tactile dimension 
question did not have a significant effect on children‟s performance. Future research may 
determine whether or not an equivalent tactile dimension (if found) would increase young 
children‟s performance on these trials. Until then it is difficult to fully assess the current 
findings with the dimension question trials, and compare them to the identity and aspect 
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question results. Therefore, the focus in the remainder of this chapter and thesis will be on 
the findings regarding the aspect and identity question. 
The main result of interest is that performance with the identity question was very 
poor with both visual and tactile trials. Children did not understand what perceptual action 
they need to take when they were asked to find out “which one” had been hidden. This was 
despite them, only moments earlier, dealing with the modality that differentiated the two 
items by handing those items back to the experimenter (and so focussing on the aspects of 
the items, for example, by passing back “the red one” and “the blue one” when requested). 
The difficulty children had with the identity question suggests that either they were not able 
to remember how the items differed, or they could remember but did not know what action 
to take. From the evidence shown here, it appears that children‟s difficulty is with recall. 
To explain further, the current findings demonstrate that when they are given the 
identity phrasing, children must recall their experience of the items. This is because no clue 
is included in the question. For example, when children are asked to find out if the item is 
red or blue, or what colour it is, they can succeed at the task by making an association with 
looking. They do not need to remember how the items differed. In contrast, when asked to 
find out “which one” is hidden, they must remember the modality in which the items 
differed. There is no other way of them knowing how they differ. They must remember 
their pre-trial experience of the items. Children‟s poor performance in the identity task 
provided clear evidence that they had forgotten their pre-trial experience. 
Young children‟s ability to recall their experience of the items has been shown to 
influence their performance on aspectuality tasks (Perner & Ruffman, 1995). These 
researchers found that children under the age of 6 years performed better when they were 
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not given pre-trial experience of the items (see previous chapter of this thesis for further 
research on the influence of pre-trial experience). What is of interest here is that Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) used two types of aspectuality task to demonstrate the effect of experience, 
and an important secondary factor was also changed. As mentioned previously, their 
experiments either included, or did not include, pre-trial experience (the “two item test” and 
“one item test” respectively). However, changes were also made to the phrasing of the test 
question. Although Perner and Ruffman (1995) did not discuss these changes, they had to 
be made in order for children to understand how the items differed. For example, in their 
aspectuality task that included pre-trial experience (“two item task”) children were asked 
“which one” was hidden. It was intended that children would realise how the items differed 
during the pre-trial experience, so it was not necessary for this difference to be pointed out 
in the question. However, in their task that did not include pre-trial experience (“one item 
task”), children were asked if the hidden item was “black or white”. In this case children 
had not seen, felt, or been told about the items and so had no way of knowing how they 
differed. Therefore, the way in which the items differed had to be included in the test 
question. There is the possibility that these differences in the test question, and not the 
differences in the pre-trial experience, were responsible for their findings.  
The findings of the present experiment offer some degree of clarification for this. 
They demonstrate that 4-year-old children perform at chance with the identity question 
(where they have to recall their pre-trial experience) but deal well with the aspect question 
(where they do not have to recall their pre-trial experience but can use the clues in the 
question to succeed). Therefore, children have more difficulty with the task when they have 
to recall their experience. These results offer support for Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) 
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hypothesis that young children‟s ability to succeed on aspectuality tasks is related to the 
development of their episodic memory and their ability to recall their pre-trial experience of 
the items.  
It is important to note that the current experiment differed from Perner and 
Ruffman‟s (1995) study. All children tested here were given pre-trial experience of the 
items, regardless of their test question, whereas the focus of Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) 
manipulation was the presence, or not, of experience. Therefore, the results of Experiment 
7 imply that while young children might have difficulty in recalling their pre-trial 
experience, they are not limited by their inability to remember the items. When they are 
given a useful clue in the question, and so do not have to recall the items, they perform 
well. This shows that children did realise when information included in the test question 
was relevant and useful.  
In summary, the current findings suggest that 4-year-old children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality is robust to the extent that they realise when they can sometimes use evidence 
(from the test question). While they might fail to recall their experience of the items (as 
proposed by Perner & Ruffman, 1995) if there are sufficient clues in the test question, then 
children can successfully choose the correct perceptual access to gain information about the 
hidden item. However, their poor episodic memory does not allow them to recall how the 
items had differed, so if the test question does not offer any clues (e.g., “which one is in the 
tunnel”) then children have difficulty knowing how the items differed and whether they 
need to look or feel.  
These results have major implications for the aspectuality literature. Many use the 
identity question to assess young children‟s understanding without taking into account the 
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difficulty that they have in recalling their pre-trial experience. For example, O‟Neill et al. 
(1992) found that children under 5 years of age performed poorly when asked to find out 
which piggybank was hidden under a tunnel (despite having just felt that one was heavy 
and one was light). These children, who apparently fail aspectuality tasks, may understand 
the modality specific aspects of knowledge, but are unable to remember the items and are 
not given a specific target reference in the test question. It appears that future research 
investigating the development of aspectuality understanding may benefit from using an 
alternative procedure that allows for young children‟s poor recall ability.
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CHAPTER 6 – GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The current research aimed to discover the limits of young children‟s understanding 
of sources of knowledge. More specifically, the intention was to find out whether, once 
gained, young children‟s understanding of aspectuality was robust. This was investigated 
by examining 4 to 7-year-old‟s ability to deal with changes and variations applied to 
standard aspectuality tasks. As someone with a robust understanding of aspectuality should 
have no difficulty dealing with such manipulations, it was intended that young children‟s 
performance on these tasks would reveal the extent of their comprehension.  
Four manipulations were carried out over seven experiments. The first manipulation 
targeted the situational context of the task; the second aimed to discover whether children 
had difficulty dealing with irrelevant information included in the task; the third, whether the 
type of pre-trial experience they received affected their performance; and finally, if they 
were influenced by different target references. If children possessed a robust understanding 
of aspectuality, then their performance would not be disrupted by any of these 
manipulations. They would understand that specific perceptual knowledge could only be 
gained by particular perceptual actions, regardless of these variations. 
Initially, the findings will be summarised and then each manipulation will be 
discussed in more depth. The robustness of young children‟s understanding of aspectuality 
will then be assessed in the light of the results reported here. Subsequently, the 
methodological and theoretical implications of this research will be considered, before this 
chapter and thesis are concluded. 
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1. Summary of Results 
In all seven of the experiments in this thesis children took part in tasks assessing 
their understanding of perceptual aspectuality. These tasks followed a specific format 
inspired by methods that had been used by other researchers in the aspectuality field (e.g., 
O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Pillow, 1993). Children had to choose 
whether they needed to look or feel to gain specific visual or tactile information about a 
hidden item.  
The current research showed that 4 to 5-year-olds could succeed at a basic task 
assessing understanding of aspectuality (Experiment 2). However, 4-year-olds encountered 
problems when the test question did not directly refer to the relevant aspect of the target 
(Experiment 7). Five and 6-year-olds were not affected by context alterations: They 
performed just as well when they had to identify a single hidden item, as when they had to 
locate a target item from two that were hidden (Experiment 1). Children had no difficulty 
dealing with irrelevant perceptual information about the target item that was included in the 
test question (Experiment 2 and 3). However, 5 to 6-year-olds did have trouble handling 
irrelevant, partially differentiating information that was included in the array of items 
(Experiment 4). In Experiment 5, the performance of 6-year-olds was worse when verbal 
descriptions of the perceptual qualities of the items were included in their pre-trial 
experience. Five-year-olds also performed poorly when given these verbal descriptions, 
even when the descriptions just consisted of the relevant differentiating perceptual 
information about the items (Experiment 6). Finally, a bias towards feeling was found in 
Experiment 2, but a bias towards looking was found in Experiment 3.  
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2. The Impact of Irrelevant Information 
 As proposed in the introduction to this thesis, someone with a robust understanding 
of aspectuality should be able to deal with irrelevant information. They should realise when 
irrelevant information can be ignored. For example, if they genuinely understand that 
looking will lead to knowledge of an item‟s colour, then they will realise that other 
perceptual information is irrelevant. Evidence suggests that 3-year-olds can show some 
understanding of when information is relevant or irrelevant in visual search tasks (e.g., 
Sophian & Wellman, 1980). However, children‟s ability to deal with irrelevant information 
in aspectuality tasks had never been investigated. The aim here was to find out if young 
children could ignore irrelevant information in these tasks as this would be one way of 
demonstrating the robustness of their understanding of sources of knowledge. 
The results of the current research showed that young children were sometimes able 
to deal with irrelevant information that was included in their task. Their success depended 
on how and when the irrelevant information was presented to them. In Experiments 2 and 
3, all the age groups tested (4, 5, and 6-year-olds) coped well with the inclusion of 
irrelevant information in the test question. For example, they were able to correctly choose 
to look to find the “red soft one” when the two items hidden were both soft and differed 
only in colour. In Experiments 3 and 4, however, children showed more difficulty handling 
irrelevant information that was included in their pre-trial experience. The 5 and 6-year olds 
tested here had problems choosing the correct perceptual action to find the target when 
partially differentiating (PD) information was included in the array. For example, they had 
difficulty choosing to feel to find “the soft one” when the four objects all felt different but 
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two were red and two were blue. To recap, irrelevant information in the pre-trial experience 
caused children difficulty but irrelevant information in the test question did not.  
 How can the different effects of irrelevant information be explained? They can, by 
considering the four stages of the aspectuality task. At the beginning of each trial the 
children had experience of the items; then the target item was hidden; after that the test 
question was asked; and finally children made their choice of perceptual action. The results 
of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 showed that children were affected by irrelevant information in 
the first stage, but not irrelevant information in the penultimate stage. Consequently, Perner 
and Ruffman‟s (1995) theory is supported: It is the pre-trial experience stage that is 
important for children‟s understanding. The findings of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 
demonstrate that it is the pre-trial experience stage where children‟s comprehension can be 
more easily disrupted. It is possible that the knowledge gained in pre-trial experience is the 
most vulnerable and the least robust. 
 The importance of pre-trial experience will be addressed again in subsequent 
sections of this discussion. For now, future research concerning irrelevant information will 
be considered. The impact of irrelevant information produced interesting and apparently 
conflicting results. It is possible that other stages of the aspectuality task are susceptible to 
the influence of irrelevant information and this could easily be tested. For example, the 
final stage of the task (when children choose the perceptual access they want to take) could 
be adapted to include irrelevant information. Children could be offered an additional 
perceptual access option. For example, they could be asked if they wanted to look or feel or 
listen to find out the colour of the hidden item. If they had only looked at or felt the items 
during their pre-trial experience stage, it is likely that they would realise that listening was 
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irrelevant (according to the present findings). If, however, they behaved as though listening 
would give them knowledge about the hidden items visual or tactile qualities, this could 
have important consequences for the aspectuality literature. It might exemplify children‟s 
confusion over the modality specific aspects of knowledge, or demonstrate their inability to 
recall the relevant action performed during their pre-trial experience. 
In summary, irrelevant information only influenced children‟s performance when it 
was included in the first stage of the aspectuality task. It had no effect when it was included 
in the penultimate stage. This demonstrated that children‟s understanding of the task was 
dependent on the information in their pre-trial experience rather than the information in 
their test question. The next section will build on this discussion by considering other 
apparently contradicting evidence that shows children‟s performance affected by 
information in their test question.   
 
3. Target References 
In the previous section of this discussion it was shown that the pre-trial experience 
of the items was important for children‟s understanding, rather than the information that 
was in the test question. The changes that were made to pre-trial experience resulted in 
disruptions to young children‟s performance, whereas additional information included in 
the test question had no effect (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). Nevertheless, the results from 
Experiment 7 suggest otherwise. In Experiment 7, the aim was to find out if children‟s 
performance was influenced by the different phrasings of the test question that had been 
used in some of the aspectuality literature (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Pillow, 1993; 
Robinson et al., 1997). 
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If children‟s performance depended on their pre-trial experience (as shown in the 
previous section) they should have performed well in Experiment 7, regardless of the way 
the test question was phrased. However, this was not what was found: Children‟s 
performance differed according to the way the target was referred to in the test question. 
Children had little difficulty when their test question referred to a specific aspect of the 
target, for example, if it was red or soft. However, when they were asked to determine 
which item had been hidden, and the quality of that item was not directly referred to, their 
performance was at chance level. Whereas in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 children seemed to be 
focussed on their pre-trial experience rather than the information in their test question, in 
Experiment 7 the reverse appeared to be true. 
How can this apparent conflict be explained? One possibility concerns the way in 
which the target was referred to. In Experiment 7 children had difficulty when the test 
question did not directly refer to an aspect of the target, and they were asked to find out, 
“which one” had been hidden. In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, the test question always referred 
to either one or both of the target‟s perceptual aspects. For example, the simple question 
might refer to it as being “the red one”, whereas the complex question might refer to it as 
being “the red soft one”. In Experiment 7 it was also found that children performed well at 
the task when their test question referred to the target, for example, when they were asked 
to find out if it was “the red one or the blue one” that was hidden. In other words, when the 
perceptual aspects of the target were mentioned in the test question children performed 
well, but when the target was not directly referred to in this way they performed poorly. 
The way that the items were described in the question appeared to have had a major effect 
on young children‟s performance. 
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There is other evidence to suggest that young children are sensitive to the way items 
are described. They can have problems making associations between items and the labels 
that refer to them. For example, Apperly and Robinson (1998, 2002) propose that 4 and 5-
year-old children have difficulty fully understanding the relationship between an item and 
its representation: they do not understand that an item can be correctly referred to in many 
different ways. Although this example denotes labels rather than types of reference, it could 
also explain children‟s performance in Experiment 7. Here the target was referred to 
directly (e.g., by aspect or dimension) and indirectly (e.g., by being the “one” that was 
hidden). Children found it easy to deal with direct references (e.g., red or colour) but 
difficult to deal with indirect references (e.g., “which one”). It seems that young children 
can understand the relationship between an item and its reference better when that reference 
is direct. 
Nevertheless, there is an alternative possibility. The findings from the previous 
section of this discussion clearly showed that it was the pre-trial experience that was 
important for children‟s understanding of the task, not the test question. Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) also suggest that children‟s experience is crucial in aspectuality tasks. So 
can the results of Experiment 7 be explained with relation to pre-trial experience? The 
answer lies in the connection between children‟s pre-trial experience and the phrasing of 
the identity question. When children were asked to identify “which one” was hidden, they 
were forced to think back to their pre-trial experience of the items because no perceptual 
information was included in the test question. As there was no perceptual information in the 
test question that could direct them towards the correct perceptual action to take, they had 
to remember how they had found out the difference between the two items (by either 
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looking or feeling). In contrast, when children received the aspect or dimension question 
they were given perceptual information about the target in the test question. For example, 
they were asked to find out whether it was red or blue and this information could direct 
them towards the correct action of looking. This is particularly important because 
aspectuality tasks often ask children to find out “which one” was hidden, without 
necessarily considering their recall ability (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Robinson et al., 1997). 
It could be that children‟s ability to succeed at aspectuality tasks has been underestimated 
because of the way the target is referred to in the test question. 
Another possibility concerns the age of the children tested. In Experiment 7 the 4-
year-old participants showed little ability to recall their pre-trial experience. Even though 
they were asked to hand back the items to the experimenter they still did not remember how 
the items differed. For example, children were asked to hand back “the red one” and “the 
blue one” which required them to differentiate them by looking, but moments later when 
they were asked to find out “which one” was hidden, they had difficulty. However, the 
children that were given the complex test question in Experiments 2 and 3 did seem to have 
some recall ability. These children (youngest were 4 to 5-year-olds) must have been able to 
remember the items as their test question did not give them any clue as to which perceptual 
action they should choose.  
To recap, the current research showed that when the target was not directly referred 
to in the test question and children were forced to recall their pre-trial experience of the 
items, they had difficulty with the task. However, when the target was directly referred to in 
test question, children had no need to recall their pre-trial experience and performed well. 
This means that the 4-year-old‟s performance in Experiment 7 was dependent on their 
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ability to recall their pre-trial experience. This supports Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) 
theory that young children‟s poor episodic memory affects their performance on 
aspectuality tasks: If children have difficulty recalling their experience then they have 
problems understanding which perceptual action they need to take.  
How does this explain children‟s ability to deal with the complex test question in 
Experiments 2 and 3? Here the target was referred to, but both its perceptual qualities were 
mentioned. In this case, children could not have been directed towards the correct mode of 
perceptual access by the information included in the test question. Children must have been 
able to recall their pre-trial experience to succeed at the task. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
these children did have difficulty recalling the items, but being told the target‟s perceptual 
qualities in the test question prompted their memory. Even though both aspects of the target 
were mentioned and this was not enough to direct them towards the correct perceptual 
access, it was enough to remind them of their pre-trial experience and the items that they 
saw and felt. There is other evidence to suggest that verbal cues can increase young 
children‟s recall ability, even when the prompts are non-specific (e.g., Elischberger & 
Roebers, 2001). However, further research is needed to confirm this effect with relation to 
understanding sources of knowledge. Whether young children‟s recall of their pre-trial 
experience can be prompted by the references in the test question or is evidence of a more 
developed episodic memory, should be the subject of future research. 
In particular, these future studies could clarify young children‟s ability to recall 
perceptual information when prompted. Children could be asked to recall how two items 
differed, following; no prompt; a non-specific prompt (e.g., “think about the balls”); a 
relevant prompt (e.g., “think about the red one”); an irrelevant but somewhat useful prompt 
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(e.g., “think about the red soft one”); and an irrelevant and un-useful prompt (e.g., “think 
about who they belong to”).  If children were able to make use of information to increase 
their recall ability this could have important implications for how items are referred to in 
future aspectuality tasks. It could be that aspectuality test questions will no longer include 
direct target references, as they have been shown to assist children in their choice of 
perceptual action. On the other hand, the findings from the current and future research may 
do no more than standardise the way that targets are described in these tasks.   
So far in this discussion, it has been shown that children have difficulty recalling 
their pre-trial experience (Experiments 3, 4, & 7) but suggested that their ability to 
remember this event is responsive to prompts (Experiments 2 and 3). The next section will 
focus in more detail on the influence of pre-trial experience and its implications regarding 
the robustness of young children‟s understanding of aspectuality. 
 
4. The Impact of Experience 
 The results discussed up to now have demonstrated that young children focus on 
what they experience during the pre-trial procedure in aspectuality tasks. As previously 
stated, Perner and Ruffman (1995) also proposed that this part of the procedure plays a 
crucial part in young children‟s understanding. They showed that children performed better 
in aspectuality tasks when they did not receive any pre-trial experience of the items. In 
Experiments 5 and 6 this was tested. These experiments also aimed to discover whether 
children found some types of pre-trial experience more difficult to deal with than others. If 
children were susceptible to different types of pre-trial experience then this would reveal 
more about the robustness of their understanding.  
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Why do Perner and Ruffman (1995) believe that pre-trial experience is so 
important? They suggest that to succeed at an aspectuality task children have to remember 
“which sense modality they used in the warm-up phase” (p. 539). In other words, children 
have to recall their pre-trial experience with relation to the perceptual action that allowed 
them to differentiate between the items (e.g., remembering looking). This is opposed to 
recalling how the items themselves differed (e.g., remembering that one was red and one 
was blue). Therefore, it is the information that children gain from their own perceptual 
action that is crucial to their understanding, rather than information gained in any other 
way. Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) hypothesis can be interpreted to suggest that when 
young children have difficulty recalling their pre-trial experience, they are in effect failing 
to recall their self-directed access.  In other words, if children cannot remember what action 
they took to find out knowledge, then they do not understand what action they need to take 
to gain further information. 
In Experiment 5, therefore, the presence and absence of children‟s self-directed 
experience should have been the focal point of the findings. If children had received self-
directed experience then they should have performed well. If they had not received it, they 
should have performed poorly. However, the results showed that self-directed experience 
was no better or worse than any other type of experience and, more importantly, it was no 
better or worse than receiving no experience at all. Children‟s ability to recall their self-
directed pre-trial experience did not seem to affect their success at the task. Quite the 
contrary was found: The presence and absence of verbally-directed information in 
children‟s pre-trial experience was the focal point of these findings. 
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 Subsequently, the current research agrees with Perner and Ruffman (1995) only in 
so far as young children‟s success with aspectuality tasks is based on their ability to deal 
with their pre-trial experience. However, while Perner and Ruffman suggest that children 
have difficulty recalling their self-directed experience, the results of Experiment 5 and 6 
demonstrate that young children have difficulty in recalling information that is told to them 
during their pre-trial experience. It is this difficulty with verbal information that disrupts 
children ability to succeed at aspectuality tasks. Children‟s problem recalling the 
experimenter‟s descriptions of the items means that they find it harder to choose what 
perceptual action they need to take. 
Why might young children have particular difficulty in recalling verbal information 
and why does this affect their understanding of the aspectuality task? One possibility 
concerns the determining features of episodic memory. As mentioned in the introduction, 
episodic memory specifically allows one to recall something as having been personally 
experienced, as opposed to knowing something but not recalling how one has come to 
know it (e.g., Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007; Tulving, 1985). Additionally, episodic 
remembering is distinctive in that it requires both recalling an event and introspecting about 
it (Perner, Kloo, & Stottinger, 2007). In other words, to be able to recall an event, one must 
be able to introspect on what was found out during that event and how it was found out.  
So what does this mean as far as aspectuality tasks are concerned? It means that 
young children must personally experience the items in aspectuality tasks in order to be 
able to introspect about their knowledge and understand what action they need to take 
(Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007; Perner, Kloo, & Stottinger, 2007; Perner & Ruffman, 
1995). They must carry out the actions of looking and feeling in order to succeed at the 
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task. If, as in Experiments 5 and 6, they have only had verbal experience of the items, then 
they cannot introspect about looking and feeling, as they did not perform those actions. 
This could be why children who just received verbal experience performed less well. Being 
told perceptual information does not allow introspection in the same way that looking and 
feeling does. 
How does this explanation account for those children who received the combined 
experience? These children were given the verbal descriptions but also carried out the 
looking and feeling actions. They should have been able to introspect on their pre-trial 
experience and re-enact the perceptual access that had given them knowledge of the items. 
Based on Perner, Kloo, and Gornik‟s (2007), Perner, Kloo, and Stottinger‟s (2007), and 
Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) suggestion, one would have expected these children to 
perform well. Also, as previously mentioned, combining relevant prior information has 
been shown to improve 5 and 6-year-old children‟s recall of an event (McGuigan & 
Salmon, 2005). Yet in Experiment 5 the opposite effect was found. The addition of the 
verbal descriptions appeared to lessen any advantage that children might have gained from 
their self-directed experience.  
These findings from Experiments 5 are particularly important because most 
aspectuality and sources of knowledge tasks in the existing literature have involved 
children receiving such combined pre-trial experiences. Children tend to be given the items 
to look at and feel, while the experimenter describes them (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992). One 
possible explanation for children‟s poor performance in the combined pre-trial experience 
condition concerns the additional cognitive effort required. Young children do show signs 
of difficulty when trying using two simultaneous strategies to solve a problem (e.g., 
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Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Garber, & Church, 1993). It could be that it is extremely 
effortful for young children to hold in mind both verbal information and self-directed 
information while reasoning about what action they need to take to find a target. Therefore, 
when they are attempting to recall verbal descriptions, their ability to recall their self-
directed introspections is reduced, along with their ability to decide which perceptual action 
they need to take to succeed at the task. This possibility could be investigated further by 
directly comparing children‟s ability to recall perceptual information accessed in different 
ways (e.g., verbally and self-directed) and testing how much cognitive effort is used for 
each method (e.g., by assessing their performance on a secondary task run simultaneously).  
The findings from Experiment 5, however, showed that children performed poorly 
when they received combined experience and just verbal experience. Also, in Experiment 6 
the detrimental effect of verbal experience seemed to be maintained even when the amount 
of verbal information was reduced. There is other evidence to suggest that children find 
event information harder to recall when they had heard about it, than when they saw it, or 
had taken part in it (e.g., Gobbo et al., 2002). However, the idea that the presence of any 
amount of verbal information can reduce the effect of other sources of knowledge requires 
further investigation. One possibility is that children have difficulty dealing with particular 
verbal labels and referents (and this could explain the effect found with the tactile 
dimension question in Experiment 7). Therefore, if children were given the opportunity to 
create their own descriptions for the items they might show greater recall of this verbal 
information. It could be that the more salient the description is, the easier it is for children 
to remember.  
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In summary, it had been suggested previously, in this discussion and by Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) that young children depend on recalling their pre-trial experience to 
succeed at tasks assessing understanding of aspectuality. On the basis of Experiments 5 and 
6 it is now argued that young children‟s difficulty is with recalling the verbal information 
included in their pre-trial experience and that this difficulty disrupts their ability to succeed 
at the task. The next section will discuss the final set of findings from the current research 
concerning modality biases.  
 
5. Modality Biases 
Evidence suggests that young children are initially biased towards the visual 
modality: At around 3 years of age young children behave as if looking will give them all 
the information they need about to know about the perceptual qualities of an object (e.g., 
Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). For example, they 
act as though they can find out whether a toy contains a rattle or a bell just by looking at the 
uninformative shape of the toy (Pillow, 1993).  
The aspectuality literature is unclear about why older children can still show 
modality biases. Some studies have shown that up until 6 years of age, children tend to 
prefer looking as a source of knowledge: they believe that visual access will inform them 
about tactile qualities (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 1995). However, preferences for feeling 
have also been shown (Naito, 2003; O‟Neill et al., 1992). The general consensus seems to 
be that young children sometimes do show biases towards particular perceptual modalities, 
even after 3 years of age, when they are thought to have a better understanding of the 
modality specific aspects of knowledge. Nevertheless, the importance of these biases in the 
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development of aspectuality understanding has never been directly addressed, and the 
current research aimed to correct this.  
The findings from the research carried out here gave a mixed picture of young 
children‟s bias towards perceptual modalities; analyses showed modality bias in two of the 
seven experiments. The 4 to 5-year-olds tested in Experiment 2 showed a preference for 
feeling, yet the 5 and 6-year-olds from Experiment 3 were biased towards looking. The 
results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that 7 out of the thirty children tested always chose to 
feel. It is suggested that the equipment used influenced this feeling preference: it was only 
in this experiment that bags were used and only in this experiment that this tactile bias was 
found. Putting a hand into a bag to take something out is a very common occurrence. 
Children may well have been accustomed to taking an object out of a bag with their hand, 
so that it could be looked at and played with. Feeling an object while it is still inside a bag, 
however, is an unusual act. This is particularly so when the hand is not inserted into the 
bag, but feels the object from the outside of the bag, as was done in this experiment. It is 
possible that this distinct and unusual action attracted children‟s attention and meant that 
they always choose to feel. In other words, although they could have been expected to 
prefer to carry out more familiar acts, in this case children may have chosen to feel because 
they liked carrying out that atypical action.  
If using the bags to hide the items encouraged the children to feel, did using the 
tunnels encourage them to look? Tunnels have been used in much of the aspectuality 
literature (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 1995; O‟Neill et al., 1992; Robinson & Whitcombe, 
2003) and, although biases have often been found, they were not always in favour of 
looking. For example, as stated previously, O‟Neill et al. (1992) found preferences for both 
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looking and feeling in their series of experiments using the same tunnel apparatus. This 
would imply that modality biases occur by chance or for other undisclosed reasons. The 
current findings support this suggestion and can be demonstrated in two ways. First, the 
tunnels were used in all the experiments except Experiment 2, yet it was only in 
Experiment 3 that a looking bias was found. Further analysis indicated that this was driven 
by children‟s difficulty dealing with PD in the array of items: an interaction showed that 
children had particular difficulty with PD information in their feeling trials. Second, there 
was an indication of a preference towards looking in Experiment 7 with children who were 
given the dimension question. Children had particular difficulty dealing with the unusual 
sentence construction for the tactile dimension question. Therefore, it is possible that 
additional complexities such as PD information and unusual sentence construction can 
contribute towards modality preferences. 
Consequently, the effect of equipment in influencing modality bias is not important. 
What is important is the actual behaviour of the children who showed these biases. Two 
factors must be considered: how children‟s behaviour was analysed and whether they were 
confident in their judgements or merely guessing. Regarding the first point, for analysis to 
show a modality bias, a significant number of children must have chosen one form of 
access on almost every trial, if not every trial. They would have always (or almost always) 
chosen to look, or always (or almost always) chosen to feel. This would have resulted in 
them being correct on approximately half their trials, albeit accidentally. In the other 
experiments, where the bias was not shown, some children may have chosen the wrong 
perceptual access on most, or all their trials, but not mainly chosen either to look or to feel. 
Where care must be taken, is in interpreting low, or chance performance as being different 
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to biased performance. In all cases it should be apparent that the children did not 
understand aspectuality: they did not comprehend the link between the correct source of 
knowledge and subsequent information. Comparing individual children‟s performance to 
what would be expected by chance (as was done in this thesis), rather than merely 
evaluating their mean scores, allows a more accurate assessment of whether children were 
biased or merely guessing. 
The second point is regarding the confidence of children‟s judgements. The children 
who showed bias in the current experiments did not appear to be randomly choosing just 
one form of perceptual access. Many of them acted as though they genuinely believed they 
could find out the information they needed from just one perceptual action. For example, 
they seemed confident that they could tell the colour of the balls just by feeling them from 
outside the bag: one child distinctly said, “This one definitely feels red”. Most children did 
not behave as though they simply preferred performing that action without considering the 
outcome. 
Colour can sometimes be inferred without direct visual contact, however, (Robinson 
et al., 1997), and young children do show some ability to use inference as a source of 
knowledge, even if they cannot explain how they have inferred it (e.g., Pillow & Anderson, 
2006; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987; Varouxaki, Freeman, Peters, & Lewis, 1999). However, 
the experiments in this thesis did not afford success with such actions. There was no way 
that children could infer the colour or tactile qualities of the hidden items without looking 
or feeling. Thus, children who showed biased behaviour clearly did not understand 
perceptual aspectuality any more than children who guessed on every trial.  
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Nonetheless, it would be interesting to investigate further young children‟s 
confidence in their biased behaviour. It would enhance the existing literature if we could 
find out why some 5-year-olds, who should understand the modality specific aspects of 
knowledge, act as though one modality will give them all the perceptual information they 
require. Evidence suggests that is possible to ask children of this age, and even younger, to 
say why they hold certain beliefs. For example, children over 3 years of age are able to 
justify how they have gained knowledge and suggest how knowledge can be acquired (e.g., 
O‟Neill et al., 1992; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Sodian, 
1988). Therefore, future research could ask children to explain how they believe they can 
tell an item‟s colour by feeling, if they say they can. Or, on the other hand, they could be 
asked to rate their certainty of an object‟s colour when they have been feeling it (e.g., they 
are guessing) and when they have been looking at it (e.g., they know). 
In conclusion, biases towards particular forms of modality access are apparent in 
aspectuality tasks after children reach 3 years of age. Children who show these biases 
behave as though one mode of access will give them multiple types of perceptual 
information. It is possible that these biases are a demonstration of the difficulties young 
children sometimes have with the aspectuality task, and how their preferences may be 
directed by particular equipment used. It could be that when children have to deal with a 
situation that they are unsure about, they revert back to a previously used strategy. In this 
case the strategy that one form of perceptual access will lead to all types of perceptual 
knowledge. How do the current results add to the aspectuality literature? Modality biases 
demonstrate only that aspectuality is not robustly understood, and consequently, as long as 
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children‟s performance is analysed correctly, little regard should be paid to which particular 
modality is preferred. 
The next section of this discussion will pull together all the findings from the 
current research. This is in order to determine whether young children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality is robust, or whether their ability to succeed at the tasks are subject to 
performance related issues. 
 
6. Is Young Children‟s Understanding of Aspectuality Robust? 
The research discussed here has shown that young children attempted to recall the 
information they gained through pre-trial experience in order to succeed at the tasks. 
However, they had difficulty recalling this experience. Specifically, they found it harder to 
recall verbal information than knowledge that they had gained through self-experience. 
However, remembering the pre-trial experience is only really necessary if children are 
asked a non-referencing “which one” question. If children are asked if it is “the red one” 
that is hidden then they do not have to re-experience their initial contact with the balls. In 
this case the information in the question directs them towards the appropriate answer. 
Children could just associate the correct sense modality (e.g., looking) with finding the 
perceptual information mentioned (e.g., red).  
The current research has demonstrated that children do not always use this 
perceptual information in the test question to help them succeed at the task. The results 
from Experiment 7 indicated that 4-year-olds relied on this information, but only because 
they had real difficulty recalling their pre-trial experience. In this study it was particularly 
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clear that children could not recall their pre-trial experience. They were unable to remember 
what actions they had just used when they had handed the items back to the experimenter. 
In Experiments 2 and 3 it was also shown that children could use the perceptual 
information in the test question, but this time it appeared to be as a prompt to recall their 
pre-trial experience. However, in Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (and other experiments when the 
simple test question was used) a different pattern of behaviour became apparent. Despite 
the enormous hint in the question (e.g., “find the red one”) the children tested here still 
attempted to recall information from their pre-trial experience to succeed at the task. Even 
when they struggled with recalling the PD information in Experiment 4 they did not realise 
that they could succeed at the task by attending to the information in the test question. Even 
when they had difficulty recalling the verbal information in Experiments 5 and 6, they did 
not realise that they could succeed at the task by just associating the quality mentioned in 
the test question with the appropriate action.  
So it seems that children cannot reliably make use of the perceptual information 
they are told in the test question. They do not always recognise when this verbal 
information can help them. They also have difficulty recalling verbal information from 
their pre-trial experience. Consequently, the problem that these children have with 
aspectuality tasks is not only with remembering verbal information (as proposed 
previously). The trouble that these children have with aspectuality tasks is also in knowing 
when verbal information is useful to them and when it is unimportant. In summary, they 
have difficulty both recalling verbal information and recognising the usefulness of verbal 
information.  
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What must be considered now is how this problem with verbal information relates 
to young children‟s understanding of aspectuality. Does it demonstrate a lack of robustness 
in their understanding? Or is it a separate difficulty that causes them to perform poorly on 
these tasks? As mentioned previously, there is evidence that children under the age of 8 
years can have difficulty rehearsing articulatory information (e.g., Kemps et al., 2000). This 
would include information they have been told and are trying to remember. Also, young 
children can have more difficulty recalling verbal information than other types of 
information (e.g., Gobbo et al., 2002; Murachver et al., 1996) although this is not always 
the case (e.g., McGuigan & Salmon, 2005). There is also research showing that young 
children do not treat verbal information as a valid source of knowledge, for example, by 
attributing ignorance to someone who had been told of an item‟s identity (Pillow, 1989; 
Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Perner, 1988; Woolley & Wellman, 1993).  
The examples just described demonstrate that young children can have trouble 
recalling verbal information and recognising its importance. Therefore, these difficulties are 
not specific to tasks assessing understanding of aspectuality. They are apparent when other 
cognitive processes are being tested. Consequently, young children‟s difficulties with 
verbal information are not a demonstration of how aspectuality is misunderstood. They do 
not reveal the lack of robustness of young children‟s understanding of aspectuality. Rather, 
they are performance problems that become apparent while children‟s understanding of 
aspectuality is being tested. 
The next section will discuss how the findings generated by the current research 
relate to the existing aspectuality literature. The way that future research might tackle these 
issues will also be addressed.    
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7. Methodological and Theoretical Implications 
Aspectuality understanding requires comprehension of the modality specific aspects 
of knowledge (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner, 1991). For example, understanding that if 
you want to find out the colour of something then you will need to look, and realising that 
other forms of perceptual access will not give you the information that you need. From this 
it would appear that demonstrating an understanding of aspectuality involves recognition of 
the modality specific aspects of knowledge and the ability to make active use of this 
knowledge. Knowing how to discover particular perceptual information would be the 
important skill here. The current research has focussed on children‟s ability to find out 
specific perceptual information, for example, whether an item is red or blue. 
In some of the aspectuality tasks that have featured in the literature, however, young 
children are not only required to find out particular perceptual information. They are also 
required to recall information. For example, they are asked “which” of two items is hidden 
and must remember how they discovered the difference between them (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 
1992; Robinson et al., 1997). However, it is argued here that if you genuinely understand 
what perceptual action is needed to find out specific perceptual information, then your 
ability to remember a particular experience is irrelevant. If you understand how to gain 
knowledge then why should your ability to recall information even be considered? 
Understanding aspectuality does not have to include recall. If understanding 
aspectuality just means knowing what perceptual action leads to specific perceptual 
information, then children do not need to have pre-trial experience of the items. If they 
know what action they need to take to find out particular information then that is enough. 
  General Discussion
  
  
149 
 
Their poor abilities in dealing with and recalling verbal information should not become an 
issue. If, on the other hand, understanding aspectuality means more than this, then recall 
might be important. If understanding aspectuality means being able to figure out how items 
differ perceptually and then what perceptual action is needed to identify which one is 
hidden, then children do need to be able to recall their pre-trial experience.  
A further consideration must be how adults would respond to aspectuality tasks and 
whether they would show the same tendencies as young children. Considering the 
functioning of a mature understanding of aspectuality could reveal more about its 
development.  For example, if adults were to show any difficulties with aspectuality tasks, 
would those difficulties be in recognising the relevance of verbal information? Or would 
different processes be involved? Future research could answer these questions by 
comparing children‟s and adult‟s performance on functionally similar aspectuality tasks. 
So, what must be established now is how a genuine understanding of aspectuality 
should be assessed: whether it requires knowing how to find out perceptual information, or 
whether it requires being able to figure out, remember, and then find out perceptual 
information. As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, the main difference between 
children‟s and adult‟s use of sources of knowledge is that adults tend to make their 
judgements spontaneously, without explicit reflection (e.g., Flavell, 2000). Also, 
aspectuality tasks that have allowed children to repeat perceptual actions that they have 
previously carried out have been criticised (e.g., Robinson, Haigh, & Pendle, 2008). This is 
because children could succeed at these tasks by replicating behaviour, rather than really 
understanding the importance of specific perceptual access as evidence for knowledge 
states. If children need to recall their self-directed pre-trial experience to succeed at an 
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aspectuality task (Perner & Ruffman, 1995) then they could be just replicating their 
behaviour and not understanding aspectuality.  
It seems that in the future aspectuality understanding should be assessed 
spontaneously, without the need for reflection. The emphasis should be on asking young 
children to find out perceptual information, rather than asking them to recall it. Only then 
can their genuine understanding of the modality specific aspects of knowledge be 
evaluated. 
 
8. Relation to ToM and Other Cognitive Processes  
In the introduction to this thesis the link between understanding sources of 
knowledge and understanding other cognitive processes was reviewed. It was suggested 
that comprehension of aspectuality and possession of a ToM relied on the recognition of the 
importance of sources of knowledge. To succeed at aspectuality tasks children have to 
understand what perceptual action will give them the knowledge they need. To succeed at 
ToM tasks children have to understand how someone‟s belief is based on the evidence from 
knowledge gained. The two abilities are therefore intricately connected. They demonstrate 
that understanding how to gain knowledge is associated with understanding how 
knowledge has been gained. While the current research focussed on young children‟s 
understanding of how to gain knowledge, both abilities rely on a comprehension of the 
importance of evidence in forming beliefs.  
Evidence is not only important for understanding aspectuality and ToM. It is also 
important for scientific thinking (Pillow et al., 2000), evaluation of truth (Robinson et al., 
1999; Robinson, Haigh, & Nurmsoo, 2008), and social interaction (Gopnik & Astington, 
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1988; Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). Therefore, the present findings have wider implications than just 
understanding of aspectuality. Young children‟s difficulty in recalling and recognising the 
importance of verbal information could influence their performance in all these areas. It is 
possible that young children‟s understanding has been underestimated because of their 
problems in dealing with verbal information. Future research should allow for such 
difficulties when assessing children‟s abilities. 
Experimental designs that allow for performance difficulties can reveal more about 
young children‟s implicit understanding. For example, assessing non-verbal or preferential 
looking responses showed that children younger than expected can understand another 
person‟s false belief (Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005). Even these infants and pre-school children appeared to understand the 
role of evidence in understanding beliefs. It is possible that using less demanding methods 
(e.g., requiring no verbal information or recall) when assessing understanding of other 
knowledge states would result in younger children than expected succeeding at these tasks.  
The results of the research carried out for this thesis demonstrate young children‟s 
difficulty in understanding and remembering verbal information. It was mentioned earlier 
how young children had specific difficulty dealing with indirect references to items 
(Apperly & Robinson, 1998, 2002). It was also shown how children did not always seem to 
recognise the relevance of verbal information (Experiments 4, 5, & 6). It is possible that 
young children treat being told information as an indirect knowledge source whereas 
looking and feeling are treated as direct. In other words, children behave as though hearing 
information is like making an inference; both sources are indirect and both require 
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additional cognitive effort. It has been shown that children do not successfully recognise 
inference as a valid source of knowledge until they are at least 8 years of age (Pillow et al., 
2000). It is possible that recognising verbal information as a valid source of knowledge is a 
similarly later development in young children‟s understanding of knowledge sources. 
In summary, the results of the current research not only have implications for how 
aspectuality is tested in the future. They should also be considered when children‟s 
understanding of other knowledge states and beliefs are being assessed. It is possible that 
young children‟s performance on other tasks is influenced by their difficulty in recalling 
and recognising the usefulness of verbal information.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to discover the limitations of young children‟s 
understanding of sources of knowledge. The existing literature had suggested the age at 
which children could succeed at aspectuality tasks (e.g., O‟Neill et al., 1992; Perner, 1991) 
but had not considered whether, once apparent, this understanding was robust. The findings 
from the current research have enhanced the extant research in several ways. It is now 
apparent that young children‟s understanding of aspectuality is robust across contextual 
situations; they are just as able to discover information about a single hidden item as locate 
an item amongst many that are hidden. It has also been shown that 4-year-olds can perform 
well at basic aspectuality tasks, younger than previously thought. Nevertheless, if an 
aspectuality task requires a 4-year-old to find out “which one” is hidden, then they perform 
badly. This result, among others reported in this thesis, demonstrates that children‟s success 
at aspectuality tasks is associated with their ability to recall their pre-trial experience, 
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supporting Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) hypothesis. However, the current research has 
added to Perner and Ruffman‟s (1995) theory by establishing that it is not the experience as 
a whole that is the cause of the problem. Rather, young children have specific difficulty in 
recalling verbal information. They also encounter problems in realising when verbal 
information can be useful to them, for example, when the target is specifically referred to in 
the test question.  
In conclusion, young children have difficulty in recalling verbal information and 
recognising when verbal information is useful to them. These specific impediments prevent 
children succeeding at tasks assessing aspectuality. The difficulties they have in dealing 
with verbal information limit their ability to demonstrate their understanding of sources of 
knowledge. Consequently, even at the age of 6 years, their comprehension of aspectuality 
should not be described as robust but rather as vulnerable to certain performance 
restrictions. As a result, future research should consider assessing children‟s active 
understanding of aspectuality, rather than relying on methods that require reflection. 
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APPENDIX  
CROSS TABULATIONS FOR LOOKING AND FEELING RESPONSES  
 
Experiment 1 discovery task (5-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 1 0 2 
1 3 6 10 19 
2 1 2 12 15 
Total 5 9 22 36 
 
 
Experiment 1 discovery task (6-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 2 1 3 
1 0 1 7 8 
2 0 3 22 25 
Total 0 6 30 36 
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Experiment 1 location task (5-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 2 0 3 
1 2 8 8 18 
2 3 3 9 15 
Total 6 13 17 36 
 
 
Experiment 1 location task (6-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 2 2 5 
1 0 4 5 9 
2 0 4 18 22 
Total 1 10 25 36 
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Experiment 2 simple question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 2 2 4 
1 0 5 1 6 
2 0 1 5 6 
Total 0 8 8 16 
 
Experiment 2 complex question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 5 5 
1 1 2 0 3 
2 0 2 4 6 
Total 1 4 9 14 
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Experiment 3 FD simple question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 1 3 4 
1 3 10 5 18 
2 3 9 12 24 
Total 6 20 20 46 
 
Experiment 3 PD simple question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 1 1 2 
1 3 12 2 17 
2 8 12 7 27 
Total 11 25 10 46 
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Experiment 3 FD complex question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 4 1 6 
1 1 14 4 19 
2 2 6 13 21 
Total 4 24 18 46 
 
 
Experiment 3 PD complex question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 2 1 5 8 
1 3 10 3 16 
2 5 9 8 22 
Total 10 20 16 46 
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Experiment 4 PD task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 3 3 7 
1 2 4 2 8 
2 4 6 7 17 
Total 7 13 12 32 
 
 
Experiment 4 ND task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 2 2 
1 1 2 4 7 
2 4 8 11 23 
Total 5 10 17 32 
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Experiment 5 no experience task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
3 0 0 2 3 3 8 
4 0 0 1 4 6 11 
Total 0 0 7 9 9 25 
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Experiment 5 verbal experience task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 2 0 1 4 
2 0 0 3 3 0 6 
3 0 0 2 4 4 10 
4 0 1 1 1 2 5 
Total 0 2 8 8 7 25 
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Experiment 5 self experience task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2 0 1 0 1 0 2 
3 0 0 0 5 1 6 
4 1 1 1 10 3 16 
Total 1 2 1 16 5 25 
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Experiment 5 combined experience task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 2 3 
2 0 1 1 2 1 5 
3 0 1 2 6 2 11 
4 0 1 0 1 4 6 
Total 0 4 3 9 9 25 
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Experiment 6 no experience task (5-year-olds) 
 
  
 
 
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2 0 1 3 1 0 5 
3 0 1 3 2 1 7 
4 0 0 2 3 5 10 
Total 0 2 8 7 6 23 
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Experiment 6 verbal experience task (5-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
2 0 3 2 2 1 8 
3 3 0 3 1 1 8 
4 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 3 4 6 4 4 21 
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Experiment 6 relevant experience task (5-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 2 1 1 0 4 
2 0 4 3 2 0 9 
3 0 0 1 0 1 2 
4 0 0 0 1 3 4 
Total 0 6 5 4 5 20 
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Experiment 6 no experience task (6-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 2 0 2 
2 0 0 0 1 1 2 
3 0 1 0 0 2 3 
4 0 0 2 2 6 10 
Total 0 1 2 5 9 17 
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Experiment 6 verbal experience task (6-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2 0 1 2 0 0 3 
3 0 0 2 3 2 7 
4 0 0 1 2 3 6 
Total 0 1 5 6 5 17 
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Experiment 6 relevant experience task (6-year-olds) 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 2 0 1 3 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
3 0 0 0 1 0 1 
4 0 1 1 2 7 11 
Total 0 1 5 4 8 18 
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Experiment 7 aspect question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 4 3 7 
2 1 3 8 12 
Total 1 8 11 20 
 
 
Experiment 7 dimension question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 0 1 0 1 
1 2 6 1 9 
2 2 4 4 10 
Total 4 11 5 20 
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Experiment 7 identity question task 
 
  
Correct number of feeling trials 
Total 
  0 1 2 
Correct number of 
looking trials 
  
0 1 5 1 7 
1 3 2 2 7 
2 5 0 1 6 
Total 9 7 4 20 
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